Essays In United States Social Security Policy by Armour, Philip
ESSAYS IN UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY
POLICY
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Philip Ogden Armour
August 2014
c© 2014 Philip Ogden Armour
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ESSAYS IN UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY
Philip Ogden Armour, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2014
My dissertation examines the effects that US Social Security policy changes have
on labor supply and application behavior. In my first chapter, I use survey data
matched to administrative records to measure the effect of a natural experi-
ment in the provision of information - the introduction of the Social Security
Statement - on Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) application behavior.
I find that receipt of the Statement, a document gradually introduced in the
1990s which contained personalized information on all Social Security bene-
fits, had a positive, substantial, and statistically significant effect on DI appli-
cation, amounting to a 62% increase over the base rate. The overall effect was
entirely driven by individuals reporting a work-limiting condition who were
previously not employed. Furthermore, my analysis shows no evidence of ap-
plicants “shifting forward” their DI application. In the absence of these new
applicants, the 32% growth rate of the per-capita DI rolls from 1995-2004 would
have been approximately 25%, a 20% drop. My second chapter examines the im-
pact of the Statement on individuals approaching retirement who are still work-
ing. I find that the effects are mixed: individuals working few hours per week
prior to Statement receipt markedly increase their hours worked, while those
working full time or more decrease their hours. However, it appears that indi-
viduals misunderstood that the Statement provided a retirement benefit projec-
tion based on constant earnings going forward. After second Statement receipt,
those who previously decreased their labor supply then increased it. My third
chapter uses program interactions between the two federal disability programs
- DI and Supplemental Security Income - to estimate labor supply elasticities of
DI beneficiaries. Given wide variation in SSI state supplements temporally and
geographically and temporal variation in DI parameters, otherwise similar DI
beneficiaries may face a 50% or 0% disability benefit reduction rate. This varia-
tion in marginal rate allows for a direct calculation of labor supply responsive-
ness to such a rate change. My elasticity estimates - the first for US disability
beneficiaries based on differences in benefit reduction rates - are inelastic and
low, ranging from -0.14 to -0.36 for the participation elasticity.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN DISABILITY INSURANCE
APPLICATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT
PHASE-IN
1.1 Introduction
A recent and growing body of research documents that lack of knowledge about
social programs, taxes, and savings options can result in individuals leaving a
substantial amount of money on the table (Bettinger et al. 2009). Information is
at the core of economic decision-making; however, many policies of both busi-
nesses and governments assign secondary importance to information provision.
The general conclusion of the existing research is that timely and relevant infor-
mation can be a highly cost-effective way to increase take-up among a target
population (Duflo et al. 2006, Bhargava and Manoli 2011, Chetty et al. 2012).
This information often has heterogeneous effects, allowing subpopulations to
“catch-up” to those groups already participating at high levels (Chetty and Saez
2009, Chetty et al. 2012, Hoxby and Turner 2012, Liebman and Luttmer forth-
coming).
This paper, to my knowledge, is the first to look at a natural experiment in
information provision with regard to Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
decision-making: the introduction of the Social Security Statement. This doc-
ument provided information on the suite of Social Security benefits, including
DI coverage status and potential DI benefit. Starting in 2000, the Statement was
mailed annually to all workers 25 and older, with over 149 million Statements
sent out in 2008, representing a massive information intervention. I exploit the
1
gradual introduction of the Statement in the mid-1990s to estimate how DI ap-
plication decisions change after Statement receipt. I find that people react very
strongly to the Statement, increasing their application rate by 62% over the base
rate, and this increase is driven entirely by those not employed and reporting a
work-limiting condition. These results indicate that information about person-
alized program benefits can substantially affect the decisions of those consider-
ing DI application, affecting both the targeting of DI and the size of the program
itself.
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), the largest income replacement pro-
gram for working-age adults in the US, faces impending insolvency. The Social
Security Board of Trustees projects that under current policy, the DI trust fund
will be unable to cover its obligations by 2016. One of the factors in this insol-
vency is that the DI program, which accounts for over 15% of total payments of
the Old Age, Survivor’s, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and covers
over 8 million beneficiaries, has experienced a marked rise in its rolls in the past
few decades. The number of individuals receiving DI as a percentage of the
working age population was 2.3% in 1980. In 2011, this fraction was 4.7% (Daly
et al. 2013). Much of this growth occurred during the 1990s, as shown in per-
capita terms in Figure 1.1, with the rise in these rolls as a fraction of working-age
adults increasing over 50% between 1995 and 2008.
Chief among the explanations for this increase are demographic and policy
changes: the aging of the population, increasing labor force participation among
women leading to greater DI eligibility rates, and the increase in the Social Se-
curity retirement age. However, these explanations together explain only about
50% to 60% of the growth in the per-capita DI rolls (Daly et al. 2013, Duggan
2
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Figure 1.1: Growth in DI Disabled Worker Rolls as a 
Fraction of the Working-Age Population, 1990-2011
Source: FRED Series USAWFPNA and Social Security Administration Annual Statistical Supplement 2013
and Imberman 2009). Explanations for the remaining growth are numerous, al-
beit smaller in impact: the additional costs of hiring and continuing to employ
disabled individuals imposed on employers by the American with Disabilities
Act in 1990, the welfare reform of the mid-1990s that shifted some individu-
als from Aid to Families with Dependent Children to DI, easing of eligibility
standards and increasing use of vocational factors in disability determination,
and a combination of structural changes in the labor market that negatively im-
pact low-skill workers and increased the generosity of the DI program for lower
wage workers (Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003, Autor and Duggan 2003, Dug-
gan and Imberman 2009). Depending on the particular estimates one takes from
these studies, there remains a small to a substantial unexplained portion of the
recent increase in DI rolls.
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No previous work has examined the role of the Social Security Statement,
and the massive provision of information to the DI-covered population starting
in the mid-1990s it represents, in the rise of the DI rolls. This Statement was
sent out to specific age groups in different years. The first age group to receive
a Statement was all workers 60 and older in 1995. Younger and younger age
groups were then sent Statements from 1996 to 1999, until from 2000 onward it
was sent to all individuals over the age of 25 (see Figure 1.2 for the timing of
the Statement’s provision). Contained in the Statement was personalized in-
formation about Social Security benefits: projected retirement benefits given
a constant earnings rate, Disability Insurance coverage status and, if covered,
corresponding benefit upon immediate application, and survivor’s benefits for
one’s family (see the Appendix for an example Statement). Therefore, this State-
ment represents a near-universal provision to eligible individuals of otherwise
difficult-to-obtain personalized information about DI benefits that is of imme-
diate relevance to workers.
Research on the application decisions of individuals with work-limiting con-
ditions shows that many are on the margin of DI application and may be af-
fected by information. For example, most individuals wait a significant period
of time after experiencing disability onset and applying for a disability program.
The mean application delay between initial onset and DI application for men is
4 years (Burkhauser et al. 2004). Previous work on variation in the generosity
of DI, access to health insurance, and interactions with other programs demon-
strate (Autor and Duggan 2003, Rutledge 2012, Maestas et al. 2014) the exis-
tence of a substantial group of “conditional applicants,” who have a qualifying
medical disability but apply for DI only under certain conditions. Although
no previous work has examined whether information can influence these “con-
4
Figure 1.2: Social Security Statement Phase-In Schedule
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
61 and Older X X X
60 X X X X X X X
58-59 X X X
53-58 X X X
47-53 X X X
40-47 X X X
25-40 X X
135.6
SSA Fiscal Year
Note: SSA Fiscal Years are October of the preceding calendar year to September of the stated year. No Statements 
were sent out before Fiscal Year 1995, and all individuals with Social Security Numbers age 25 and over received a 
Statement from 2000 to 2011.
Total Statements 
Sent (millions) 0 7 5.5 12.4 20.7 26.6 134.7
ditional applicants,” work on the take-up of other social programs has shown
the important role of information in the likelihood of application (Meyers and
Heintze 1999, Currie 2004, Chetty et al. 2012).
Using the Health and Retirement Study panels matched to Social Security
Administration earnings and beneficiary records, I estimate the impact of State-
ment receipt on DI application rates for an individual in a given year. Be-
cause the Statement was phased-in according to age group, with different co-
horts receiving Statements in different years, I control for unobservable trends
in DI application by comparing the behavior of adjacent, otherwise identical, co-
horts. I find that the Intent-to-Treat of the Statement has a statistically significant
and substantial effect on the likelihood of DI application among older workers,
amounting to an increase of about 1.3 percentage points per two-year period
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in the general DI-covered population, representing an approximately 62% in-
crease.
When the effect is decomposed by health condition, it becomes clear that
the overall estimated increase masks heterogeneity. There is a small but sta-
tistically insignificant decrease in DI application among the general population
after Statement receipt, but those individuals with self-reported work-limiting
conditions increased their marginal likelihood to apply for DI by 11 percent-
age points, more than double their base rate. When further decomposed, this
large effect is entirely due to work-limited individuals who were previously not
working. Additionally, there is no decrease in the average rate of acceptance of
applicants onto the rolls, nor is there evidence that this increase in applicants is
due to individuals who would eventually apply for DI “shifting forward” their
DI application decision. Although the Statement’s effect attenuates with older
individuals, it is still positive and significant, and the effect does not become
negative as time after Statement receipt passes, both of which indicate that the
overall propensity to apply for DI has risen post-Statement.
Because these are new applicants, a portion of the rise in the DI rolls during
the period of this analysis (1992-2004) can be attributed to the provision of the
Statement. Reducing the actual DI awards by age group from 1995 to 2004 by
the estimated number of applicants induced to enter due to Statement receipt
(or more specifically, the fraction of these induced applicants who are accepted
onto the rolls), I find that the 32% rise in the per-capita DI rolls from 1995 to
2004 would have been 7 percentage points lower. That is, about 20% of the
increase over this period can be explained by the provision of the Social Security
Statement.
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The significant application and entrance effects point to the importance of
informational costs in DI, suggesting that information provision is an important
policy lever among the population covered by DI.1 This paper contributes to
the growing field that analyzes the salient factors in the DI application decision
(Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003, Autor and Duggan 2003), as well as the more
general role of information in social program application and take-up (Currie
2004, Bettinger et al. 2009, Chetty et al. 2012). By demonstrating the import of
this information in increasing DI rolls so markedly, this paper provides a new
explanation for part of the large rise in the DI rolls observed in recent decades.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant
features of Disability Insurance; Section 3 describes the structure of the Social
Security Statement’s phase-in; Section 4 describes the HRS-SSA matched data;
Section 5 presents the empirical methodology; Section 6 presents the results;
Section 7 estimates the implied effect on the growth in DI rolls; while Section 8
concludes. An example Statement is available in the Appendix.
1.2 Disability Insurance
Social Security Disability Insurance is the largest disability program in the US.
It is part of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance social insurance,
commonly known as Social Security. However, instead of providing retirement
income, it insures workers’ earnings in the event of the onset of a work-limiting
condition. This condition must reduce earnings potential under a Substantial
1As of 2012, the Social Security Administration is no longer automatically sending out a
personalized Statement to every American over 25 due to budgetary considerations; however,
they are still available upon request. Furthermore, a recent Social Security Advisory Board
position paper has argued for the reintroduction of automatic Statement provision.
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Gainful Activity level, as well as be expected to last at least 12 months or result
in death.
Benefit determination for DI follows many of the same rules as Social Secu-
rity Old Age Insurance (OAI) benefits. However, to qualify for DI benefits, a po-
tential beneficiary must be both medically eligible and satisfy DI’s recent-work
requirement, and because DI is designed for working-age adults, the coverage
requirements and benefit determination differ depending on age. For example,
while retirement benefits are based on the 35 years of highest indexed earnings,
DI benefits are based on between 2 and 35 years of indexed earnings, depend-
ing on age at time of application. Since the parameters for DI coverage and
benefits are based on age in addition to the earnings and overall wage growth
factors used in the calculation of retirement benefits, an individual faces signfi-
cant informational costs in determining his or her coverage status and potential
benefit.
The medical eligibility is based on both the nature and severity of the im-
pairment, as well as earnings capacity. If applicants’ conditions are not in the
Listings of Impairments, then their work capacity is evaluated. In order to be
eligible, they must be unable to earn above a Substantial Gainful Activity level,
at $1,040 per month for non-blind individuals in 2013. See Burkhauser and Daly
(2011) for a full description of this process.
The second requirement for DI entry, the recent-work requirement, is age de-
pendent. For example, a 20-year-old applicant must have earned 6 Quarters of
Coverage in the most recent 3 years (12 quarters), while a 50-year-old applicant
needs to have earned 20 Quarters of Coverage (QCs) in the most recent 10 years
(40 quarters). In 2013, a QC was allocated for each whole multiple of $1,160 of
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earnings, with up to 4 QCs earned per year. The historical income levels that
define a Quarter of Coverage and the schedule describing the requirement at
different ages are available in the Social Security Administration Annual Statis-
tical Supplement;2 it suffices to note that since the income requirement for QCs
changes with the National Average Wage Index and the age of the applicant,
the complexities of DI coverage represent a significant knowledge barrier. For
the remainder of the paper, I refer to this eligibility requirement as DI coverage
to distinguish it from medical eligibility, a condition I cannot fully observe, al-
though for which self-reporting of a work-limiting condition has been shown to
be an unbiased proxy (Benitez-Silva et al. 2004a).
Since DI is a social insurance program, a potential program participant’s ben-
efit level is dependent on previous earnings, related to how much they have
paid into the program. Disability Insurance follows the same calculation pro-
cess as Old Age Insurance, first determining an Average Indexed Monthly Earn-
ings (AIME) based on a given number of computation years, which is then
translated into a monthly benefit through the progressive Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA) schedule.3 However, of particular note is that the number of
computation years - years of earnings that are indexed to wage growth and
then averaged to determine the AIME - varies depending on the age of the ap-
plicant. As stated above, the number of computation years can be as low as 2
and as high as 35, again adding a layer of computational complexity on top of
the already complex OAI benefit calculation process.4
2Available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/
3The exact structure of the AIME and PIA computation process is also available in the Annual
Statistical Supplement.
4The DI benefit calculation formula at the Normal Retirement Age corresponds to the Old
Age Insurance formula. Therefore, at this age, individuals on DI are transferred from DI to
OASI automatically and continue to receive the same benefit, while any potential DI applicants
instead face the choice of when to collect their retirement benefits.
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Mastrobuoni (2011) reviews older Americans’ inaccurate knowledge of their
own OAI benefits, finding that older Americans have a poor understanding of
their OAI benefits, although this knowledge improves as a worker nears re-
tirement. Since DI’s benefit and eligibility structures have additional layers of
complexity, knowledge of coverage and benefit level is most likely even lower.
Although one’s DI coverage status and potential benefit can be learned by ei-
ther visiting a SSA office during business hours and requesting this information
or by visiting SSA’s website and using their benefit calculator, the former repre-
sents a definite transaction cost while the latter was unavailable over the time
period studied here, and even now, requires the input of one’s previous earn-
ings in every calendar year. Therefore, the automatic and yearly distribution of
a document showing DI coverage and potential benefit represents a dramatic
reduction in the cost of acquiring this information. Since informational costs
have previously been shown to be relevant in depressing take-up of other social
programs (Meyers and Heintze 1999, Bhargava and Manoli 2011), distribution
of previously difficult to acquire DI information, presented in a clear context,
may be expected to change DI application behavior if lack of information is an
important factor.
Information also may play a role in the sorting of which individuals choose
to apply. DI eligibility depends on two components: first, sufficient recent earn-
ings to qualify for DI coverage, and second, a medically qualifying disability.
Ascertaining the presence of the latter is an unavoidable noisy process admin-
istered by the Social Security Administration and state-level gatekeepers (see
Maestas et al. (2013) for a review of the determination process). A long-standing
literature in DI research has shown that this disability screening process results
in both acceptance of work-capable individuals and rejection of medically el-
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igible individuals. Much research has concentrated on the prevalence of the
former problem - accepting applicants who do not have a qualifying disability
- and found that between 15% and 50% of those accepted onto the rolls would
work if not receiving DI benefits, depending on disability type (Bound 1989,
Maestas et al. 2013). However, (Benitez-Silva et al., 2004b) show that although
approximately 20% of applicants accepted onto the rolls do not meet the statu-
tory disability requirements, 60% of applicants rejected do meet these require-
ments. Many of the stages of determination currently have long backlogs. If
self-sorting can become more efficient on the DI application margin, then these
backlogs and overall wait times for eligible individuals can decrease.
As discussed above, the DI rolls have increased markedly both in absolute
terms and as a fraction of the working-age population. Explanations abound for
this increase, with demographic and program shifts accounting for a majority
of the increase. There is still discussion as to what describes the remaining por-
tion, be it increasing program generosity for low-wage workers, employer disin-
centives to hire individuals with disabilities perversly created by the American
with Disabilities Act, or liberalization of the disability determination process.
However, there remains unexplained growth in these rolls, as well as a current
surfeit of papers illustrating that there are many more individuals on the mar-
gin of DI application than just those who have recently experienced a serious
health shock.
The above research demonstrates that there are many medically-eligible in-
dividuals on the margin of DI application, and changes in program generosity,
employment situation, and other social programs influence their application de-
cision. Moreover, many individuals exit the labor force for an extended period
11
of time to apply for DI, despite being eventually deemed ineligible for benefit
receipt. A previously unstudied factor that can affect both these facets of DI
application behavior is information about the program itself.
1.3 The Social Security Statement
Starting in 1990, the Social Security Administration began providing benefit
statements for all individuals who requested them, and starting in late 1994,
Statements were automatically sent out. These Social Security Statements even-
tually were automatically sent annually to all Americans 25 and older between
2000 and 2011 and contained personalized information about OASDI benefits
upon retirement, disability, or death. The Appendix contains a fictional exam-
ple Statement provided by SSA. In addition to providing information on these
benefits, the Statement also displays each worker’s historical covered earnings,
allowing for a Statement recipient to check whether SSA has a correct record
of his or her earnings history. Although previous research on the Statement
finds a lack of any compelling effect of this information on retirement behavior
and limited impact on OAI benefit knowledge (Mastrobuoni 2007, Biggs 2010,
Mastrobuoni 2011), the Statement is much more informative with regard to DI
decision-making, as will be discussed below, thus can be expected to have larger
impact on behavior.
Although the Statement has, until recently, been sent to those 25 and older, it
was phased in across different age groups in the late 1990s. The Statement was
initially sent out to those age 60 and over in 1995, as well as all those turning 60
from 1995 onward. Additionally, in 1996, they were automatically sent to those
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58 to 60; in 1997, 53 to 58; in 1998, 47 to 53; in 1999, 40 to 47; and in 2000, 25 and
over.5 Figure 1.2 illustrates which age groups received the Statement in which
Fiscal Year, as well as the total number of Statements sent out. This phase-in
schedule provides a natural experiment in the provision of information about
OASDI benefits in the late 1990s. Previous research on this Statement has shown
that once one controls for age and year, no other factors influence Statement
receipt (Mastrobuoni 2011).
The Statement describes retirement benefits, based on an earnings level con-
sistent with that of the past two years, if a retiree elects to receive benefits at
the Early Retirement Age (62), the Full Retirement Age (between 66 and 67,
depending on birth cohort), and age 70. It also states whether an individual’s
work experience provides coverage for Disability Insurance benefits, and if so,
what those benefits would be each month. The only previous research on the
effect of the Statement on Social Security behavior found no average change in
timing of collecting Old Age Insurance, nor any change in the responsiveness of
older Americans to the effect of additional earnings on these retirement benefits
(Mastrobuoni 2011).
Since retirement benefits are temporally removed from current decision-
making and may change considerably between the time of receipt (especially
with younger individuals) and the decision to begin receiving retirement bene-
fits, it is a priori unclear that a rational agent should react to this information. This
information is a snapshot of what these benefits might be at particular points in
the future but provides no information on how changes in earnings between
5The years described here correspond to SSA fiscal years, which start in October. The exact
timing of Statement receipt depends on one’s birth month, but approximately one third of those
60 and over received a Statement in 1994: those born October, November, or December 1994, or
January 1995.
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now and these future dates affect benefits. The DI benefit level in the Statement,
on the other hand, is the benefit available to individuals right now,6 which is
of immediate relevance to a different target population. Although the previous
research found no impact on retirement timing, the impact on DI behavior is a
distinct and largely unrelated empirical question, which this paper addresses
directly.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data Description
This paper uses the Health and Retirement Study panels, matched to Social Se-
curity earnings and benefits records. The HRS is a national panel survey of
individuals over age 50 and their spouses. The survey elicits information about
demographics, income, assets, health, cognition, job status and history, expec-
tations, and insurance and is administered by the Institute for Social Research
(ISR) at the University of Michigan. It consists of six cohorts:
1. The Initial HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 1941, first interviewed in
1992 and reinterviewed every 2 years;
2. AHEAD cohort, born before 1924, initially the separate Study of Assets
and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, first interviewed in 1993,
then in 1995, 1998, and subsequently every two years;
6Although the example Statement in the Appendix shows the DI benefit of someone covered
by DI, if one is not covered, then it simply states this lack of coverage, without displaying any
potential benefit information.
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3. Children of Depression (CODA) cohort, born 1924 to 1930, first inter-
viewed in 1998 and subsequently every two years;
4. War Baby (WB) cohort, born 1942 to 1947, first interviewed in 1998 and
subsequently every two years;
5. Early Baby Boomer (EBB) cohort, born 1948 to 1953, first interviewed in
2004;
6. Mid Baby Boomer (MBB) cohort, born 1954-1959, first interviewed in 2010.
For this analysis, I primarily use the initial cohort, as well as the AHEAD,
CODA, and WB cohorts, since the fifth and sixth cohorts enter after the State-
ment has been universally provided, and the last year I use in my sample is
2004. These panels are then matched to Social Security Respondent Cross-Year
Summary Earnings, for which the match rate is approximately 72% among the
cohorts I use, and 66% overall for the Initial Cohort (Mitchell et al., 1996). These
records provide earnings from 1951 to the year of the match. The match is im-
perfect due to two factors: approximately a quarter of respondents do not grant
permission to have their administrative records matched, while the remaining
unmatched individuals provided erroneous Social Security Numbers. Previous
research using these matched data show that for the Initial Cohort, the matched
subset is an unbiased subsample (Kapteyn et al. 2006, Michaud and Van Soest
2008). These earnings records include earnings histories only up to the year of
the match, corresponding to when a given individual enters the HRS panels,
after which I have only self-reported earnings. Additionally, individuals who
had their SSA records matched previously and were still in the panel in 2004
had their earnings and benefits records updated with information from the in-
tervening years.
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Additionally, I use self-reported DI application dates from the RAND HRS
file, since for much of my sample, administrative data has not been re-matched.7
For those for whom it has, the correlation between the two is above 0.8. There-
fore, these records provide historical earnings but are not updated for every
individual. The match to the administrative earnings records allows for the use
of historical earnings and Quarters of Coverage, as well as statutory rules on
the number of calculation years and QCs required by age, to assign DI coverage
status and DI PIA in either 1994 - before anyone received a Statement - or in the
last year of their match, whichever was earlier.8 This information allows for a re-
construction of the information appearing on each individual’s first Statement.
These variables were calculated before Statement receipt to avoid any possible
behavioral responses of Statement receipt on DI coverage and PIA, since these
values change depending on individual labor supply which the Statement can
influence. Disability Insurance coverage status and potential benefit are thus
constant for all within-person years.
Where possible, I use the RAND HRS file, a cleaned and standardized ver-
sion of the public-use HRS available publicly on the HRS website, for any HRS
panel question. The HRS asks individuals a range of questions relating to dis-
abilities. Specifically, in every wave, individuals are asked whether they have a
condition that limits work, as well as extensive questions on conditions that may
affect Activities of Daily Life, Instrumental Activities of Daily Life, the score on
7Although before wave 5 of the HRS (year 2000), there is not separate identification of ap-
plication for SSI, the other federal disability program, or DI, I limit my analysis to individuals
who are fully insured by SSDI. SSI applicants are also required to apply for any other benefits
they may be eligible for, including SSDI. Limiting one’s analysis to SSDI-insured individuals
has previously been used for isolating DI applicants in these earlier waves in the HRS for the
purpose of DI application (Li and Maestas 2008).
8For example, a member of the 1992 cohort who is not SSA rematched in 2004 has coverage
status based on their 1992 earnings while a 1992 cohort rematched in 2004 has a coverage status
based on earnings through 1994. The analysis presented below is robust to alterations in this
procedure.
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the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CESD) scale, and back prob-
lems. Each individual is asked if he or she has applied for DI, and if so, in what
year and month. These responses are used to determine whether an individual
has applied for DI since their last interview.9
For the purpose of this paper, the unit of analysis is the person-year, fol-
lowing the Allison (1984) survival framework. For each individual, there is a
separate observation for every interview date they were “at risk” of applying
for DI from 1992-2004, i.e. if they are alive, over 50 but under the Full Retire-
ment Age,10 have worked enough to obtain “Fully Insured” status, and have
not previously applied for DI or SSI. Individuals contribute an observation up
until and including the year in which they apply for DI or SSI.11 The binary de-
pendent variable, DI application, is then assigned the value 1, and individuals
contribute no further observations, since they are no longer at risk of applying
for DI. Table 1.1 shows the results of the above sample restrictions, with a final
count of 40,308 person-years, corresponding to 12,113 unique persons. Addi-
tionally, in Table 1.12, I analyze DI entrance. The analytic structure and sample
are identical in this part of the analysis, with the exception of the dependent
variable. For DI entrance, the dependent variable is 1 only if the person applied
for DI since the last interview and was eventually accepted onto the rolls and is zero
otherwise.
9Although application dates are available through the Respondent Cross-Year Benefits file,
the records in this file have the same limitation as the earnings records: they only provide
records up until an individual enters the HRS panel or if they stay in the panel until 2004.
10Because data on under-50 spouses of respondents are irregular, they are omitted from this
analysis. However, inclusion of these spouses does not change any of the results for other age
groups, and they appear largely unaffected by Statement receipt, although estimation of their
behavior is underpowered in this paper’s analytic framework. Moreover, these individuals are
outside of the sampling frame of the HRS, and thus their reactions cannot be interpreted as
representative of their segment of the population, i.e. they have zero weights in the HRS.
11Since SSI receipt requires individuals to apply for all other available programs for which
they may be eligible, individuals are no longer at risk of applying for DI after they have applied
for SSI: they have, in essence, applied for both.
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Table 1.1
Sample Construction
Sample selection restriction Remaining Person-years
Non-missing application data 62,948
Alive 62,267
Have not previously applied to DI/SSI 54,758
SSDI Fully Insured and between 50 and 64 40,308
Unique Persons 12,113
Statement receipt is defined as ever having received a Statement before the
current interview date. As soon as an individual receives a Statement, as cal-
culated using the rollout depicted in Figure 1.2 and in accordance with Mas-
trobuoni (2011)’s monthly-receipt schedule based on birth month and year, the
Statement receipt variable is 1 until they leave the sample. Since I have informa-
tion on month and year of birth, interview month and year, and DI application
month and year, I can determine if an individual has received a Statement prior
to an interview.12 However, if an individual both applies for DI and receives
12In the analysis below, I use variation between cohorts in Statement receipt to estimate an
information effect on DI behavior. It is possible to use intra-cohort variation, measuring the dif-
ference in DI application between two individuals born in the same year, but only one of whom
has received a Statement when he is interviewed. This source of variation would only measure
the immediate impact of information on DI application; my multiple-Statement analysis sug-
gests that the Statement’s effect is delayed by at least one year. Moreover, given the biennial
nature of the HRS, this estimation technique would be substantially underpowered; however,
I will use this intra-cohort technique to test the impact of Statement receipt on self-reporting
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a Statement since his last interview, but he applied for DI first, the Statement
receipt variable is 0.
Additionally, DI PIA quintile is calculated as the quintile of an individual’s
DI potential benefit in the distribution of DI benefits in the year of its calculation:
either when the individual enters the HRS panel or 1994, whichever is earlier.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of these main variables and control
variables used in this analysis, with the person-year as the unit of analysis, for
the entire sample used, the subsample that has not received a Statement, and
the subsample self-identifying a work-limiting condition.
1.5 Methodology
The primary question I address in this paper is whether showing individuals’
their DI coverage status and potential DI benefit affects their likelihood of ap-
plying for this program. These reactions have strong implications for the DI
program and individuals’ income: application to DI generally requires exit from
the labor force, while exits from DI to the labor force are rare, and even in the
event of denial, there is evidence of human capital decay during the lengthy DI
application and determination process (Autor et al. 2011).
However, in as much as added information allows potential applicants to
sort themselves along the DI application margin, if those who are more likely to
be accepted onto the rolls are induced to apply while those who are less likely
instead opt not to apply, this information provision can increase the coverage of
of health conditions, to determine if being informed of DI’s existence and one’s benefit makes
one’s health conditions more salient.
19
Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD
Has Received a Statement 58.5% 49.3%
Male 47.5% 49.9%
Years of Education 13.11 2.79
Initial Earnings 27174.14 42819.62
Initial PIA 870.68 292.83
Applied for Disability 2.8% 15.0%
Accepted onto Disability 2.2% 13.4%
Age 57.02 3.74
Any Work-Limiting Condition 12.8% 33.4%
Mean SD
Has Received a Statement 0 0
Male 47.9% 50.0%
Years of Education 12.85 2.85
Initial Earnings 25555.46 39414.21
Initial PIA 851.85 292.57
Applied for Disability 2.1% 11.5%
Accepted onto Disability 1.6% 10.1%
Age 56.54 3.44
Any Work-Limiting Condition 12.6% 33.2%
Mean SD
Has Received a Statement 59.2% 49.2%
Male 49.3% 50.0%
Years of Education 12.41 2.86
Initial Earnings 17568.12 19984.21
Initial PIA 800.40 295.62
Applied for Disability 18.5% 37.1%
Accepted onto Disability 15.6% 34.3%
Age 57.28 3.82
Any Work-Limiting Condition 1 0
Source: HRS Waves 1-7
Full Sample
Subsample with Work-Limiting Condition
Subsample with No Statement Receipt
the target population.
My analysis identifies the Intent-to-Treat effect of Statement receipt on DI
application, following the Allison (1984) person-year approach described above.
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This analytic structure allows me to estimate the effect of Statement receipt on
DI application as measured by the parameter β in the below linear-probability
model:
DI applicationit = α + βS itIS itXit + XitΛ + Yitγ + it (1.1)
where α is a constant, β is the coefficient vector of interest, and S it is ever hav-
ing received a Statement. Xit is a set of covariates that vary by person-year, in-
cluding marital status, educational level, and drop in the present value of OAI
benefits due to the rising Normal Retirement Age,13 The diagonal matrix IS it
changes depending on which Statement receipt interaction terms are included
in the particular specification. Yit is initially a set of indicators for each year and
age in the my sample, thus γ corresponds to fixed-effect coefficients controlling
for each age and year.14 All regressions two-way cluster standard errors at the
year and birthyear level (Cameron et al. 2011).
Because of the phase-in structure of the Statement, equation (1.1) estimates
the average effect of post-Statement receipt when controlling for the above co-
variates, as well as age and year fixed effects. Any time trends in DI application
common to all ages or time-invariant differences between age groups that oth-
erwise affect DI application in this period will be absorbed. For example, any
labor force changes that are common to all ages will be absorbed by the year
fixed effects, while differences in DI application rates by age are accounted for
by age fixed effects. Since the variation in the Statement is both by age and by
13This decline in present value is calculated using the methodology employed in (Duggan
et al., 2007), since during this time period, the rise in the Normal Retirement Age increased the
relative present value of DI benefits over OASI benefits. This change has been shown to affect
the likelihood of DI application over this time period and is thus included to prevent conflation
of this effect with Statement receipt (Duggan et al. 2007, Li and Maestas 2008).
14The analyses below employ a linear probability specification; however, logit analyses are
consistent with these results from the linear probability regressions, both qualitatively and in
the case of the overall increase in DI application, quantitatively, since logits estimate a 55% to
60% increase over the base rate.
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year, β can be interpreted as a set of difference-in-difference estimates that com-
pare changes in DI application rates across cohorts when workers of different
ages receive a Statement.
However, this difference-in-difference structure means that if there are any
age-specific time trends that are unrelated to Statement receipt but occur during
this time period, they will bias the coefficient on the Statement receipt variable.
Because of the potential for labor market changes affecting only those in par-
ticular age bins or changes in DI rules that disproportionately affect different
age groups (an example of such a change would be the accounting of vocational
factors in DI eligibility requirements concentrated among those above a cer-
tain age), I estimate additional specifications controlling for 5-year age-group-
specific year dummy variables. These 5-year age groups are overlapping but
not collinear with the Statement recipient age groups. For example, those 58-59
received a Statement in 1996, 53-58 in 1997, and 50-53 in 1998, while the age-
group controls are for those age 50-54 and 55-59. The staggering between the
two sets of age groups allows for identification of the effect of Statement receipt
separate from age-specific year fixed effects by comparing DI application rates
within age groups when one set of this age group receives a Statement. The
only remaining factors that may bias the Statement receipt coefficient would be
those almost exactly following the Statement phase-in schedule.15 These age
group specific year fixed effects are estimated using the following specification:
15In essence, I am exploiting the variation in timing of receipt between adjacent birth cohorts.
For example, of those born between 1935 and 1939, the first Statement could have been received
in 1995, 1996, or 1997. I then can control for separate year effects specifically for this 5-year age
group which will not be collinear with Statement receipt, isolating any trends common to the
5-year age group.
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DI applicationit = α + βS itIS itXit + XitΛ + (Age Group)itYeartγ + it (1.2)
where (Age Group)it is a vector of 5-year age group dummy variables, and Yeart
is a vector of year-specific dummy variables. Subsequent specifications also in-
clude Statement interaction terms with work-limited status, previous employ-
ment, other disability conditions, and potential DI benefit interaction terms.
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) both contain an important assumption of the role
of information on DI application decision-making - that the Statement reveals
the program’s existence and has a constant effect afterward. This assumption
is based on Mastrobuoni (2011)’s analysis and is common to most difference-in-
differences analyses, and although it allows for straightforward extrapolation
of the results to trends in the DI rolls, I will relax this assumption and allow
for a time-varying effect in Tables 1.10 and 1.11 of the Results Section below.
Furthermore, one can conceptually separate the information effect of the State-
ment on DI decision-making into two components: one is the revelation that the
program exists, and the second is the revelation of one’s potential benefit. The
former cannot decrease the likelihood of DI application in absolute terms, while
the second can. I will examine these distinct effects by estimating the impact
of the Statement along the distribution of DI benefits of the individuals in my
sample.
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1.6 Results
Table 1.3 presents the initial results from the above methodology. Specifically,
Columns 1 and 2 show the Statement coefficient estimates from the two above
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specifications over the entire sample, controlling for the demographic variables
and fixed effects discussed above in a linear probability framework. Column 3
goes on to restrict this analysis to the subsample that is DI covered before State-
ment receipt. From Column 1, which includes separate age and year dummy
variables for the entire HRS sample, DI-covered or not, to Column 3, where I
have separate year dummy variables for each 5-year age group and restrict my
sample to those DI-covered, the overall Statement receipt coefficient falls from
an increase in the two-year DI application rate of about 1.5 percentage point
down to 1.3 percentage points. Given the base two-year rate of pre-Statement
application of 2.1%, this marginal effect is an increase of about 62%. Since this
estimate is highly statistically significant across controls and samples, there is
clearly an aggregate effect of Statement provision on DI application propensity
in the population at large. The remaining analysis in this paper isolates for
whom and how the Statement affects DI application rates.
Column 4 shows the Statement receipt effect broken out into its impact on
those with and without a self-reported work-limiting condition in the interview
before the current wave. The likelihood of DI application among the work-
limited population, independent of Statement receipt, is higher by 9.7 percent-
age points. However, the previous Statement estimate among the entire popu-
lation was the average of a small and statistically insignificant, negative State-
ment impact on the entire sample and a large and statistically significant pos-
itive Statement impact on the work-limited sample. The Statement increases
this work-limited population’s DI application likelihood by about 11 percentage
points. Taking into account the overall effect of the Statement on this population
and its base-rate, this marginal increase amounts to a 96% rise in the likelihood
of DI application. Inasmuch as self-reported work-limiting conditions proxies
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for medical eligibility for DI benefits, the effect of Statement receipt shown in
Table 1.3 - resulting in higher application rates among the work-limited - repre-
sents an increase in the efficiency of the self-sorting process. The applicant pool
itself will have fewer misclassifications present on average, since prior work has
shown that self-identification of a work-limiting condition in the HRS is an un-
biased proxy for disability as defined by DI/SSI medical-disability determiners
(Benitez-Silva et al. 2004a).
Since these effects are large, one may be concerned that the age-group-
specific year dummies are not capturing other important policy shifts or secular
trends, and the estimated Statement coefficient is conflating the Statement’s ef-
fect with these non-informational trends. To address this concern, Column 5
includes interaction variables with the HRS question of whether a respondent
previously asked the Social Security Administration to calculate their retirement
benefits, a service first available in the early 1980s (Smith and Couch 2010). Al-
though the question does not ask about either when SSA was contacted or about
disability-related requests, DI coverage status and potential benefit level would
have been included with the information requested. The coefficients from this
column indicate that, indeed, prior knowledge about personalized OASDI ben-
efits attenuates the effect of Statement receipt, thereby rejecting the hypothesis
that these estimates entirely driven by non-informational trends correlated to
Statement receipt.
As a further falsification test, I construct leading Statement recent variable;
that is, a variable that mirrors Statement receipt but occurs one interview ear-
lier. Because this variable is similar to the Statement’s but does not actually
track its release, it provides a test as to whether my Statement variable isolates
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Table 1.4
(1) (2)
Statement Receipt 0.015** -0.0003
[0.005] [0.007]
Leading Statement Receipt 0.002 -0.003
[0.002] [0.006]
Work-Limiting Condition 0.091***
[0.022]
Statement X Work-Limiting Condition 0.098**
[0.042]
Leading Statement X Work-Limiting 0.031
[0.035]
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes
Fully Insured Only Yes Yes
No-Statement DI Application Mean
General Population 0.021 0.021
Person-Years 29039 29039
R-squared 0.014 0.141
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Application
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is the unit of 
analysis. Individuals followed until (inclusively) the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or Supplemental 
Security Income. Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years. Statement receipt defined as 
ever having received a Social Security Statement (except if applied for DI before Statement receipt). Work-limiting 
condition is self-reported work-limitation in the previous year. "Ever Asked" variable correponds to whether 
respondent answered that they had at some point contacted SSA for personalized retirement benefit information. All 
regressions control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to rising Normal 
Retirement Age. Sample limited to living, DI fully insured individuals (if indicated), age 50 to 64. "Leading Statement" 
defined as wave before first Statement receipt. Age Group X Year Dummies correspond to a separate dummy for 
each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in each year. Standard errors in brackets, twow-way clustered at the 
year and birthyear levels.
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Application, by Work-Limiting Condition and Lead 
Statement Receipt
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the information intervention or other trends. Table 1.4 shows the results of this
analysis for the general population and interacted with the work-limited popu-
lation. Both specifications show that there is no effect from this placebo variable,
while the Statement effect remains statistically unchanged.
Table 1.5
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Application by Work-Limiting Condition and Recent Work Status
(1) (2)
Statement Receipt -0.003 -0.001
[0.009] [0.002]
Working (lagged) -0.002
[0.002]
Statement X Working (lagged) -0.029
[0.060]
Work-Limiting Condition 0.097*** 0.108***
[0.019] [0.024]
Statement X Work-Limiting Condition 0.108*** 0.103***
[0.039] [0.041]
Work-Limiting X Working (lagged) -0.089***
[0.026]
Statement X Work-Limiting X Working (lagged) -0.094***
[0.039']
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes
Fully Insured Only Yes Yes
No-Statement DI Application Mean
General Population 0.021 0.021
Person-Years 40308 40308
R-squared 0.151 0.168
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Application
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is the unit of analysis. Individuals 
followed until (inclusively) the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security Income. Dependent 
variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years. Statement receipt defined as ever having received a Social Security 
Statement (except if applied for DI before Statement receipt). Work-limiting condition is self-reported work-limitation in the previous 
year. "Working" variable correponds to whether respondent answered that they were employed in the previous interview wave. All 
regressions control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to rising Normal Retirement Age. Sample 
limited to living, DI fully insured individuals (if indicated), age 50 to 64. Age Group X Year Dummies correspond to a separate 
dummy for each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in each year. Standard errors in brackets, two-way clustered at the year 
and birthyear levels.
I now turn to an examination of the heterogeneous effects of Statement re-
ceipt on subpopulations of my sample. Table 1.3 showed that the aggregate pos-
itive impact is the combination of a very large positive effect among the work-
limited population and a negative effect among the general population. Table
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1.5 shows this effect decomposed by work-status during the previous interview,
since one’s likelihood of exiting the labor force to apply for DI after receiving a
Statement may be mediated by whether one is currently working. Column 1
corresponds to the last column in Table 1.3 for ease of comparison, while Col-
umn 2 further breaks the effect down by work-limiting condition, finding that
the large increase in DI application likelihood of those with a work-limiting
condition is isolated to those not working who identify a work-limiting condi-
tion: the target population of the DI program. Statement receipt decreases the
likelihood of application of those without a work-limiting condition, indicating
greater match efficiency due to Statement receipt.
Table 1.6
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Application, by Education and Work-Limited Status
(1)
High School or Less X Statement -0.002
[0.007]
High School or Less X WL X Statement 0.152***
[0.040]
Any College X Statement -0.004**
[0.002]
Any College X WL X Statement -0.05
[0.038]
More than College X Statement -0.002
[0.002]
More than College X WL X Statement 0.015
[0.033]
Education and Education X WL Controls Yes
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes
Person-Years 40308
R-squared 0.163
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Application
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is the unit of 
analysis. Individuals followed until (inclusively) the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or 
Supplemental Security Income. Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years. Statement 
receipt defined as ever having received a Social Security Statement (except if applied for DI before Statement 
receipt). All regressions control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to rising 
Normal Retirement Age. Sample limited to living, DI fully insured individuals (if indicated), age 50 to 64. Age 
Group X Year Dummies correspond to a separate dummy for each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in 
each year. Standard errors in brackets, two-way clustered at year and birthyear levels.
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Table 1.6 provides another specification to test which are the responsive seg-
ments of this sample by breaking the effect by education level. The results are
stark: the increase in the likelihood of application amongst those with a work-
limiting condition is due entirely to those with a high-school education or lower,
while any negative effect that might be accruing in the general population de-
rives from those with a college degree or higher. This result is predictable: these
individuals with less education may be generally less informed about their suite
of Social Security benefits, and the straightforward provision of DI information
in the Statement is novel.
Although the overall positive effect is driven entirely by those with self-
reported work-limiting conditions, not all work-limiting conditions are alike.
Since the mid-1980s, the growth in DI rolls has not been uniform across disabil-
ing conditions: there have been disproportionate increases in musculoskeletal
conditions, largely related to pain, and non-retardation mental disorder cases
(Autor and Duggan 2006). Concern has arisen that the residual work capacity
of these new enrollees is disproportionately higher (Maestas et al. 2013). Be-
low, I address the question of whether those induced to enter the program by
Statement receipt skew toward these conditions.
I separate the Statement’s impact on differing disabling conditions, provid-
ing evidence on the mix of conditions amongst those responsive to Statement
receipt. To illustrate the prevalence and interaction of these conditions, Table
1.7 shows the cross-tabulations of disability frequency among the person-years
in the sample, both by absolute count and as a correlation matrix. The disabling
conditions that I include in my analysis are limitations to Activities of Daily
Living (e.g. eating, getting out of bed), limitations to Instrumental Activites
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Table 1.7
Matrix of Number of Individuals with Any Given Disability Reporting Another Disability
Counts
ADL iADL Mental Back Problem Work-Limiting
ADL 2464 565 1550 1212 1442
iADL 565 3568 770 1279 850
Mental 1199 579 8817 2690 2218
Back Problem 1212 1279 4304 9838 2400
Work-Limiting 1442 850 3183 2400 5735
Fraction of Row
ADL iADL Mental Back Problem Work-Limiting Total
ADL 1.00 0.23 0.63 0.49 0.59 2464
iADL 0.16 1.00 0.22 0.36 0.24 3568
Mental 0.14 0.07 1.00 0.31 0.25 8817
Back Problem 0.12 0.13 0.44 1.00 0.24 9838
Work-Limiting 0.25 0.15 0.56 0.42 1.00 5735
ADL - Activities of Daily Living (e.g. eating, getting out of bed)
iADL - Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (e.g. using cash, using a telephone)
Mental - Scoring above a 1 on the CESD scale
Work-limiting - Self-reporting any work-limiting condition
Source: Health and Retirement Study, Waves 1-7
A
n y
Any
Any
A
n y
of Daily Living (e.g. using a telephone, handling money), mental depression
conditions defined as scoring above a 1 on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression scale, reporting a back problem, and the previously used reporting a
health condition that limits the amount or kind of work the individual is capable
of. It is important to note these are independent categories and can be overlap-
ping or non-overlapping. For example, approximately 25% of those identifying
a work-limiting condition do not report an ADL, iADL, mental, or back condi-
tion. As such, there is independent variation across these conditions, allowing
for separate estimation of the Statement’s effect across these subpopulations.16
16Appendix Table 1.1 presents estimates of the likelihood of reporting such a condition due
to Statement-receipt alone by using the intra-cohort variation in the month of receipt relative
to birthmonth of interviewees. This variation arises because receipt of the Statement during
this time period generally occurs within three months of one’s birthmonth. Therefore, there
are individuals who are born in the same year (or even in the same month), but because of
the timing of their HRS interview, some of these individuals will have received a Statement
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when asked if they have a disabling condition, while others will not have. Exploiting this intra-
cohort variation in the relative timing of Statement receipt and HRS interview, I test whether
Statement receipt has a direct effect on reporting these disabling conditions. For ADL, iADL,
mental, or back conditions, there is no statistically significant difference in reporting before or
after Statement receipt within a cohort. On the other hand, for a work-limiting condition, there
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Table 1.8 presents the separate marginal effects on DI application of these
conditions and their interaction with Statement receipt. The first three columns
provide In Column 1, the Statement greatly increases the marginal likelihood of
DI application of individuals with either depression or a back problem. How-
ever, these increases disappear when including ADL- and iADL-reported ef-
fects, implying that their addition to DI application after Statement receipt is
channeled entirely through how they affect one’s daily life. Moreover, including
the Statement’s effect on the work-limited population reduces the Statement’s
effects on the ADL and iADL population although they retain their statistical
signficance.
The results in Table 1.8 show that the effect of Statement receipt on those with
mental or back conditions is small and significant only in so much as these con-
ditions interfere with an individual’s ability to work or conduct daily activities.
There is a much stronger Statement effect that independently impacts those with
conditions that interfere with Activities of Daily Living or Instrumental Activ-
ities of Daily Living, suggesting that the Statement increases the likelihood of
DI application disproportionately among those who are medically eligible for
the program. Additionally, the likelihood of DI application increases the more
ADLs or iADLs and individual reports, suggesting that the applicant on the in-
formation margin is disproportionately more disabled, in contrast to the finding
in the literature that the applicant on the acceptance margin is healthier.
Although the previous tables demonstrate that the presence of a work-
limiting disability has a clear mediating role in the impact of Statement receipt
may be a slight increase in the likelihood of reporting; however, the point estimate is an order
of magnitude lower than both the base-rate of reporting of a work-limiting condition and the
increase in DI application for those reporting a work-limiting condition, suggesting that the
vast majority of those responding to Statement receipt in Tables 1.3 and 1.8 are those previously
identifying such a condition.
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Table 1.9
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Application, by DI Benefit Quintile
(1) (2)
PIA Quintile
Bottom - -
- -
Second 0.0015 0.0014
[0.0016] [0.0016]
Middle -0.0016 -0.0017
[0.0014] [0.0015]
Fourth -0.0038* -0.0036
[0.0021] [0.0021]
Top -0.0071** -0.0068**
[0.0031] [0.0032]
PIA Quintile X Statement Receipt
Bottom -0.01 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Second -0.028 -0.03
[0.05] [0.05]
Middle -0.03 -0.031
[0.04] [0.04]
Fourth -0.03 -0.034
[0.04] [0.04]
Top -0.03 -0.031
[0.04] [0.04]
PIA Quintile X Work-Limited
Bottom 0.115*** 0.114***
[0.043] [0.043]
Second 0.087*** 0.087***
[0.016] [0.016]
Middle 0.113*** 0.113***
[0.017] [0.017]
Fourth 0.098*** 0.098***
[0.031] [0.031]
Top 0.078*** 0.079***
[0.014] [0.014]
PIA Quintile X Work-Limited X Statement Receipt
Bottom 0.079 0.076
[0.062] [0.061]
Second 0.128*** 0.125***
[0.033] [0.033]
Middle 0.148*** 0.145***
[0.038] [0.037]
Fourth 0.154*** 0.152***
[0.045] [0.045]
Top 0.06** 0.06**
[0.025] [0.025]
Age Fixed Effects Yes No
Year Fixed Effects Yes No
Age-Group X Year Fixed Effects No Yes
Person-Years 31598 31598
R-squared 0.182 0.187
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Application
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is 
the unit of analysis. Individuals followed until the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance 
or Supplemental Security Income. Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two 
years. Statement receipt defined as ever having received a Social Security Statement (except if 
applied for DI before Statement receipt). Work-limiting condition is self-reported work-limitation in 
the previous year. All regressions control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI 
benefits due to rising Normal Retirement Age. Sample limited to living, age 50 to 64, and those 
fully insured at the beginning of the sample. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the cohort-
year level.
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of DI application, this effect need not be uniform across potential DI benefit lev-
els. To this point, Table 1.9 reports the Statement’s effect along the potential DI
benefit, or Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), distribution. To estimate these ef-
fects, each individual is sorted into a PIA quintile based on their DI PIA in the
latest year before Statement receipt for which earnings histories are available.
These DI benefit quintiles are then interacted with work-limiting conditions and
Statement receipt. There is no statistically significant Statement effect at any PIA
quintile for the non-work-limited population.
The large positive impact on the work-limited population, on the other hand,
is not uniform across PIA quintiles: in absolute magnitude, the Statement’s ef-
fect is highest in the middle three quintiles and lowest for the top and bottom
quintiles. The second through fourth quintiles experience the greatest increase
over their baseline rate, while the top and bottom quintiles are the least affected,
the latter not statistically significantly at all. Given the progressive structure of
OASDI benefits, the bottom quintile has the lowest PIA benefit, while the top
quintile has the lowest replacement rate. The middle quintiles strike a balance
between these two extremes, so the group most responsive to Statement receipt
has both high PIA benefits and a high replacement rate.
Although the analysis thus far has estimated the impact of ever having re-
ceived a Statement on DI application, the phase-in schedule depicted in Figure
1.2 shows that not only is there variation in when an individual first receives a
Statement, but there is further variation in receipt of subsequent Statements. To
more precisely estimate the timing of the effect of Statement receipt on DI appli-
cation, I create more variables in addition to the current “Ever Having Received
a Statement” (now referred to as “At Least 1 Statement”). I include “At Least 2
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Statements” and “Years Since Last Statement” variables. This second variable is
broken down two ways - one, as a continuous variable, albeit containing only
three non-zero values (1,2,3), and two, as a dummy variable for each non-zero
value.
In order to exploit the variation present in both first and second Statement
receipt, I construct a yearly dataset instead of the biennual HRS interview fre-
quency. These data are correspondingly noisier and rely more heavily on the ac-
curacy of both Statement receipt and self-reported DI application dates, but they
allow for separate estimation of the diffusion of information on the DI applica-
tion decision, relaxing the previous assumption of a constant post-Statement
effect. Table 1.10 shows that for the subpopulation identifying a work-limiting
condition, the effect of the Statement is gradual - it is insignificant in the year
of receipt and increases as time progresses, especially after second Statement
receipt. Column 2 shows results that include a dummy variable for each year
after receipt and demonstrates that although for both groups the Statement’s
effect takes one year before it becomes statistically significant, its effect then
fades afterward. For the work-limited population the effect remains significant
into the second and third years afterward, while for the general population it
does not. The information intervention requires a year before its strongest effect
is felt, and then fades afterward, slowly for the work-limited population. The
second Statement reinforces the previously estimated effects.
Table 1.11 breaks down the effect by age, demonstrating that the Statement’s
effects are driven by younger individuals. This analysis provides some evidence
on whether the effect identified above is due to “shifting forward” of applica-
tion behavior or, rather, whether it reflects new applicants. If this shifting were
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Table 1.10
Estimated Effect of Statement Receipt, by Time Since Statement and Number of Statements
(1) (2)
At Least 1 Statement 0.002 -0.001
[0.008] [0.007]
Years Since Last Statement (continuous) -0.009 -
[0.007] -
1 Year Since Last Statement - -0.02
- [0.02]
2 Years Since Last Statement - -0.017
- [0.011]
3 Years Since Last Statement - 0.0002
- [0.007]
At Least 2 Statements -0.012 -0.01
[0.003] [0.01]
Work-Limiting Condition (WL) 0.007* 0.007*
[0.004] [0.004]
WL X At Least 1 Statement -0.011 -0.015
[0.012] [0.013]
WL X Years Since Last Statement 0.097*** -
[0.034] -
WL X 1 Year Since Last Statement - 0.226***
- [0.079]
WL X 2 Years Since Last Statement - 0.197***
- [0.065]
WL X 3 Years Since Last Statement - 0.07***
- [0.019]
WL X At Least 2 Statements 0.031*** 0.035**
[0.014] [0.014]
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes
Fully Insured Sample Yes Yes
Person-Years 63286 63286
R-squared 0.028 0.032
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
p y g ( g ) g , y
unit of analysis. Individuals followed until the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or Supplemental 
Security Income. Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years. Statement receipt defined as 
ever having received a Social Security Statement (except if applied for DI before Statement receipt). Work-limiting 
condition is self-reported work-limitation in the previous year.  All regressions control for gender, educational 
attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to rising Normal Retirement Age. Sample limited to living, DI covered 
individuals, age 50 to 64. All regressions control for Age Group X Year Dummies corresponding to a separate 
dummy for each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in each year. Standard errors in brackets, two-way 
clustered at the year and birthyear levels.
DI Application
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Table 1.11
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Application by Age Group and Work-Limiting Condition
(1) (2) (3)
50-54 X Statement 0.025*** -0.011* -
[0.010] [0.0055] -
55-59 X Statement 0.007** -0.0072*** -
[0.003] [0.0024] -
60-64 X Statement -0.0003 -0.003 -
[0.003] [0.0027] -
Work-Limiting X 50-54 X Statement - 0.187*** -
- [0.048] -
Work-Limiting X 55-59 X Statement - 0.115*** -
- [0.025] -
Work-Limiting X 60-64 X Statement - 0.055*** -
- [0.013] -
Statement - - 0.003
- - [0.004]
Years Since Statement - - -0.003
- - [0.004]
Work-Limiting - - 0.087***
- - [0.014]
Work-Limiting X Statement - - 0.073***
- - [0.023]
Work-Limiting X Statement X Years Since - - 0.012
- - [0.017]
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Person-Years 40308 40308 40308
R-squared 0.182 0.181 0.162
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Application
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is the unit of analysis. 
Individuals followed until (inclusively) the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security Income. 
Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years. Statement receipt defined as ever having received a 
Social Security Statement (except if applied for DI before Statement receipt). Work-limiting condition is self-reported work-
limitation in the previous year.  All regressions control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to 
rising Normal Retirement Age. Sample limited to living, DI fully insured individuals (if indicated), age 50 to 64.  Age Group X 
Year Dummies correspond to a separate dummy for each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in each year. "Years Since" 
variable is the number of years since first Statement receipt. Standard errors in brackets, two-way clustered at the year and 
birthyear levels.
the dominant explanation, then the Statement’s effect on the oldest age group
would have to be negative (or, more generally, it could not be positive for every
age group). However, Column 1 shows that even for the general population, the
Statement effect for those 60-64 is approximately zero and tightly estimated. If
the average results found above were due to “shifting forward” of inevitable ap-
plicants, then the Statement effect for the oldest at-risk workers would have to
be strongly negative to make up for those applicants who applied earlier. That
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this effect is zero for these older workers implies that any forward shifting is
overwhelmed by the number of new applicants. This effect is further supported
by breaking down the impact by work-limiting condition, as shown in Column
2. For the work-limited population, the Statement’s marginal effect halves with
every increase to the next 5-year age group. However, it still has a highly sta-
tistically significant and substantial impact on those 60-64, so for no group in
the work-limited population is the effect negative or even statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, and it is this population that is driving the increase in the
aggregate rolls. To the extent that there is shifting forward, it is swamped by the
influx of new applicants. Column 3 provides additional evidence that shifting
forward is not the driving story in this analysis; if it were, then as individuals
exited the sample due to DI application, the remaining pool would be less likely
to apply for DI, since their applicants have already applied. Therefore, the trend
effect of the Statement should be strongly negative as all the eventual DI appli-
cants leave the sample. However, as Column 3 indicates, the point estimate of
this effect is positive, albeit statistically insignificant, once again demonstrating
that this effect is not due to shifting forward of eventual applicants. 17
Table 1.12 alters the above analysis by studying DI entrance, corresponding
to DI application and eventual acceptance. As such, this new dependent vari-
able “DI entrance” is a strict subset of the previous “DI application,” since those
who applied and were not accepted have a zero value for the dependent vari-
able. The rest of the analytic framework, regression design and sample creation,
is identical. The results indicate that there is a corresponding increase in DI
entrance; indeed, most induced DI applicants are eventually accepted onto the
17It is worth noting here that even if “shifting forward” were the dominant explanation for the
observed effect, it would still have a large impact on the size of the DI rolls, since applying 5-10
years earlier when previously one would only have been on the rolls for 1-5 years represents a
large increase in the time spent on the rolls and the total benefits received.
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Table 1.12
Effect of Statement Receipt on DI Entrance, by Work-Limiting Condition
(1) (2)
Statement Receipt 0.010*** -0.001
[0.004] [0.007]
Work-Limiting Condition ‐ 0.076***
‐ [0.018]
Statement X Work-Limiting Condition ‐ 0.097***
‐ [0.032]
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes
Fully Insured Only Yes Yes
No-Statement DI Entrance Mean
General Population 0.016 0.016
N 40308 40308
R-squared 0.013 0.137
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DI Entrance
Note: Linear probabiliy regression (weighted) using individuals 50-64 from the HRS. Person-year is the unit of 
analysis. Individuals followed until the year in which they apply for Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security 
Income. Dependent variable is whether applied for DI in previous two years and eventually accepted onto the DI 
rolls. Statement receipt defined as ever having received a Social Security Statement (except if applied for DI before 
Statement receipt). Work-limiting condition is self-reported work-limitation in the previous year. All regressions 
control for gender, educational attainment, and reduction in OAI benefits due to rising Normal Retirement Age. 
Sample limited to living, DI covered individuals, age 50 to 64. Age Group X Year Dummies correspond to a separate 
dummy for each 5 year age group (50-54, 55-59, 60-64) in each year. Standard errors in brackets, two-way 
clustered at the year and birthyear levels.
rolls. In fact, the implied acceptance rate of 82%18 is greater than the previous
mean of 77%. This increase in acceptance rates is similar for work-limited ap-
plicants, from 79% for non-Statement recipients to 84% to Statement recipients,
and almost all older induced applicants are accepted onto the DI rolls. There-
fore, the applicants induced to apply for DI because of Statement receipt are on
average more likely to be medically eligible for the DI program, thereby shrink-
ing the misclassification errors identified previously in the DI literature (Bound
1989, Maestas et al. 2013).
Tables 1.3, 1.8, and 1.12 all demonstrate an overall increase in the likelihood
of DI application driven by new applicants who are just as likely, if not more so,
18This value is calculated by dividing the marginal acceptance effect plus the base acceptance
rate by the marginal application effect plus the base application rate.
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to be accepted onto the DI rolls.19 As will be estimated in the next section, this
combination implies that the Statement’s provision has significantly contributed
to the rise of the DI rolls over this period.
1.7 Implied Effect on DI Rolls
The analysis above identified an aggregate increase in the likelihood of DI ap-
plication upon Statement receipt over a sample period of 1992-2004. Since the
DI rolls were growing over this time period, both absolutely and as a fraction of
working-age adults, the question arises as to how much of this increase can be
attributed to those entering the rolls due to Statement receipt.
In this section, I perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation to approximate
the implied increase in the size of the DI program due to the large effect esti-
mated above. This is not a precise estimate: it is intended to provide a sense
of how the above increase in DI application rates translates to the increases in
the size of the DI rolls. To calculate the number of awards that were due to
Statement receipt, I start with the actual awards from Social Security’s Annual
Statistical Supplement for the years 1992-2004, broken down by age group. These
figures show how many of the awards in a given year went to those aged 50-54,
55-59, 60-61, and 62-64. I then calculate the fraction of these awards that were
induced by Statement receipt, given my estimates above, and subtract these
Statement-induced awards from the actual awards to construct a no-Statement
counterfactual series of DI rolls.
19Additional interactions with prior health insurance coverage has been estimated, although
the results of that analysis demonstrate no statistically significant effect of the Statement ap-
plication. It appears that the Statement’s novelty amounts to the existence of DI and its corre-
sponding monthly benefit.
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In particular, I estimate the counterfactual awards (A0) figures starting with
the actual awards (A1):
A1 = A0(1 + S ∗ α)
where S is the fractional increase in applicants and α is the acceptance rate of
these applicants (see footnote 20 for an explanation of this calculation). This
leads to the number of additional DI recipients of:
A1 − A0 = A1
(
1 − 1
1 + S ∗ α
)
To this end, I determine who received a Statement and responded to it by
entering DI by assigning to each age group’s awards in a given year the fraction
of that age group that received a Statement three years previously. I selected
three years since the aggregate DI application Statement effect was shown to
have a more gradual effect in Table 1.10. I assume an increase in the probabil-
ity of DI application of 62%, which is the estimate from Column 3 of Table 1.3.
Furthermore, I assume an acceptance rate onto the DI rolls of 80% given appli-
cation (which, when applied to the increased application rate, is approximately
the increase estimated in the DI entrance analysis in Table 1.12).
Last, I assume it takes one year from application to acceptance, since wait
times between application and initial determination average 131 days and be-
tween application and reconsideration, the first appeal stage granted to denied
applicants, 279 days in 2006 (O’Carroll 2008).20 Using these assumptions and
the age-specific awards in each year, I then calculate how many awards each
year can be attributed to increased application and subsequent acceptance due
20Although subsequent appeal results in much longer delays until possible award, 83% of
cases were resolved by the reconsideration stage in 2006.
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to Statement receipt. By 2004, of the 6,198,271 disabled workers on the DI rolls,
393,449 of them were due to Statement receipt. Figure 1.3 shows the difference
between the actual rolls and what the rolls would have been in the absence of
the Statement according to the above calculations.
2,500,000
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3,500,000
4,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
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6,000,000
6,500,000
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Figure 1.3: Actual Growth in DI Disabled Worker Rolls 
and No-Statement Counterfactual, 1995-2004
Note: Assumes post-Statement increase in DI application likelihood of 62% among those aged 50-64, 80% acceptance rate onto rolls, 3 
year delay between Statement receipt and application, and 1 year delay from application to acceptance. Age-group specific awards
sourced from Social Security's Annual Statistical Supplement, Various Years
Actual Growth
No-Statement 
Counterfactual 
Growth
Figure 1.4, on the other hand, shows these rolls as a fraction of the working-
age population and indexed to one in 1995. By 2004, these “per-capita” DI rolls
had increased by 32%. If the Statement had not been sent out, this growth would
have been 25%. That is, 7 percentage points, or about 20%, of the growth in the
DI rolls over this period can be explained by the Statement’s provision alone.
I implicitly assume in the above calculation that the overall effect was en-
tirely new applicants. However, if “shifting forward” accounts for an impor-
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Figure 1.4: Actual Growth in DI Disabled Worker Rolls as 
Fraction of Working Age Population and No-Statement 
Counterfactual, 1995-2004, Indexed to 1 in 1995
Note: Assumes post-Statement increase in DI application likelihood of 62% among those aged 50-64, 80% acceptance rate onto rolls, 3 
year delay between Statement receipt and application, and 1 year delay from application to acceptance. Age-group specific awards
sourced from Social Security's Annual Statistical Supplement, Various Years
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tant component of that overall effect, this component still has first order effects
on the size of the DI rolls, since these individuals are at least doubling, if not
tripling or more, their time spent in the program. The portion of the DI rolls’
increase explained by Statement receipt will be qualitatively unchanged.
The analysis of the effect of the Statement on DI rolls stops in 2004 because
that is where the analytic sample ends, and any additional projection of the
Statement’s effect will be difficult given the lack of variation in Statement re-
ceipt, requiring assumptions over how large the pool of individuals sensitive
to the information in the Statement is (i.e. whether the effect falls since those
who respond to the Statement have already applied for DI). Despite this limita-
tion, Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show a large percentage of the growth in the DI rolls
over this period can be explained by a previously unstudied influence on DI
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decision-making: the Social Security Statement.
1.8 Discussion and Conclusion
Using the Health and Retirement Study panels matched to administrative So-
cial Security records and the variation in information provision arising from
the staggered introduction of the Social Security Statement in the late 1990s, I
analyze the effect of revealing personalized DI benefit information on DI ap-
plication rates among older workers. A central finding of this analysis is that
this information provision had a positive, significant, and substantial effect on
DI application rates, increasing the likelihood of applying for DI by about 62%.
Moreover, this rise in the likelihood of DI application increased the targeting
efficiency of the DI program, since it was driven entirely by those with a work-
limiting condition who were not working.
Unlike previous work finding no average impact of the Statement on Social
Security decision-making (Mastrobuoni 2011), I focus on Disability Insurance
behavior instead of retirement timing, for which the Statement provides im-
mediately relevant information for a potentially little-known program among
Statement recipients. Additionally, to my knowledge there has been no pre-
vious research studying the role of information in the DI application decision.
This paper thus contributes to the literature on information costs in social pro-
gram application and take-up, adding a perspective on the importance of infor-
mation in disability program behavior.
My initial analysis had certain drawbacks: the possibility of individuals
“shifting forward” their application decisions, the use of self-reported appli-
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cation data, an assumed structure of a constant Statement effect, and a focus on
older workers. In my attempt to estimate the extent of any “shifting forward”
of DI application behavior, I find that DI application rates among workers age
60 and over still increases after Statement receipt and there is no negative trend
in DI application rates in the years that follow Statement receipt, implying that
any forward shifting of DI application is overwhelmed by the number of en-
tirely new applicants. A separate analysis of how the effect of Statement receipt
changes depending on how long ago one received a Statement demonstrates
that much of the effect is front-loaded and fades over time. However, I do not
estimate how Statement receipt affects the general adult population’s DI behav-
ior, and whether the strong and positive overall effect of Statement receipt varies
widely for younger workers is an avenue for future research.
My estimates imply that these new applicants induced to apply for, and over
80% of whom are accepted onto, the DI rolls, account for approximately 7 per-
centage points of the 32% rise in per-capita DI rolls from 1995 to 2004. Consistent
with previous work on the EITC and various social programs, I find that widely
disseminated, personalized information about program eligibility and benefit
levels can have a large effect on application behavior. Although the analysis in
this paper suggests both that the response is driven by those already reporting a
work-limiting condition and that there is no decrease in acceptance after appli-
cation, the DI-related information presented in the Statement is asymmetric. It
displays only the benefit available if one immediately exits the labor force, while
omitting the increases in Social Security benefits accrued from additional work
or projections of accrued income from current earnings versus benefit receipt.
Careful study should be made as to how the information environment can af-
fect those with work-limiting conditions, since provision of this information can
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have large effects on DI application, targeting, and the resulting size and fiscal
sustainability of the program itself.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY (MIS)INFORMATION ON THE
LABOR SUPPLY OF OLDER AMERICANS
Co-authored with Michael F. Lovenheim
2.1 Introduction
A central question in economics is how information affects decisions, especially
when this information is imperfect. Older workers’ retirement behavior is a
particularly relevant area in which partial information may lead to sub-optimal
decisions, as the incentives embedded in pension plans often are difficult to un-
derstand. Evidence points to American workers having rather poor knowledge
of their pension and social security wealth (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001, Mas-
trobuoni 2011). Thus, there is clear scope for information-based interventions
that can help workers make optimal intertemporal labor supply and private
savings decisions. At the same time, if the information workers receive is mis-
leading, it may cause optimization errors that render them worse off.
In this project, we use the differential timing of the Social Security Statement,
phased in from 1994 to 2000 according to age, to examine the role information
about Social Security wealth plays in labor supply decisions of older workers.
The fact that different-aged workers received the Statement in different years
allows for exogenous cross-cohort differences in the timing of information. Fur-
thermore, workers receive multiple statements that are staggered over several
years depending on their birth cohort, which allows us to examine how workers
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respond to updated Social Security wealth information. A central motivation of
this paper is the fact that the Statement itself provided very limited information
to workers: it informed them of their projected Social Security monthly bene-
fit at ages 62, Full Retirement Age (FRA), and 70, assuming constant earnings
growth until these ages. As a result, it was difficult if not impossible for work-
ers to use the information contained in the Statement to forecast how changes in
their labor supply would impact their future benefits. The information also was
presented in such a way that workers may have thought the wealth shown was
accumulated wealth that they would have if they stopped working today (even if
they did not claim benefits until 62 or the FRA). This highlights the importance
of observing worker reactions to subsequent Statements, when they would be
able to observe how their labor supply changes affected their Social Security
benefits.
The introduction of the Statement recently has been used to study the ef-
fect of retirement benefit information on retirement timing (Mastrobuoni 2011).
Although this paper found that the Statement increased the accuracy of Social
Security benefit predictions, it found no effect, on average, of having received
a Statement on the timing of Social Security claiming or on the timing of self-
reported retirement. This paper is very important in demonstrating that the So-
cial Security Statement increased older workers’ knowledge of their retirement
wealth. However, the analysis of a binary claiming decision and retirement de-
cision can miss many of the ways in which workers’ labor supply responds to
information. For one, the transition to retirement is not binary. Older workers
tend to reduce their labor supply quite dramatically on the intensive margin be-
fore leaving the labor force altogether, and they also re-enter the labor force after
they first leave (Rust and Phelan 1997). Both of these behaviors are not captured
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by a retirement indicator variable. In addition, there are large spikes at the early
and full Social Security retirement ages, which likely are due to the incentives
embedded in the Social Security system as well as rule-of-thumb behavior and
interactions with other government programs and work rules.
The large retirement spikes at these ages makes it difficult to observe any
impact of an intervention on a binary retirement measure, when so many indi-
viduals are not on the decision-making margin. Instead of examining the binary
retirement decision with few marginal decision-makers, we focus on the labor
supply responsiveness on the intensive margin. Because of the often slow (and
non-monotonic) transition from full-time work to full-time retirement, examin-
ing direct labor supply measures will allow us to examine in far more detail
how labor supply decisions among older workers are influenced by this infor-
mation intervention. The second main contribution of our paper is to examine
the dynamic responses of workers to partial Social Security wealth information,
i.e. the benefit projections based on constant real earnings. That is, does the par-
tial nature of the information provided cause workers to make “mistakes” that
are then corrected when the information is updated? To our knowledge, this
question has not been addressed by any prior research.
Using the timing of the rollout of the Statement by age, combined with
restricted-access Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data that include Social
Security earnings histories on workers aged 40-61, we first estimate the average
effect of Statement receipt on hours worked as well as how the treatment effects
vary across the (pre-Statement) distribution of hours worked and worker age.
In particular, treatment effect heterogeneity across the hours worked distribu-
tion is important to identify: workers who work few hours may seek to increase
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their labor supply when they observe their projected Social Security benefits
based on their current low hours level. High-hours workers may have the op-
posite reaction. For workers in the tails of the hours worked distribution, their
current labor supply also is likely to have large impacts on their projected Social
Security benefits.
Our main findings are that Statement receipt reduced annual hours worked
by 198 hours, which is an 18.6% reduction relative to mean hours worked. The
hours reductions come mainly from workers aged 50-61, with some suggestive
evidence that younger workers increase their labor supply when they receive a
Statement. We also find a large amount of heterogeneity across previous hours
worked. Workers who work less than 10 hours per week increase their hours
worked when they receive the statement by a large amount, on the order of 797
hours per year. The labor supply declines are due to workers with 40 or more
hours per week, where workers decrease their hours worked by between 344
and 593 hours per year. These results are not simply a reflection of mean rever-
sion, since we control for previous hours worked in our main specifications. We
also show similar patterns exist for self-employment hours and for earnings. In
short, our results point to large labor supply responses to receiving a Social Se-
curity Statement, which prior work looking at binary retirement indicators has
missed.
We next examine the impact of second Statement receipt on labor supply.
If workers mis-interpret the information they receive such that they think the
wealth on the Statement is accumulated wealth, they may reduce hours worked.
When they receive the second Statement, they will see their projected wealth has
decreased, and if the initial hours reduction was an error, i.e. they had not taken
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into account this decline in wealth, we should see these workers increase their
hours worked. Our approach to this question is to estimate the difference in
labor supply changes among those workers who decreased their hours worked
after first Statement receipt and then received an updated Statement in the prior
survey wave compare to workers who have the same time pattern of Statement
receipt but who did not reduce their labor supply after first receipt. Of those
who decreased earnings after first Statement receipt, and thus will see a lower
projected benefit on their second Statement, receipt of this second Statement
led to a subsequent increase in labor supply and earnings. Again, this is not
just mean reversion: workers who reduced their labor supply after first receipt
but who have not yet received the second Statement do not increase their labor
supply (in fact it continues to decline).
We interpret this evidence as reflective of many workers misunderstanding
the initial information and then attempting to correct decisions made based
on that erroneous understanding. For some workers, the confusing nature of
the information provided likely made them worse off. Since the HRS also in-
cludes extensive information on expected Social Security benefits, we directly
test whether individuals who decrease their hours of work after their first State-
ment receipt report lower expected Social Security wealth. We find no evidence
of this, which suggests the changes we are picking up after the second Statement
are reflective of mis-information.
Finally, we use the exogenous rollout of the Statement as an instrument for
workers expectations about Social Security benefits in order to estimate the elas-
ticity of hours worked and earnings with respect to these expectations. These
estimates are among the first in the literature to estimate such elasticities on the
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intensive margin and to do so for relatively younger workers. We find consis-
tent evidence that Statement-induced changes in expected benefits increase both
hours worked and earnings. These results suggest that providing older work-
ers below the early retirement age information that increases their expectations
about future retirement benefits can generate increased labor supply amongst
these workers.
Taken together, the results from this analysis suggest that information about
retirement benefits has substantial effects on the labor supply of older, male
Americans, whether this information is well-understood or not. Although in
2011, the Social Security Statement was no longer automatically sent out, a re-
cent Social Security Advisory Board position paper (SSA 2013) suggests it will
be reintroduced. Furthermore, workers can request a Statement or can generate
the information on the Statement through the Social Security Administration
Website. Our analysis sheds light on the potential value correct information on
retirement wealth can have for workers but that much care needs to be taken
to ensure the accuracy and transparency of this information in order to avoid
worker errors from misinterpretation.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes essential com-
ponents of Social Security benefits; Section 3 describes the Social Security State-
ment and its implementation; Section 4 discusses the data used in this analysis;
Section 5 outlines our empirical methodology; Section 6 discusses results; and
Section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Social Security, officially known as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI), provides a suite of potential benefits to individuals who pay payroll
taxes in the US. This program is large: in 2014, total expenditures were $785
billion. Chief among these programs in both saliency and size is the Old Age
Insurance (OAI) portion. Because OASDI is a social insurance program, eli-
gibility for benefits and benefit level are both based on one’s entire history of
covered earnings. OAI in particular requires individuals to have paid into the
Social Security system with about 10 years of work for eligibility.1
For OAI benefit calculation, OAI uses the highest 35 years of an individual’s
annual earnings, indexed to average national wage growth, to then calculate
an Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) amount. To determine one’s
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), or benefit available upon retirement at the
Full Retirement Age, the SSA then applies a progressive formula to the AIME.
This PIA formula provides a 90% marginal replacement rate for the first $816 of
an AIME, a 32% marginal replacement rate for the next $4,101 of the AIME, and
a 15% marginal replacement rate for any remaining AIME. Hence one’s benefit
is always increasing in previous earnings, although at a decreasing rate. This
PIA is then reduced if one opts for early retirement, available starting at age 62,
or is increased if one delays collecting benefits after the Full Retirement Age,
currently at 66. Additionally, an earnings test applies where benefits can be
withheld if one claims benefits early yet continues to work.
Although a full discussion of program details is outside of the scope of this
1Specifically, the requirement to be insured is 40 Quarters of Coverage (QC), where in 2014 a
QC is earned for every $1,200 of earnings, up to 4 per year.
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paper, a few points are relevant to the analysis below: if a potential retiree does
not have 35 years of earnings in their work history, then their AIME will contain
zero earnings years. Because most individuals are earning at their highest levels
late in their careers, there can be large returns to continue to work embedded in
the Social Security system as these higher earnings years replace the zero years.
As a result, there can be strong incentives for some older workers to continue
to remain fully in the labor force when approaching Social Security retirement
ages (Coile et al. 2002). The extent to which this is true depends on a worker’s
earning history, and thus workers with similar income levels may have vastly
different returns to remaining in the labor force.
Additionally, individuals can collect benefits based on their spouses’ work
history, generally limited to 50% of their spouses’ PIAs. Since we focus on older
Americans in the 1990s in this sample, we limit our analysis to men largely to
avoid the complex incentives facing women who may be deciding whether to
collect benefits based on their husbands’ work histories or their own. Because
men have been shown to be largely unresponsive to the impact of their own
claiming behavior on spousal benefits (Sass and Webb 2007), our sample repre-
sents individuals responding to their own retirement benefits.
A large literature measures the effects that the various components of the
Social Security system have on labor supply, largely through changes in the
parameters or scope of these components (Krueger and Pischke 1992, Fried-
berg 2000, Duggan et al. 2007, Mastrobuoni 2009). For a thorough discussion of
decision-making and OAI more generally, Krueger and Meyer (2002) provide a
comprehensive survey of studies that modeled retirement behavior.
However, most papers in this literature either implicitly or explicitly as-
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sume that workers know their future benefits and can weigh alternative income
streams when decision-making. Survey-based evidence, on the other hand, sug-
gests that such sophisticated decision-making is rare. In the HRS, a sample of
older Americans approaching retirement, only about 50% of respondents are
able to provide any estimate of their expected Social Security benefits. Fewer
than 30% of respondents are able to estimate their future benefits to within
$1,500 (2000 dollars) per year (Gustman and Steinmeier 2001). These results
suggest it is a very strong assumption that these respondents are not only aware
of the range of complex retirement incentives they face but that they also factor
these incentives into their decision-making years in advance. Chan and Stevens
(2008) find that the result in the literature of responsiveness to pension incen-
tives is entirely driven by the 20% of workers who perceive them correctly.
On the other hand, behavior entirely inconsistent with these incentives ob-
tains among a substantial portion of the population. For example, family mem-
bers for whom it is more advantageous to delay collecting benefits from spousal
work histories after their own labor force exit are more likely to instead imme-
diately collect benefits. Conversely, unmarried men who should immediately
collect retirement benefits after exiting the labor force are more likely to delay
this collection (Gustman and Steinmeier 2000).
More recent research has found that a majority of 50- to 70-year-olds un-
derstand future Social Security benefits are linked to one’s participation in the
labor force on the extensive margin. These individuals also largely understand
the incentives behind the delayed retirement credits and widow benefits (Lieb-
man and Luttmer 2012).2 However, there are still aspects of the Social Security
2It is important to note that the evidence in Liebman and Luttmer (2012) comes from a survey
they conducted in 2008, well after the Social Security Statement had first been introduced. At
this time, most workers would have received yearly Statements for several years, which may
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system about which individuals have a poor understanding, which and how
many years of earnings are used in benefit calculations that impact intensive
margin incentives. Moreover, individuals’ ability to operationalize this knowl-
edge is unclear, or at least incomplete, since these same authors found that a
field experiment designed to increase knowledge about Social Security benefit
and the incentives embedded in the benefit formula increased labor force partic-
ipation by 4 percentage points, or over 5% (Liebman and Luttmer forthcoming).
These effects, however, were limited to females, and there was no evidence on
an impact on intensive margin labor supply. The intervention we study differs
from theirs most notably in the fact that they did not provide any information
about participants’ Social Security wealth to them, whereas the Social Security
earnings statement did. Thus, responses to the two types of information may be
quite different.
Unfortunately, beyond this recent field experiment, understanding the effect
of improving knowledge of these incentives has been largely stymied by a lack
of exogeneity in information. Cross-sectional variation in program knowledge
can be highly correlated with the benefits themselves. However, the staggered
introduction of the Social Security Statement created exactly the variation in
knowledge needed to study this topic.
2.3 The Social Security Statement
Starting in 1990, the Social Security Administration began providing standard-
ized benefit statements for all individuals who requested them, and starting in
have increased their knowledge about their benefits and the incentives embedded in the Social
Security System.
57
late 1994, Statements were automatically sent out. These Social Security State-
ments eventually were sent annually to all individuals who ever paid payroll
tax 25 and older between 2000 and 2011 and contained personalized informa-
tion about OASDI benefits upon retirement, disability, or death. The Appendix
contains a fictional example Statement provided by SSA. In addition to provid-
ing information on these benefits, the Statement also displays each worker’s
historical covered earnings, allowing for a Statement recipient to check whether
SSA has a correct record of his or her earnings history. Although previous re-
search on the Statement finds a lack of any compelling effect of this information
on retirement timing, it greatly increases the likelihood of an individual’s cor-
rectly anticipating their OAI benefits (Biggs 2010, Mastrobuoni 2011).
While the Statement has, until recently, been sent to those 25 and older, it
was phased in across different age groups in the late 1990s. The Statement was
initially sent out to those age 60 and over in 1995, as well as all those turning 60
from 1995 onward. Additionally, in 1996, they were automatically sent to those
58 to 60; in 1997, 53 to 58; in 1998, 47 to 53; in 1999, 40 to 47; and in 2000, 25 and
over.3 Figure 2.1 illustrates which age groups received the Statement in which
Fiscal Year, as well as the total number of Statements sent out. An “X” in an
age-group by year cell indicates that a Statement was sent to that age-group in
that year. This phase-in schedule provides a natural experiment in the provision
of information about OASDI benefits in the late 1990s. As evident in Figure 1,
there is variation by year and age in both first Statement receipt as well as in
the timing of when individuals received the Statement a second time. We will
discuss subsequent Statement receipt more fully below.
3The years described here correspond to SSA fiscal years, which start in October. The exact
timing of Statement receipt depends on one’s birth month, but approximately one third of those
60 and over received a Statement in 1994: those born October, November, or December 1994, or
January 1995.
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Figure 2.1: Social Security Statement Phase-In Schedule
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
61 and Older X X X
60 X X X X X X X
58-59 X X X
53-58 X X X
47-53 X X X
40-47 X X X
25-40 X X
134.7 135.6
SSA Fiscal Year
Note: SSA Fiscal Years are October of the preceding calendar year to September of the stated year. No Statements 
were sent out before Fiscal Year 1995, and all individuals with Social Security Numbers age 25 and over received a 
Statement from 2000 to 2011.
Total Statements 
Sent (millions) 0 7 5.5 12.4 20.7 26.6
Previous research on this Statement has shown that once one controls for age
and year, no other factors influence Statement receipt (Mastrobuoni 2011), and
that, indeed, after having received these Statements, individuals are much more
likely to be able to provide any estimate of their OAI benefits, and among those
who already provided estimates, the accuracy of these estimates improves.
The Statement describes retirement benefits, based on an earnings level con-
sistent with that of the past two years, if a retiree elects to receive benefits at the
Early Eligibility Age (62), the Full Retirement Age (between 65 and 67, depend-
ing on birth cohort), and age 70. Some researchers have expressed concern that
the static nature of these estimates is misleading, and conveying information on
Social Security Wealth accrual rates by different earnings trajectories would be
more relevant to the decision-making of potential beneficiaries (Jackson 2006).
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Indeed, this is a central motivation for our paper. The only previous research on
the effect of the Statement on Social Security behavior found no average change
in timing of collecting Old Age Insurance, nor any change in the responsiveness
of older Americans to the effect of additional earnings on these retirement bene-
fits (Mastrobuoni 2011). However, there has been no analysis of the Statement’s
effect directly on labor supply of older Americans until this paper.
To provide a stronger sense of the variation in both first and second State-
ment receipt that we exploit in our analysis, Figure 2.2 shows the Statement re-
ceipt patterns of five adjacent birth cohorts from 1994 to 2001.4 The shadings in
each column allow one to track each cohort across columns to see the timing of
first and second Statement receipt. Three of these cohorts (1936-1938) received
their first Statement in 1996, while the younger two cohorts had to wait until
1997. Second Statement receipt patterns are even more disparate: we do not see
the 1936 birth cohort receive a second Statement; the 1937 birth cohort receives
a second Statement in the year directly after first receipt; the 1938 birth cohort
receives a second Statement two years after first receipt; the 1939 birth cohort
also experiences a two-year wait, but both their receipt years are one year later
than the 1938 cohort; and the 1940 birth cohort received their first Statement
in the same year as the 1939 cohort but must wait three years before their sec-
ond Statement receipt. It is this substantial variation in both first and second
Statement receipt that allows for the identification of the effect of the Statement
separate from age and year fixed effects. We exploit the fact that otherwise sim-
ilar cohorts have such markedly different Statement receipt patterns to identify
the causal effect of the Statement information on labor supply of older workers.
4We include only men under the age of 62 in our analysis to avoid complex interactions with
those who may already have claimed benefits.
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Figure 2.2: Statement Receipt Pattern among 1935-1940 Birth Cohorts
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
61 X X X
60 X X X X X X X
59 1935 X X X
58 1936 X X X X
57 1937 X X X
56 1938 X X X
55 1939 X X X
54 1940 X X X
53 X X X X
52 X X X
51 X X X
50 X X X
49 X X X
48 X X X
47 X X X X
46 X X X
SSA Fiscal Year
2.4 Data
This paper uses the Health and Retirement Study panels, matched to Social Se-
curity earnings and benefits records. The HRS is a nationally representative
panel survey of individuals over age 50 and their spouses. The survey elicits
information about demographics, income, assets, health, cognition, job status
and history, expectations, and insurance and is administered by the Institute for
Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan. It consists of six cohorts:
1. The Initial HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 1941, first interviewed in
1992 and reinterviewed every 2 years;
2. AHEAD cohort, born before 1924, initially the separate Study of Assets
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and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old, first interviewed in 1993,
then in 1995, 1998, and subsequently every two years;
3. Children of Depression (CODA) cohort, born 1924 to 1930, first inter-
viewed in 1998 and subsequently every two years;
4. War Baby (WB) cohort, born 1942 to 1947, first interviewed in 1998 and
subsequently every two years;
5. Early Baby Boomer (EBB) cohort, born 1948 to 1953, first interviewed in
2004;
6. Mid Baby Boomer (MBB) cohort, born 1954-1959, first interviewed in 2010.
For this analysis, we use men in the first four cohorts only, since the fifth and
sixth cohorts enter after the Statement has been universally provided to those
25 and older, so the last year covered in our sample is 2002 (corresponding to
wave 6 of the survey). These panels are then matched to Social Security Respon-
dent Cross-Year Summary Earnings, for which the match rate is approximately
72% among the cohorts we use and 66% overall for the Initial Cohort (Mitchell
et al. 1996). These records provide earnings from 1951 to the year of the match.
The match is imperfect due to two factors: approximately a quarter of respon-
dents do not grant permission to have their administrative records matched,
while the remaining unmatched individuals provided erroneous Social Security
Numbers. Previous research using these matched data shows that for the Ini-
tial Cohort, the matched subset is an unbiased subsample (Kapteyn et al. 2006,
Michaud and Van Soest 2008).
The largest problem when using the matched data is that the Social Security
records are matched only up until a permission year, and for the vast majority
of respondents in our sample there are only three permission years: 1992, 2004,
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and 2008. In a permission year, an HRS respondent is asked again whether
the survey administrators can match his or her SSA records up until that year.
Therefore, an individual must stay in the HRS until 2004 for researchers to ob-
serve his or her records past 1992. These individuals represent a skewed sample
of younger and healthier respondents. We therefore primarily use self-reported
measures of earnings and hours-worked instead of administrative records.5
We focus our analysis on men, for two reasons: first, for this population
of older workers, labor force participation rates of men are much higher than
among women, and men represent the primary earners in their families. Sec-
ond, because of their higher lifetime earnings, their Social Security Statement
will be informative as to their retirement benefits, while their wives’ will be
much more likely to collect spousal benefits. We further limit our analysis to
men under age 62, thereby avoiding the complex incentives facing someone
who can choose to receive benefits immediately and for whom the Statement
has different informational content. In effect, we are focusing only on men who
can change their labor supply in anticipation of future Social Security benefits.
Next, we calculate whether individuals have earned the 40 Quarters of Cover-
age in their lifetime to be fully insured for OAI benefits by using the administra-
tive earnings records that start in 1951 for all matched individuals. We drop in-
dividuals who are not fully insured by 1991. Although they may subsequently
work enough to gain OAI eligibility, their benefits will be very low and they
represent an unusual sample of workers. Last, we include only those individ-
uals who reported positive hours worked before having received a Statement.
This limitation is intended to avoid interactions with other OASDI programs:
5When we use administrative data during our sample window in Appendix Table 2.6, we
approach this sample skewing as a non-response bias and estimate a logit model of likelihood
of rematching in 2004, then reweight these observations by the inverse probability of their in-
clusion in this sample (Carlson et al. 2001).
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the first chapter in this dissertation shows that among HRS respondents who
are not currently employed, Statement receipt is associated with increased So-
cial Security Disability Insurance application. The analysis herein is targeted
toward the retirement portion of Social Security, which necessitates dropping
non-employed workers prior to Statement receipt.
Table 2.1 shows the effect of these sample restrictions on the size of our pri-
mary sample. Ultimately, there are 14,320 observations corresponding to 3,963
unique respondents that are in our sample.
Table 2.1
Sample Restrictions Count
Unique HRS Respondents in 1992-2002 Window 30,671
Successful Match to SSA Records 21,633
Fully Insured for OAI 17,101
Under 62 and Male 6,781
Total Remaining Person-Years in Sample 28,165
Note: Sample counts from 1992-2002 Health and Retirement Study (waves 1 
to 6), matched to SSA administrative records.
For variable construction, we draw from the RAND Corporation’s pre-
cleaned version of the HRS for self-reported earnings, hours worked, self-
employment status, analytic weights, health status, IRA wealth, general assets
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not including IRAs, and pension information. We use the HRS Tracker File for
marriage status, birth and death information, and education. Last, we use HRS
modules for expected OAI benefits at age 62 or 65. We calculate whether an
individual had a second job before any Statement receipt, as well as the number
of hours they worked in the year before the first Statement receipt. Tables 2.2a
and 2.2b provide descriptive statistics on the variables we use in our analysis.
Finally, our primary analysis uses the HRS as a natural sample, as is com-
mon practice in the Social Security program analysis literature using the HRS
(Burkhauser et al. 2004, Li and Maestas 2008, Mastrobuoni 2011). The primary
reason for this is that the weights are not available in all years, and thus using
them distorts the age composition of the sample. As a check on our results,
weighted versions of all regressions are included in corresponding appendix
tables and show our estimates are robust to using sample weights.
2.5 Empirical Methodology
Our goal in this analysis is to estimate the effect of Statement receipt on the labor
supply of older male workers. The identifying assumption is that by controlling
for age and year fixed effects, the only remaining systematic difference between
adjacent cohorts in the pattern of the Statement’s provision is the Statement it-
self. That is, no other factor that would influence labor supply decisions of this
population is systematically related to the Statement’s phase-in pattern across
birth cohorts. This is the same assumption invoked by Mastrobuoni (2011).
Given the idiosyncratic variation in both first and second Statement receipt tim-
ing illustrated in Figure 2.2 and that conditional on controlling for age and year,
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Table 2.2a Mean
Descriptive Statistics, Unweighted (SD)
Dependent Variables
Annual Hours Worked 1065.28
(1,252.12)
Self-Employment Annual Hours Worked 227.79
(764.36)
Self-Reported Annual Earnings 34,836.79
(58,514.62)
Decreased Expected PIA 0.29
(0.45)
ln(Self-Reported Earnings) 10.18
(1.11)
ln(Hours Worked) 7.67
(0.48)
Independent Variables
Age 52.4
(6.56)
White 0.803
(0.398)
Married 0.491
(0.500)
High School 0.493
(0.500)
College 0.137
(0.343)
More than College 0.133
(0.340)
Ever Received Statement 0.389
(0.488)
Ever Received 2 Statements 0.176
(0.381)
Had Second Job Before 1st Statement 0.104
(0.305)
All Hours Worked Self-Employed Hours Worked
1 to 9 per Week 17.5% 71.92%
10 to 19 per Week 1.85% 0.93%
20 to 29 per Week 2.97% 1.20%
30 to 39 per Week 5.19% 1.58%
Exactly 40 per Week 22.99% 1.78%
Over 40 per Week 49.53% 22.60%
Hours Worked Category Pre-Statement among those with Positive Hours 
Worked Pre-Statement
Note: Descriptive statistics from 1992-2002 Health and Retirement Study, matched to SSA 
administrative records, from sample restrictions outlined in Table 1, unweighted.
no other observable factor predicts Statement receipt (Mastrobuoni 2011), there
is substantial evidence to support this assumption. The rollout of the State-
ment across cohorts lends itself naturally to a difference-in-difference analysis,
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Table 2.2b Mean
Descriptive Statistics, Unweighted, cont'd (SD)
Received a Statement by w-1 0.37
(0.48)
Decreased Hours between w-2 and w-1 0.18
(0.39)
Decreased Hours X Statement by w-1 0.12
(0.32)
Decreased Hours X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 0.08
(0.27)
Decreased Earnings between w-1 and w-2 0.18
(0.39)
Decreased Earnings X Statement by w-1 0.14
(0.34)
Decreased Earnings X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 0.08
(0.28)
Decreased Earnings between w-1 and w 0.25
(0.43)
Decreased Earnings X Statement by w 0.13
(0.34)
ln(Expected PIA) 6.72
(0.54)
Note: Descriptive statistics from 1992-2002 Health and Retirement Study, 
matched to SSA administrative records, from sample restrictions outlined in 
Table 1, unweighted.
in which we compare changes in labor supply among those who receive a State-
ment to those who do not. The simplest model we use for estimating the effect
of the Statement on labor supply is:
LS it = α0 + α1FS it + Zitθ + XitΛ + it (2.1)
where LS it represents labor supply, be it hours-worked across all jobs, self-
employed hours-worked, or earnings; FS it is an indicator for whether an in-
dividual i has received a Statement by time t. The parameter α1, therefore, is
our main coefficient of interest and represents the average effect of Statement
receipt on the given labor supply measure. Zit is a set of age and year indicators,
so θ is a vector of corresponding fixed effects; and Xit is a set of demographic
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factors shown in Table 2.2a that include marital status, education and race.
In the analyses to follow, Xit also includes how many hours per week an
individual worked before receiving his or her first Statement, measured using
10-hour categories as well as an exactly 40 hours per week category. These pre-
treatment labor supply controls serve two functions. First, they control for any
heterogeneity across workers in pre-existing labor supply levels that may be cor-
related with the timing of the Statement rollout. Second, these controls account
for mean reversion. Changes in labor supply always are potentially influenced
by mean reversion, since both low-hours workers and high-hours workers will
naturally tend to revert to the mean. Controlling for pre-treatment labor sup-
ply accounts for this mean reversion, however, and so we can identify whether
workers in each hours group exhibit differential changes in labor supply when
they receive the Statement relative to workers who work the same number of
hours and who did not receive the Statement.
Equation (2.1) estimates the direct effect of ever having received a Statement
on labor supply. Implicit in this specification is the assumption that the State-
ment has an immediate and constant effect on behavior, and that this effect is
constant across different groups. However, there might be substantial hetero-
geneity across subgroups in responsiveness to the Statement that is of high in-
terest. Although the assumption of an immediate and constant effect is not as
strong in the context of our sample - biennial waves with at most 4 waves of
post-Statement observation - we nevertheless relax it going forward by exam-
ining the effect of second Statement receipt. Furthermore, we allow for hetero-
geneity in the effect of the Statement across distinct subgroups of our sample.
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To that end, we use the much more flexible specification:
LS it = α0 + α(FS itIFSXit) + β(S S itIS SYit) + Zitθ + XitΛ + YitΩ + it (2.2)
where α is now a vector of coefficients, FS it is a vector with each entry either one
or zero depending on whether the individual i has received a Statement by time
t, Xit is a set of individual characteristics, and the diagonal matrix IFS allows
us to interact these characteristics with Statement receipt to arrive at subgroup-
specific Statement effects. Furthermore, we include the possibility of second
Statement receipt S S it having an independent effect on labor supply, and allow
this effect to differ across different subgroups Yit, which may be the same or
distinct from Xit. It is these IFS and IS S matrices that differ across specifications.
One can note that equation (2.2) nests equation (2.1), if IS S is a zero matrix and
IFS has only one non-zero entry for the constant entry of Xit.
The first set of specifications, presented in Tables 2.3 through 2.5, examine
the effect of the first Statement interacted with various demographic or pre-
vious labor supply behavior. Again, here the identifying assumption is that
controlling for age- and year-fixed effects as well as pre-treatment labor sup-
ply, Statement receipt is exogenous. We further invoke the assumption that
after controlling for demographics and pre-treatment behavior, the interaction
with exogenous Statement receipt allows for estimation of the Statement’s effect
within each subgroup.
In order to examine how workers respond to multiple doses of information,
we estimate the extent to which workers who reduced their labor supply when
they received their first statement changed their labor supply differentially after
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they received their second statement.
Specifically, we determine whether an individual decreased his hours
worked or earnings two periods ago: that is, between waves w − 2 and w − 1,
where wave w is the current wave. We construct an additional variable, which
is the interaction between this prior decrease and whether the respondent had
received a Statement before w−1. Then, we compare the labor supply responses
of these individuals who previously decreased labor supply and had received
a Statement across one additional dimension: did they receive a second State-
ment between w − 1 and w? If so, what was the marginal effect of having seen
a new version of their Statement that will now report a lower projected retire-
ment benefit? Here, we do not claim to have identified the ceteris paribus effect
of having previously decreased labor supply on current labor supply behavior;
instead, we use the variation in second Statement receipt to identify the effect of
updated information based on this previous labor supply decrease by compar-
ing otherwise similar individuals who either receive this second Statement or
do not by the current period. The assumptions underlying this specification are
almost identical to those for equation (2.1): the rollout of the second Statement
is uncorrelated with cross-cohort secular variation in labor supply trends.
As a check on our results, we also examine the impact of the Statement on
predicted respondent-predicted Social Security Wealth. The HRS asks respon-
dents about what they think their Primary Insurance Amount is. Mastrobuoni
(2011) shows that the Statement leads individuals to have a better understand-
ing of their retirement wealth. But, our analysis is based on the presumption
that knowing the level of benefits tells one little about the effect of labor supply
changes on one’s PIA. Using respondent-reported PIA expectation, we estimate
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a model similar to the one we use to identify the effect of multiple statement
receipts, except we use a dependent variable an indicator for whether a respon-
dent reports a drop in his PIA from the last survey. If our assumption that
the Statement gives recipients little information about how changes in hours
worked will translate into Social Security Wealth, we should see little effect of
the second statement on the likelihood a respondent reports reduced wealth.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Effect of Statement Receipt on Hours Worked and Earn-
ings
Baseline Estimates
The main results from estimation of equation (2.1) for the sample of men aged
40-61 are shown in Table 2.3. In the table, each column presents results from a
separate regression, and all estimates are accompanied by standard errors that
are two-way clustered at the year and birth year levels (Cameron et al. 2011).
In the first column, we show estimates that include all demographic controls as
well as age and year fixed effects. In the second column, we also control for pre-
Statement labor supply. Although the first column does not show a statistically
significant or sizable effect, in our preferred estimates in column (2), Statement
receipt reduces the amount of hours worked by 197.6 hours. This is an 18.5%
decline relative to the mean hours worked of 1065.3 shown in Table 2.2a. Thus,
Statement receipt has a large, negative effect on hours worked, even if it does not
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affect the timing of when people report being “retired” as shown in Mastrobuoni
(2011).
Table 2.3
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Hours Worked, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever Received Statement -19.87 -197.6 - -187.1 -109.8 -232.9 -
[93.11] [41.04]*** - [49.82]*** [49.35]** [46.13]*** -
Age Category X Statement
40 to 44 296.7
[378.8]
45 to 49 52.28
[185.3]
50 to 54 -205.4
[39.47]***
55 to 59 -296.4
[56.13]***
60 to 61 -191.5
[97.38]**
Less than High School X Statement -
-
High School X Statement -28.21
[54.08]
College X Statement 75.97
[76.73]
More than College X Statement -53.59
[75.01]
Had a 2nd Job Before Statement Receipt 281.5
[73.85]***
2nd Job X Statement -419.3
[108.8]***
Ever Received 2 Statements -304.7
[117.8]***
Pre-Statement Hours Worked Category X Statement
1 to 9 per Week 797.2
[94.52]***
10 to 19 per Week 163.2
[112.2]
20 to 29 per Week -33.68
[78.78]
30 to 39 per Week -81.61
[124.3]
Exactly 40 per Week -343.8
[59.77]***
Over 40 per Week -593.3
[53.04]***
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -293.2 1.05e-08 407.7 9.79e-09 -4.63e-08 1.37e-08 1.52e-09
[41.44]*** [0.00148] [250.8] [0.00185] [0.00195] [0.00180] [0.00122]
Observations 14320 14320 14226 14320 14320 14320 14320
R-squared 0.059 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.463 0.482 0.525
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported hours worked across all jobs in the reference year. Sample limited to under 
age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for marital status, 
education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 
2-6). All specifications are unweighted OLS.
Self-Reported Hours Worked per Year
There is much reason to believe that the effects of Statement receipt will dif-
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fer across age groups. In fact, if workers correctly understand the Statement
information, younger workers should not react at all to the information, as their
PIA will be highly sensitive to hours worked over the remainder of their ca-
reers. If anything, we would expect there to be a positive effect among younger
workers who are worried that their current PIA is insufficient for their expected
retirement plans. Older workers, however, are more likely to reduce their labor
supply if the Statement provides information that their Social Security Wealth is
high enough to fund their retirement. This is exactly the pattern we observe in
Column (3) of Table 2.3, in which we allow the effect of the Statement receipt to
vary by worker age. The estimates for workers in their 40s are positive, although
they are not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. Workers
aged 50-61, however, significantly reduce their labor supply when they receive
a Statement. These results strongly suggest that workers of different ages re-
spond differently to retirement information.
In columns (4) and (5), we examine whether there are heterogeneous re-
sponses by worker education level and by whether a worker has a second job
before the first statement receipt. The latter is a relevant group on which to fo-
cus because those with second jobs may have much more flexibility in hours
that those with one primary job. We find no strong evidence of heterogeneous
treatment effects with respect to education, but we do see a much larger nega-
tive response amongst workers who have a second job. Workers with only one
job also reduce their hours worked, but the size of the effect amongst those with
another job is almost four times as large. Predictably, worker flexibility in the
ability to adjust hours worked without leaving their primary job leads to larger
treatment effects. In Column (6), we also show a large, negative average effect
of the second Statement receipt as well as the first receipt.
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Finally in Table 2.3, we estimate whether workers respond differentially to
receiving a Social Security Statement according to their pre-receipt hours of
work. The results, shown in Column (7), show a large amount of heterogeneity,
with low-hours workers increasing their hours worked and high-hours workers
reducing their hours worked. Among those who work between 1-9 hours per
week, there is a massive increase in hours worked of 797 hours. If all of these
workers worked 9 hours a week for 50 weeks, this effect translates into a 177%
increase in hours worked (=797/450). There also is a positive and large effect
amongst workers who worked between 10 and 19 hours per week, although the
estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero. The rest of the hours
groups have negative coefficients, but only those who work 40 or more hours ex-
hibit large and statistically significant declines in labor supply. For workers who
worked exactly 40 hours per week, they reduce hours worked by 343.8 hours,
which is a 17.2% decline relative to the mean (=343.8/2000). Those working over
40 hours reduce labor supply even more. These results clearly demonstrate that
there is significant heterogeneity in the response to information receipt across
the distribution of hours worked. One explanation for these results is that low-
hours workers increase labor supply due to receiving information about low
projected PIA levels, and vice versa for high-hours workers.
The results in Table 2.3 include hours from all types of work. However, as
the second job effects indicate, it may be hard to reduce hours in one’s primary
occupation without switching jobs. This is not true for the self-employed, for
whom it typically is easier to make adjustments on the intensive margin. In
Table 2.4, we repeat our analysis using only self-employed hours. Note that
all workers are included in these regressions, but that only their reported self-
employed hours are used as the dependent variable.
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Table 2.4
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Self-Employment Hours Worked, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever Received Statement 14.47 -326.3 -242.9 14.20 -309.3
[42.97] [77.19]*** [89.27]*** [13.28] [79.17]***
Age Category X Statement
40 to 44 281.8
[228.8]
45 to 49 -41.46
[398.5]
50 to 54 -878.3
[359.1]**
55 to 59 -196.8
[129.9]
60 to 61 138.9
[94.06]
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -105.1
[34.23]***
College X Statement -94.86
[71.72]
More than College X Statement -175.5
[80.02]**
Had a 2nd Job Before Statement Receipt 79.32
[29.46]***
2nd Job X Statement -116.0
[83.86]
Ever Received 2 Statements 159.4
[197.7]
Pre-Statement Hours Worked Category X Statement
1 to 9 per Week 107.6
[82.32]
10 to 19 per Week -107.1
[186.3]
20 to 29 per Week -70.99
[136.1]
30 to 39 per Week -129.8
[116.8]
Exactly 40 per Week -706.5
[171.6]***
Over 40 per Week -2183
[156.9]***
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -106.5 -5.48e-09 153.9 -6.85e-09 -2.242 -7.07e-09 6.80e-09
[24.79]*** [0.0166] [79.54]* [0.00105] [5.706] [0.0150] [0.00281]
Observations 14320 14320 14226 14320 14320 14320 14320
R-squared 0.01 0.438 0.453 0.439 0.45 0.440 0.612
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported, Self-Employment Hours Worked per Year
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported hours worked across all self-employment jobs in the reference year. Sample 
limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for 
marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 
(i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are unweighted OLS.
The results, on the whole, are similar to those in Table 2.3, but with some
important differences we highlight. First, the average effect now is sensitive to
controlling for pre-treatment hours worked, which suggests there is much un-
75
observed heterogeneity across self-employed hours worked that it is important
to account for. In Column (2), the average effect is a reduction of 326.3 hours,
which is a 143% decline relative to the sample mean of 227.8 hours (Table 2.2a).
This finding suggests that a large proportion of workers respond to the receipt
of their Social Security Statement by no longer engaging in self-employed work.
This does not mean they exit the labor force, however, since most self-employed
hours come from workers with another, non-self-employed job.
While the pattern of age results is largely similar to those in Table 2.3, except
for a positive estimate for 60-61 year olds, the results in Column (6) suggest that
for self-employed workers only the first statement matters for self-employed
hours. This likely is due, at least in part, to the fact that workers reduce self-
employed hours dramatically upon first Statement receipt. When they receive
the second Statement, there is less room to adjust self-employed hours because
many workers have already reduced these hours to zero.
Finally, in Column (7), we show estimates by pre-Statement self-
employment hours worked. They are consistent with many full-time self-
employed workers leaving the labor force (or moving to non-self-employed
jobs). Among workers with 40 hours of self-employed hours, self-employed
hours work drops by 35% (706.5/2000), and there is a very large decline in hours
amongst those with more than 40 self-employed hours that is consistent with
these workers no longer working in self-employment.
While hours worked is our preferred measure of labor supply, since it is
a direct measure of worker behavior, it also is informative to examine earn-
ings changes related to Statement receipt. Earnings estimates are somewhat
hard to interpret in this setting, as workers may be switching jobs with differ-
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ent wage rates. It thus is not obvious how the hours effects will translate into
earnings changes. We analyze the effect of Statement receipt on earnings in Ta-
ble 2.5, which show estimates of equation (2.1) in which annual self-reported
labor market earnings are used as the dependent variable. The earnings esti-
mates are much noisier than the hours estimates in Table 2.3, but the signs and
magnitudes of the estimates tell a very similar story about worker responses to
Statement receipt. On average, earnings decline by about $570 per year, and
as with hours worked there is a strong age pattern. For earnings, there is evi-
dence that those with a college degree experience higher earnings as a result of
Statement receipt. Furthermore, those with a 2nd job have much higher earn-
ings post-receipt, on the order of a 28.6% increase relative to the pre-treatment
mean earnings level. This is a curious result, as these workers also decrease
hours worked significantly, which means they must be working in higher-wage
occupations post statement receipt.
Robustness Checks
As discussed in Sections 4 and 5, we make several data and modeling assump-
tions that are embedded in our main estimates. In this section, we explore the
sensitivity of our results to several of these core assumptions. First, we examine
how robust our estimates are to the use of sampling weights. As discussed in
Section 4, much of the research using HRS data does not use these sampling
weights. In part this is due to the fact that weights are not available in all years,
which significantly reduces the sample sizes available and introduces potential
biases in the age pattern of the sample. Our main analysis uses the unweighted
sample to avoid this problem, but it is important to assess whether this assump-
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Table 2.5
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Self-Reported Earnings, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Received Statement 2077 -570.3 1235 -746.1 -689.5
[1033]* [1153] [1602] [1235] [1264]
Age Category X Statement
40 to 44 11057
[8074]
45 to 49 1861
[4985]
50 to 54 -1483
[2339]
55 to 59 -1274
[946.2]
60 to 62 -530.3
[1630]
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -1027
[1476]
College X Statement -7694
[4366]*
More than College X Statement -2525
[4899]
Had a 2nd Job Last Interview -6594
[3174]**
2nd Job Last Interview X Statement 9960
[5836]*
Ever Received 2 Statements -1007
[2140]
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1822 4607 2244 2612 2408 4483
[6419] [3417] [4283] [3555] [2004] [3449]
Observations 13048 13048 12966 13048 13048 13048
R-squared 0.065 0.088 0.087 0.089 0.123 0.088
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported Earnings from All Jobs per Year, 2000 Dollars
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported earnings across all jobs in the reference year, price adjusted to 
2000 dollars with the CPI-U-RS. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 
Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in 
brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are unweighted OLS.
tion is driving our results. Appendix Tables 2.3 through 2.5 contain these re-
sults, akin to the analyses in Tables 2.3 through 2.5.6 We use the 1994 sampling
6Appendix Tables 2.2a and 2.2b contain descriptive statistics from our weighted sample.
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weights, which restrict us to the 1931-1941 birth cohorts. We therefore no longer
can examine effects among workers under 50.
The results in Appendix Table 2.3 match those in Table 2.3 closely. They are
somewhat larger in absolute value, but that is to be expected since the younger
workers with positive responses to the Statement now are excluded from the re-
gressions. For self-employed hours, shown in Appendix Table 2.4, the average
effect is now close to zero and is not statistically significant. However, the age
patterns and the patterns across the distribution of pre-treatment self-employed
hours worked are very similar to those in Table 2.4. For self-reported earnings,
shown in Appendix Table 2.5, the results also are similar to the baseline esti-
mates. While there now is stronger evidence of a declining age effect and the
negative estimate for receiving a second statement now is larger in absolute
value and statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level, the qual-
itative results and conclusions are very similar across the two tables. Overall,
we see little evidence that our decision to use the larger, unweighted sample
influenced the conclusions one can draw from our results.
As discussed in Section 4, we use self-reported earnings data in our main
analysis because the administrative earnings data are only available for peo-
ple who remain in the sample to one of the three “match years” in the HRS.
However, administrative earnings data have clear benefits over self-reported
data, and so in Appendix Table 2.6 we assess the robustness of our results to
using earnings data from the matched SSA earnings files. These estimates are
weighted by the 1994 HRS person-level weights, combined with the estimated
inverse predicted probability of being in the SSA-matched sample as a function
of respondent observables in 2004 that we estimate using a logit model. The
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resulting estimates are quite imprecise. Aside from the positive but not statis-
tically significant average estimate in Column (1), the results are on the whole
qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.5. There is little evidence to suggest that
our use of self-reported earnings is driving our main earnings results.
2.6.2 The Effect of Multiple Statement receipt on Dynamic La-
bor Supply
We now turn to our analysis of how workers responded to receipt of multiple
rounds of information that allowed them to update their knowledge of their So-
cial Security wealth after their response to the first Statement receipt. Table 2.6
shows estimates of equation (2.2).7 The main coefficient of interest here is the
estimate on Decreased Hours X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w.8 This coefficient
shows how workers who decreased their hours worked between two survey
waves ago and the prior wave and who received a second Statement between
the prior and current wave changed their labor supply relative to workers with
the same pattern of lagged hours changes but who did not receive a second
Statement.9 The thought experiment underlying this regression is to compare
two workers who reduced their labor supply due to receiving the first Statement
but only one of whom received the second Statement. If the reduction in hours
worked was due to a mis-interpretation of the information given in the State-
7Note that the sample sizes have declined because in order to measure lagged labor supply
responses we have to start our analysis sample at wave 3.
8Although the estimates presented correspond to any decrease in labor supply, we have also
used various minimum thresholds of decrease, such as 200, 300 or 400 hours. The estimates and
their statistical significance remain unchanged.
9Note that very few workers have identical labor supply across the two surveys. Thus, all
changes among those who reduce their labor supply are relative to workers who increase their
labor supply in Table 2.6.
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ment, then workers who had reduced their labor supply when they received the
first Statement should increase their labor supply when they receive the second
one.
Table 2.6
(1) (2)
Ever Received Statement -47.84 -45.12
[69.19] [69.32]
Ever Received 2 Statements -518.7 -526.3
[194.5]*** [224.2]**
Received a Statement by w-1 104.2 140.7
[99.33] [89.43]
Decreased Hours between w-2 and w-1 -235.2
[113.8]**
Decreased Hours X Statement by w-1 -14.24
[224.4]
Decreased Hours X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 268.9
[221.1]
Decreased Earnings between w-1 and w-2 -9.756
[47.32]
Decreased Earnings X Statement by w-1 -111.8
[79.33]
Decreased Earnings X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 277.8
[131.1]**
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Constant -567.5 -606.2
[163.7]*** [158.6]***
Observations 10387 10387
R-squared 0.057 0.053
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported Hours Worked per Year
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Hours Worked, By Changes in Labor Supply in Previous Waves, Linear 
Regression Results, 1992-2002
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported hours worked across all jobs in the reference 
year. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of 
Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard 
errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are 
unweighted OLS.
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The results in Table 2.6 are consistent with this story. Among those who
decreased their hours between w− 2 and w− 1, but who did not recently receive
a second Statement they continue to reduce their hours worked by 235 hours
per year. However, if such workers received a second Statement, this effect
goes to zero. While the coefficient on Decreased Hours X 2nd Statement Between
w-1 and w is not statistically significant at even the 10% level, the magnitude
of the coefficient is highly suggestive that the updated information from the
second Statement led those who had previously reduced their labor supply to
increase it again. That those who do not receive the second Statement continue
to reduce their labor supply suggests we are not just picking up mean reversion.
Rather, we interpret this as evidence that a set of workers misunderstood the
information on the Statement to be accumulated (rather than projected) wealth
and therefore reduced their labor supply. Only when they receive the updated
information do they reverse this labor supply decline, and the magnitude of the
coefficient is consistent with a complete reversal of the previous decline.
The estimate for earnings in Column (2) is more precise than for hours and
points to the same conclusion. For those with decreased earnings between w− 2
and w − 1, those who receive a Statement prior to the current survey wave in-
crease their earnings significantly. The estimated earnings effect is $277.8, and it
is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This evidence is
consistent with a set of workers responding to the information on the Statement
incorrectly due to a mis-interpretation of the information. Only when this infor-
mation is updated can they see their mistake, and they respond by increasing
their labor supply. At least for this set of workers, the misleading manner of
the Social Security information likely made them worse off than if they had not
been given this information. This is particularly true because of the negative
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utility effects of labor market re-entry among older American that prior work
has estimated (Rust and Phelan 1997).
While the results in Table 2.6 are highly suggestive of worker “mistakes”
from misinterpretation of the Statement information, it is possible these work-
ers knew what they were doing and we are picking up planned intertemporal
changes in labor supply that happen to be correlated with Statement rollouts.
If so, the labor supply changes we analyze should show up in respondent-
reported expected PIA. That is, if workers reduced their labor supply in re-
sponse to the Statement knowing full well it would reduce their Social Security
Wealth, we should observe reported PIAs declining.
We explore this question directly in Table 2.7. Here, we use all workers who
report an expected PIA as well as workers who report an accrual rate of at least
1%10 to focus on those whose Social Security benefits are strongly tied to their
continued labor force participation. For workers with an accrual rate of at least
1%, we can be sure that their Social Security wealth will decline if they reduce
their labor supply. The dependent variable in this table is an indicator for report-
ing that one’s expected PIA declined between this survey and the prior survey
wave. In Columns (1) and (3), there is no evidence that workers who decrease
their labor supply believe this will reduce their PIA. This is direct evidence that
even older workers do not have a firm grasp of the fact that reducing their hours
will negatively influence their Social Security wealth.11 These estimates support
10The accrual rate was calculated as the percentage difference between monthly benefits if an
individual did not work at all between the present and the collection date or if they worked
one additional year at the same earnings level. Hence, it is a measure of returns to working
one more year at the same earnings level, consistent with Coile and Gruber (2001)’s approach
to modeling retirement incentives.
11While Liebman and Luttmer (2012) find that about 57% of respondents to their survey report
that having higher earnings will increase future benefits. However, this still leaves a large por-
tion of workers who do not understand this incentive, and they are unable to ascertain whether
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our contention that the changes in labor supply shown in Table 2.6 reflects re-
sponses to misleading information.
Table 2.7
Effect of Statement Receipt on Decrease in Expected PIA, Linear Probability Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decreased earnings from w-1 to w 0.017 0.040*** -0.002 0.061**
[0.013] [0.017] [0.023] [0.027]
Ever received Statement 0.049 0.089*
[0.035] [0.050]
Decreased earnings X received Statement -0.027 -0.077***
[0.024] [0.028]
Age fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
PIA Accrual Rate at least 1% No No Yes Yes
Constant 0.003 -0.046 -0.029 -0.101*
[0.017] [0.046] [0.025] [0.061]
Observations 2046 2046 1171 1171
R-squared 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.020
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Decreased Expected PIA from w-1 to w
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is whether individual decreased expected PIA from last interview 
to current interview. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 
Quarters of Coverage by 1992) who had a predicted PIA last interview and current interview and did not change expected 
retirement date between the two interviews. PIA Accrual Rate calculated as percentage change between PIA based on working 
one more year at current earnings level and PIA based on only earnings up until current year. All regressions control for marital 
status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year 
levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are unweighted OLS.
In Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.7, we examine how the likelihood a re-
spondent reports declines in expected PIA respond to Statement receipt. Inter-
estingly, for those who have not received a statement, workers correctly report
that reductions in their labor supply will reduce their PIA. However, having re-
ceived the Statement eliminates this effect, especially for those individuals who
will actually experience a decline in their projected PIA due to lower earnings.
The central reason behind this finding is that workers interpret the Statement
information as accumulated wealth, and so they do not believe that reducing
labor supply will reduce their accumulated PIA.
workers have the correct beliefs about the magnitude of this slope.
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On the whole, this evidence suggests that older workers mis-interpreted
the information they were given. While there is some knowledge that reduc-
ing hours worked will lower one’s PIA, the information in the Social Secu-
rity Statement gave individuals the mistaken belief that their PIA would not
change when they reduced their labor supply. As a result, many workers re-
duced their hours worked. When they received the updated Statement, how-
ever, they then increased their hours worked again. Our findings thus are con-
sistent with workers being highly responsive to retirement wealth information.
But this finding also highlights the need for this information to be transparent
and easy to understand, or workers will respond to the information by making
optimization errors that can lead them to being worse off.
2.6.3 The Elasticity of Labor Supply with Respect to Perceived
Social Security Benefit
A core questions in the economic analysis of the Social Security system is how
Social Security wealth or benefits affects labor supply. The prior literature has
focused mostly on the effect of Social Security wealth on retirement decisions
of older workers (e.g., Krueger and Pischke 1992; Samwick 1998; Gruber and
Orszag 2000; Coile and Gruber 2001). The only prior paper of which we are
aware that estimates how the labor supply of relatively younger workers re-
sponds to their perceived Social Security benefits is Liebman et al. (2009). They
exploit five discontinuities in the Social Security benefits formula to identify
how workers respond net-of-tax benefit incentives, finding an elasticity of hours
worked of 0.691 and an earnings elasticity of 0.21. Our analysis differs from
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theirs by exploiting an information shock about future benefits rather than a
change in the Social Security benefits formula to which workers are exposed
that explicitly altered work incentives.
The main difficulty in estimating the labor supply elasticity with respect to
Social Security benefits is that these benefits are highly endogenous to underly-
ing labor force attachment. To the extent that the rollout of the Social Security
Statement was exogenous with respect to worker labor force attachment, which
we believe is a plausible assumption, it can be used as an instrument for worker
beliefs about Social Security benefits.12
We first estimate OLS estimates of the relationship between expected PIA
(i.e. monthly Social Security benefit) and both earnings and hours worked.
These estimates are shown in Table 2.8, and we estimate these models both
with and without individual fixed effects. Our results indicate that, if anything,
workers respond positively to expected PIA. Without the fixed effects, the es-
timated earnings elasticity is 0.58, while the hours elasticity is much smaller at
0.09. They both are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
However, when we include worker fixed effects, these estimates become much
smaller. In particular, there now is little evidence of an hours effect.
Even with the individual fixed effects, we might be concerned the expected
PIA is endogenous. The endogeneity comes about because both changes in
worker expectations and labor supply could be driven by unobserved factors.
For example, a negative health shock could change current labor supply but
12Another way in which our estimates differ from prior work is to estimate labor supply ef-
fects of worker beliefs about their Social Security benefit rather than responses to actual benefits.
To the extent these differ, the relevant measure of benefits governing worker behavior should
be their beliefs, however, so we believe this is the more appropriate measure to use in such an
analysis.
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Table 2.8
Elasticity Estimates of Expected Monthly PIA on Labor Supply, Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Participation
Ln(Expected PIA) 0.012* 0.120*** 0.081* 0.069*** -0.002
[0.007] [0.031] [0.04677 [0.014] [0.028]
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre-Statement Hours Category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No No Yes No Yes
Obs 4632 3599 3599 3780 3780
R-squared 0.436 0.266 0.632 0.235 0.485
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Ln(Earnings) Ln(Hours Worked)
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is log self-reported earnings or self-reported hours worked. Sample 
limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992) who 
had a predicted PIA. All regressions control for marital status, education, race, hours worked before first Statement receipt, and age 
and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-
6). All specifications are unweighted OLS.
not expectations about one’s future PIA. This would bias our estimates towards
zero. In addition, any changes in the timing of retirement preferences should
impact expected PIA changes but not hours or earnings changes, which again
would bias our estimates toward zero.
The rollout of the statement plausibly overcomes these problems by provid-
ing a source of variation in expected PIA that is unrelated to unobserved factors
that can influence retirement wealth expectations as well as labor supply. IV
estimates of the effect of expected PIA on labor supply are shown in Table 2.9.
We instrument expected PIA with an indicator for whether an individual has
received a Statement and the interaction with pre-Statement PIA. Note that we
we also estimate this model using individual fixed effects, but due to a weak
first stage the results are less credible, although the resulting estimates are qual-
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itatively similar. The first stages shown in Table 2.9 are strong, with F-statistics
between 28 and 38. As expected, and consistent with prior research workers’ be-
liefs about their Social Security benefits are strongly affected by the Statement
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(Mastrobuoni 2011). We provide instrumental variable analysis of not only in-
tensive margin labor supply (log hours worked and log earnings), but also of
the extensive margin participation decision.
The IV estimates show a strong, positive effect of expected PIA on the inten-
sive labor supply of older workers. The participation elasticity still has a posi-
tive elasticity, but it loses its statistical significance. The hours elasticity is 0.26
and the earnings elasticity is 0.78. The former is statistically significantly from
zero only at the 10% level, but the latter is statistically significantly different
from zero at over the 1% level. In short, increases in worker beliefs about their
Social Security benefits driven by receipt of the Statement increase their labor
supply. Table 2.10 breaks down these IV estimates by age group. The clear im-
plication is that the prior positive elasticity estimates are driven by those within
6 years of the early retirement age, thus supporting the notion that Social Secu-
rity increases earnings and hours worked amongst older workers who are not
quite at the early claiming age.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines how older workers respond to information they receive
about their retirement benefits from the Social Security Statement. We exploit
the rollout of the Statement to different birth cohorts and different years that we
argue was uncorrelated with the underlying labor force attachment and retire-
ment preferences of each cohort. One of our main contributions is to examine
labor supply responses that include both the intensive and extensive margins,
and we find that older workers’ labor supply is highly responsive to receiv-
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ing information about future Social Security benefits. Statement receipt leads
to a reduction of 198 hours worked, on average. However, our estimates point
to significant heterogeneity in this response. Workers age 50-61 reduce hours
worked, and there is some evidence that workers aged 40-49 increase hours
worked. Workers with a second job are also highly responsive. The is much
heterogeneity across the distribution of pre-treatment hours worked as well,
with low-hours workers increasing their labor supply post-treatment and high-
hours workers significantly reducing their labor supply in response to receiving
a Statement. We show these effects are evident for self-employed hours worked
and, for the most part, show up in earnings.
In the second part of our analysis, we explore the extent to which the in-
formation on the Statement may have led some workers to mistakenly reduce
their labor supply. This would happen if workers thought the information they
were receiving was accumulated rather than projected wealth. We find evidence
that this is the case using the rollout of the second Statement workers received
that allowed them to update their information. Among workers who reduced
their hours worked in the prior period due to the first Statement receipt, they
increased their labor supply when they received the second Statement but not
if they did not receive it. This evidence suggests that once workers’ information
was updated, they corrected their mistakes and increased their labor supply.
Our results highlight the importance of providing clear information to work-
ers, as it is likely at least some people were left worse off from this misleading
information.
Finally, we use the rollout of the Statement as an instrument for workers’
beliefs about their expected PIA to estimate the labor supply and earnings elas-
90
ticities with respect to expected Social Security wealth levels. These are among
the first estimates in the literature of this parameter, as the majority of prior
work has focused on labor force participation effects only. We find that worker
hours and earnings increase when their expected PIA increases, which suggests
this information does not, on the whole, dis-incentivize them from working.
Taken together, our results suggest that information older workers have
about their retirement benefit levels is an important driver of their labor supply.
However, our estimates also suggest caution in providing such information, as
unless it is accurate and clear to workers what the implicit incentives are in the
information being shared, they could be induced to make optimization errors
that leave them worse off. That workers are so responsive to information pro-
vides much scope for information-based policy interventions to help them make
more informed labor supply decisions as they approach retirement. An impor-
tant area for further research is how to provide this information in the most
salient and accurate way possible to avoid the complications that we show arise
when information is misleading.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF DISABILITY-PROGRAM INCENTIVES ON THE LABOR
SUPPLY OF SSDI BENEFICIARIES: AN ANALYSIS USING SSI AND SSDI
PROGRAM INTERACTIONS
3.1 Introduction
A central question of the disability literature is the extent to which the bene-
fit structures of Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security
Program, the two federal disability programs, affect labor supply among cur-
rent recipients. This question is not purely academic: the rapid rise in these
programs’ rolls in the past two decades, coupled with an almost complete lack
of exit from these programs back into the labor force, has led to Congress and
the Social Security Administration’s interest in proposals to mitigate this rise or
encourage labor force re-entry. One of the foremost policy changes is to alter the
benefit reduction rate for SSDI recipients: currently, SSDI recipients keep their
benefit until they earn above the Substantial Gainful Activity level (currently at
$1,070 per month), but if they earn above that level, then their benefit is entirely
withheld. One proposed change would be to instead reduce benefits by $1 for
every $2 of earnings above the SGA level. Implementation of this change may
increase work among SSDI beneficiaries, but it may also induce entry of oth-
erwise non-recipient workers onto the now more generous SSDI program. In
order to weigh this cost with the benefit of increased work, labor supply elastic-
ities with respect to SSDI policy parameters must be estimated.
However, studies of the incentive effects of these programs have been ham-
strung by a general lack of regional variation in SSDI, as well as difficulty in
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identifying the eligible population. A recent research agenda attempting to pre-
dict the induced entry and labor supply effects of a change in work incentives
has used variation in both the Substantial Gainful Activity level and local wages
to construct an estimate of the real local SGA and use the considerable de facto
variation in this variable to estimate induced entry (Maestas and Zamarro 2012).
Additionally, there is a large randomized control trial in the field to test exactly
this proposed intervention on the labor supply of SSDI beneficiaries: the Benefit
Offset National Demonstration. Under contract from the Social Security Ad-
ministration, researchers from Abt Associates, as well as Mathematica Policy
Research and other subcontractors, have implemented a nationally representa-
tive trial, whereby SSDI beneficiaries at demonstration sites are randomly cho-
sen to face this $1 for $2 benefit offset. Although ongoing, preliminary results
are consistent with the results found in this paper: SSDI beneficiaries are not
substantially more likely to work when offered this more generous offset (Gu-
bits et al. 2013).
These results are also generally consistent with other low estimates found in
the field (Gruber 2000, French and Song 2012, Maestas et al. 2013, Moore 2014),
with the only dissenting estimates coming from a study of the Norwegian DI
system (Kostol and Mogstag 2014). The lack of comparability of this estimate
to the American disability insurance environment, and the health insurance en-
vironment in particular, most likely accounts for the greater responsiveness of
Norwegian DI beneficiaries. However, the majority of the papers cited above
identify these elasticities from overall acceptance versus rejection from SSDI or
staying on the SSDI rolls versus leaving them. Although the variation exploited
provides strong internal validity to these studies, the applicability of their esti-
mates to changes in benefit reduction rates is less straightforward. Additionally,
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these studies either implicitly or explicitly ignore other programs which these
beneficiaries may be receiving benefits from and which may affect labor supply
decisions of this population.
For example, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the other federal disabil-
ity program, differs from SSDI in two ways. First, there is a maximum federal
benefit as opposed to a benefit based on one’s previous earnings. Second, it
is means tested, and is thereby primarily targeted toward the elderly or dis-
abled poor. However, its disability determination process is the same as SSDI.
Thus, the existence of SSI creates program interaction incentives that may af-
fect the decision-making of current SSDI beneficiaries or potential SSDI appli-
cants. However, most analyses of these programs have treated them separately,
and although the demographics of the SSI population more closely resemble
the welfare population than SSDI recipients (Daly and Burkhauser 2003), there
is substantial overlap between these two programs for a given disabled indi-
vidual or a household containing a disabled individual. For example, in 2011,
about 30% of SSI recipients also received SSDI benefits, and about 17% of SSDI
receipients also received SSI benefits. SSI recipients are required to apply for
any other possible program benefits they may be eligible for, including SSDI,
the benefits from which offset SSI dollar-for-dollar. Therefore, many disabled
individuals not currently on SSI, in the absence of their SSDI benefit, would be
receiving SSI benefits instead.
To address both the range of program incentives an SSDI beneficiary may
face, as well as the potential effect of an intensive change in benefit reduction
rates instead of an extensive change in whether an individual receives any ben-
efits, this paper utilizes the regional and temporal variation in program incen-
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tives that results from the interaction between SSDI and SSI. In effect, it exploits
the complex program interactions to identify earnings’ responsiveness to differ-
ent policy parameters that are otherwise difficult to measure by observing only
one program.
In particular, many states provide supplements for SSI benefits. Because SSI
recipients are required to apply for SSDI benefits, which have a different benefit
reduction rate than SSI, the budget constraints for a given SSDI benefit can vary
widely across states. Further, there have been large changes in the SGA and
in these state SSI supplements over time. The result is that for a group of SSI-
eligible individuals with similar SSDI benefits, the implicit marginal tax rate can
be vastly different along wide ranges of earnings.
This difference in implicit marginal tax rates creates different incentives to
work for otherwise similar individuals currently on SSDI. In this paper, I con-
struct measures of the returns to work and the variation in these returns due to
similar SSDI beneficiaries facing the 50% benefit reduction rate of SSI versus the
SSDI budget constraint. Using these measures, I then test the responsiveness
of current disability recipients’ labor supply to implicit marginal tax rates with
Survey of Income and Program Participation panels matched to Social Secu-
rity administrative earnings records. Broadly consistent across reduced-form,
simple structural, and maximum likelihood kinked budget constraint estima-
tion, these elasticities are general lower than previous estimates in the literature.
They range from -0.14 to -0.36 for participation, and -0.37 to -0.64 for earnings.
One explanation for these lower estimates relative to the literature is the source
of variation: otherwise similar SSDI beneficiaries facing a 50% benefit reduction
rate. This variation stands in contrast to the more widely used variation in the
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literature: facing outright acceptance or rejection of SSDI benefits. However, it
is this variation, a 50% benefit reduction rate, that is of direct relevance to the
proposed policy change.
This paper is thus the first to provide labor supply estimates for US disabil-
ity insurance beneficiaries based on changes in the disability benefit reduction
rate, as opposed to shifts in other program parameters. Additionally, although
the Benefit Offset National Demonstration is currently in the process of imple-
menting a randomized control trial to experimentally estimate similar elastic-
ities, the analysis in this paper has the advantage of occurring in an existing,
naturalistic setting, as opposed to BOND’s combination of a program shift with
a large information intervention about benefits. Also, this analysis specifically
exploits the interactions between SSI and SSDI, allowing for a full understand-
ing of the marginal incentives facing many SSDI beneficiaries, while BOND and
other previous work on the topic largely ignores or merely controls for SSI re-
ceipt, assuming an independent effect of this other program on work behavior.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes SSDI, SSI,
and the sources of variation in their interaction; section 3 describes the Survey of
Income and Program Participation panels; section 4 presents the identification
strategy and results; section 5 concludes.
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3.2 SSDI, SSI, and Their Interaction
3.2.1 Social Security Disability Insurance
Social Security Disability Insurance is the disability social insurance program
within the Old Age, Survivors, and Disabled Insurance social insurance - gen-
erally referred to as Social Security - and provides earnings replacement for
working-age adults. As such, benefit determination follows many of the same
rules as Social Security Old Age Insurance benefits. However, because SSDI is
designed for working-age adults, the eligibility requirements and benefit deter-
mination differ depending on age; for instance, while retirement benefits are
based on 35 years of highest earnings, SSDI benefits are based on between 2 and
35 years of earnings, depending on age at time of disability eligibility.
To qualify for SSDI benefits, a potential beneficiary must be both medically
eligible and satisfy SSDI’s recent-work requirement. The medical eligibility is
based on both the nature and severity of the impairment, as well as earnings
capacity. If applicants’ conditions are not in the Listings of Impairments, then
their work capacity is evaluated. In order to be eligible, they must be unable
to earn above a Substantial Gainful Activity level, at $1,010 per month for non-
blind individuals in 2012. This SGA level has been indexed to average wage
growth since 2001; prior to 2001 it was increased on an ad hoc basis.
The second requirement for eligibility, the recent-work requirement, is age
dependent. For example, a 20-year-old applicant must have earned 6 Quarters
of Coverage in the most recent 3 years (12 quarters), while a 50-year-old appli-
cant needs to have earned 20 Quarters of Coverage in the most recent 10 years
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(40 quarters). In 2011, a Quarter of Coverage was awarded for each whole mul-
tiple of $1,120 of earnings, with up to 4 QCs awarded per year.
Since SSDI is a social insurance program, a potential program participant’s
benefit level is calculated using previous earnings, or how much was paid into
the program during his or her lifetime. SSDI follows the same calculation pro-
cess as Old Age Insurance, first determining an Average Indexed Monthly Earn-
ings (AIME) based on a given number of computation years, which is then
translated into a monthly benefit through the progressive Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA) schedule. Of particular note is that individuals generally face
different benefit levels, derived from their earnings history, and the parameters
in the AIME and PIA calculation are indexed to national average wage growth
in the US, and therefore these benefits for successive cohorts tends to increase
faster than price growth.
Once a future beneficiary applies and goes through the up-to-five stage de-
termination and appeals process, is accepted and starts receiving benefits, she is
on the SSDI rolls. Her benefit is then indexed to price inflation, and she enters a
Trial Work Period, where she will receive her full benefits regardless of earnings.
However, in the event she earns more than a certain threshold amount, $720 per
month in 20121 for 9 months out of a rolling 5 year window, she exits the Trial
Work Period and enters an Extended Period of Eligibility. During the EPE, the
beneficiary continues to receive her monthly benefit as long as her earnings are
below the SGA level. She receives no benefits in the months her earnings are
above the SGA. However, during the three-year EPE, if her earnings fall back
below SGA, she will automatically start receiving here monthly benefit again.
1Note that this value is less than the Substantial Gainful Activity level; additionally, it has
been indexed to wage growth since 2001, but was increased only ad hoc before then. See Table
3.1 for the historical TWP level.
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Table 3.1
Year Blind SGA Non-Blind SGA
1975 200 200 50
1976 230 230 50
1977 240 240 50
1978 334 260 50
1979 375 280 75
1980 417 300 75
1981 459 300 75
1982 500 300 75
1983 550 300 75
1984 580 300 75
1985 610 300 75
1986 650 300 75
1987 680 300 75
1988 700 300 75
1989 740 300 75
1990 780 500 200
1991 810 500 200
1992 850 500 200
1993 880 500 200
1994 930 500 200
1995 940 500 200
1996 960 500 200
1997 1000 500 200
1998 1050 500 200
1999 1110 700* 200
2000 1170 700 200
2001 1240 740 530
2002 1300 780 560
2003 1330 800 570
2004 1350 810 580
2005 1380 830 590
2006 1450 860 620
2007 1500 900 640
2008 1570 940 670
2009 1640 980 700
2010 1640 1000 720
2011 1640 1000 720
2012 1690 1010 720
Historical Monthly Substantial Gainful Activity Level
* = in 1999, the SGA was 500 for the first half of the year. Source: SSA 
website.
Trial Work Period 
Threshold
Despite this complex structure, the bottom-line implication is that as long
as a beneficiary earns under the SGA, she will receive her full monthly bene-
fit, while if she earns above the SGA, she’ll lose it entirely. As such, for every
99
additional dollar of earnings below the SGA, there’s a zero implicit marginal
tax rate in the SSDI system. However, exactly at the SGA, there’s an earnings
“cliff” representing a massive implicit marginal tax, and, depending on one’s
SSDI benefit relative to the SGA level or earnings, this cliff can represent large
volatility in total monthly income. See Figure 3.1 for a schedule of earnings and
its effect on benefit level and total income. only intensive margin labor supply
(log hours worked and log earnings), but also of the extensive margin partici-
pation decision.
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Figure 3.1: Monthly Income and SSDI Benefit Schedule as a 
Function of Monthly Earnings, with a $900 SSDI Benefit in 2012
Total Income
(Earnings + SSDI)
SSDI Benefit
SGA = $1,010
1
1
This cliff shifts only when the SGA itself shifts. Although the SGA has been
approximately indexed to the National Average Wage Index since the early
2000s, before this period the SGA experienced sporadic and ad hoc adjustments.
See Table 3.1 for a history of the SGA level.
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The ad hoc nature of the SGA adjustments provides differing shifts between
pairs of years before the 2000s, in particular the 1989-1990 and 1999-2000 year
pairs.2 These dramatic shifts of the SGA provide one source of variation in the
returns to work embedded in the SSDI benefit structure and has been used on
its own to arrive at estimates of induced entry onto the program depending
on benefit levels (Maestas and Zamarro 2012). However, in this paper, I will
use both these shifts in the SGA and differences in program parameters from
the Supplemental Security Income program to provide variation in the benefit
reduction rate faced by otherwise similar SSDI beneficiaries.
3.2.2 Supplemental Security Income
Since SSI’s passage in 1972 and its implementation in 1974, the US federal gov-
ernment has provided a guaranteed income floor for disabled children, disabled
adults, and to all persons once they reach age 65 via a means-tested negative in-
come tax program. This level of the guarantee was designed to be enough to
lift those not expected to work out of poverty with a maximum Federal Benefit
Rate, indexed to price inflation and reduced accordingly as individuals receive
more income, be it earned or unearned. Further, SSI recipients are required to
apply for all other government programs for which they may be eligible, includ-
ing SSDI. The medical eligibility standards and process are the same for SSDI
and SSI applicants.
The maximum benefit for an individual in 2012 was $698. Benefits are re-
duced as income rises: unearned income, including SSDI benefits, reduces SSI
2Although currently, my access to the SIPP-SSA does not allow separate identification of
blind SSDI recipients, the next version of the data will, allowing for another source of variation
in marginal incentives facing SSDI beneficiaries.
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benefits dollar-for-dollar after a $20 general income exclusion. For every $2 of
earnings, SSI benefits fall by $1 after a $65 monthly exclusion.3 In addition to
these income tests, SSI has a strict assets test. Countable assets cannot exceed
$2,000 for individuals or $3,000 for couples (these values are not indexed to in-
flation and were last adjusted in 1989). Some states provide supplements to the
federal SSI benefit level of varying generosity. Of those states with additional
benefits, these programs increase the maximum benefit but generally do not
change the benefit reduction scheme.4
The SSI program also allows for those receiving SSI benefits to continue to
do so even if they earn above the SGA level, as long as their SSI benefit is still
positive according to the benefit reduction formula, and they continue to qualify
for SSI under the medical disability and asset limit standards. As such, the
schedules for SSI benefit and income are linear, as shown in Figure 3.2.
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the first $65 of earnings are excluded under
the earned income exclusion, then the next $20 is excluded with the general in-
come exclusion (due to the assumption of no other income, earned or unearned).
There is then a $0.50 reduction in benefits for every $1 of earnings, meaning that
while the benefit falls smoothly until completely eliminated by earnings, pre-
tax total income rises by $0.50 for every dollar of earnings until the SSI benefit
is exhausted.
The SSI-disabled rolls have grown substantially over time, despite the real
value of federal benefits remaining fixed. Since 1975, the federal SSI benefit
3This $65 monthly earnings offset has stayed fixed in nominal terms over the entire window
of this study.
4As an example of a state that does change the benefit reduction scheme, in Wisconsin, the
SSI State Supplement is constant up until the Federal SSI benefit drops to zero, at which point
so does the supplement, thereby producing another small cliff. These exceptions are accounted
for in the analyses below.
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Income and SSI Benefit Schedule as a 
Function of Monthly Earnings, with a $698 SSI Benefit in 2012, 
Assuming No State SSI Supplement and No Other Income
Total Income
(SSI+Earnings)
SSI Benefit
0.5
1
1
guarantee has increased each year based solely on the growth in the consumer
price index (CPI-W) which, since 1975, has not grown as quickly as average
wage earnings. The National Average Wage Index, the basis for calculation of
SSDI benefits, has grown substantially faster than the CPI-W beginning in the
mid-90s. Thus all succeeding cohorts of adults coming onto the SSI-disabled
adults rolls since 1979 have received the same real value of benefits even though
the average American worker’s wage earnings have increased substantially
since then. Further, succeeding cohorts of adults coming onto the SSDI rolls
will experience increased disability benefits relative to SSI benefits (see Armour
et al. (2011) for a discussion of this change’s effect on disabled young adults).
In addition to this gradual change in the relative generosity of SSDI and SSI
benefits, individuals in different states will face different SSI benefit levels, and
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these SSI supplements also change over time when states opt to adjust them.
3.2.3 SSI-SSDI Interaction
Given this variation in SSDI and SSI policy parameters (SGA, SSI State Supple-
ments, Wage vs. Price Growth), across time and states5, different individuals
can face vastly different implicit marginal tax rates if eligible for both SSI and
SSDI, even if they have the same potential SSDI benefit. Figure 3.3 below illus-
trates these differences.
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Figure 3.3: SSI Benefit, SSDI Benefit, and Total Income for an 
Individual with No Other Income, a $500 SSDI Benefit in 2012, and 
No State SSI Supplement
Total Income
(SSDI+SSI+Earnings)
SSDI Benefit
SSI Benefit0.5
1
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1
1
5There is also a different SGA level and different SSI benefits for blind disabled individu-
als; however, this subsample is very small relative to the overall size of the rolls and has not
been increasing at a similar rate. Moreover, the data used in this analysis cannot distinguish
between these two types of disabling conditions - blind and non-blind - and therefore assumes
all individuals in the sample face the non-blind program parameters.
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Because the SSI benefit is reduced by both unearned income (dollar for dol-
lar) and earned income (fifty cents per dollar), the unearned SSDI benefit re-
duces SSI benefits. Additional work reduces the SSI benefit further, wherein
the beneficiary faces a 50% benefit reduction rate (once they are past the $65
earnings offset, which has stayed fixed in nominal terms). When the SSI benefit
is reduced to zero, the beneficiary faces no benefit reduction rate until the SGA
earnings cliff. Once an individual earns above the SGA and loses her SSDI bene-
fit, her SSI benefit is no longer offset by her SSDI benefit and thus rises, reducing
the magnitude of the SSDI-based income cliff and returning the beneficiary to a
50% benefit reduction regime. This regime lasts until the beneficiary earns up
to the point where the SSI benefit is reduced to zero due entirely to earnings,
wherein the individual has zero overall disability benefits and no longer faces
any benefit reduction rates.
Of note is the interval of earnings wherein earnings and the SSDI benefit
have reduced the SSI benefit to zero: the benefit reduction rate in this inter-
val is zero, while the benefit reduction rate for earnings on either side is 50%.
It is this rate difference that allows for identification of how work among the
disabled population differs according by implicit marginal tax rates. This rate
difference arises from the interaction of SSI and SSDI parameters, specifically
the SGA level, the relative value of federal SSI and SSDI benefits, and the level
of the SSI state supplement.6 The last parameter can vary over time, across fam-
ily types, and especially across states. See Table 3.2 for a list of the SSI state
supplements for non-blind individuals in 1988 and 2002 and the real difference
between them. Since most states’ SSI supplements have stayed constant or near-
6Additionally, the real value of the $65 SSI earnings offset has declined over time, which
increases the width of the first 50% benefit reduction regime.
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Table 3.2
Real % Change
1988 2002
Alabama 0 0 n/a
Alaska 305 362 -18.8%
Arizona 0 0 n/a
Arkansas 0 0 n/a
California 221 206.67 -36.0%
Colorado 58 37 -56.3%
Connecticut 393 202 -64.8%
Delaware 0 0 n/a
District of Columbia 15 0 -100.0%
Florida 0 0 n/a
Georgia 0 0 n/a
Hawaii 5 4.9 -32.9%
Idaho 73 52 -51.3%
Illinois 36 40 -24.0%
Indiana 0 0 n/a
Iowa 0 0 n/a
Kansas 0 0 n/a
Kentucky 0 0 n/a
Louisiana 0 0 n/a
Maine 10 10 -31.6%
Maryland 0 0 n/a
Massachusetts 129 121 -35.8%
Michigan 30 14 -68.1%
Minnesota 35 81 58.4%
Mississippi 0 0 n/a
Missouri 0 0 n/a
Montana 0 0 n/a
Nebraska 43 8 -87.3%
Nevada 36 44 -16.4%
New Hampshire 27 27 -31.6%
New Jersey 31 31.25 -31.0%
New Mexico 0 0 n/a
New York 72 87 -17.3%
North Carolina 0 0 n/a
North Dakota 0 0 n/a
Ohio 0 0 n/a
Oklahoma 64 53 -43.3%
Oregon 2 2 -31.6%
Pennsylvania 32 27.4 -41.4%
Rhode Island 59 64.35 -25.4%
South Carolina 0 0 n/a
South Dakota 15 15 -31.6%
Tennessee 0 0 n/a
Texas 0 0 n/a
Utah 9 0 -100.0%
Vermont 58 59.04 -30.3%
Virginia 0 0 n/a
Washington 28 13 -68.2%
West Virginia 0 0 n/a
Wisconsin 103 83.78 -44.3%
Wyoming 20 9.9 -66.1%
Source: Urban Institute's TRIM3 Policy Parameters
Nominal State Supplement
SSI State Supplements for Single Individuals, in Current Dollars, and Real 
% Change, 1988 and 2002
constant in nominal terms,7 there has been a decline in the real value of these
benefits over time. However, from 1998 to 2002, there have been 198 nominal
7The one exception is Minnesota, which increased their nominal benefit from 35% to 81%
from 1988 to 2002
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changes in state SSI supplements, with 61 of them over $10.
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Figure 3.4: Total Monthly Income for SSI/SSDI Eligible Individual as 
Function of Monthly Earnings, by State of Residence, With $600 
SSDI Benefit and No Other Income, 2011
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Because all of the aforementioned parameters have changed, sometimes dra-
matically, over the course of the past few decades, the incentives for otherwise
similar individuals can differ dramatically. For example, Figure 3.4 shows the
2011 income schedules for three SSI and SSDI eligible individuals with the same
monthly SSDI benefit of $600. One lives in Alaska (SSI state supplement of $362
in 2011), another in California (SSI state supplement of $156 in 2011), and a third
in Arizona (no SSI state supplement).
As is apparent, the width of the zero-rate interval differs dramatically from
state to state with otherwise similar individuals. In addition to a higher SSI
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Figure 3.5: Total Monthly Income for SSI/SSDI Eligible 
Individual as Function of Monthly Earnings, by June vs. July 
1999, With $400 SSDI Benefit and No Other Income
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state supplement level (weakly) shifting the total income line upward,8 thereby
shrinking the zero-rate interval, a higher SGA level will directly increase the
width of this interval by shifting the upper bound of the interval outward in the
earnings space. Figure 3.5 shows this shift by displaying the income schedules
of a given individual with a $400 SSDI benefit in June 1999 vs. July 1999, when
the SGA increased from $500 to $700.
The zero-rate interval increases markedly with this ad hoc increase in the
SGA in the middle of 1999. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrate how individuals
with the same SSDI benefit can face vastly different marginal incentives depend-
8An individual’s SSDI benefit could be high enough to completely offset her SSI benefit,
so the total income line before the SGA would stay fixed if the SSI state supplement were not
high enough. However, the post-SGA portion of the line is still strictly increasing in SSI state
supplement.
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Figure 3.6: Fraction Facing 50% Reduction Rate at each Potential 
Earnings Level, 1990-1999
ing on current SGA level and state of residence. It is through differences in SSI
state supplements, the SGA, and the SSDI benefit itself due to benefit parameter
changes, that creates this variation in the size of the zero-rate interval and the
surrounding 50% benefit reduction rates, which in turn allows for identification
of the effect of different marginal incentives on work behavior of those within
in the program. Figure 3.6 shows the fraction of individuals in my preferred
sample (SSDI beneficiaries who received SSI benefits at some point in my sam-
ple window) facing the 50% disability benefit reduction rate at each potential
monthly earnings level.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 SIPP Synthetic Beta and Completed Data Files
To estimate the effect of facing these different benefit reduction regimes on SSDI
beneficiaries’ labor supply, I use Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) panels matched to Social Security earnings and benefit administrative
records. The SIPP is a panel-format survey, with 2- to 4-year panels of house-
holds. In this analysis, I use the panels beginning in 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996,
2001, and 2004. Panel participants are then matched to numerous Social Secu-
rity administrative data: the Master Earnings File (with earnings and Quarters
of Coverage information from 1951 to 2006), the Master Beneficiary Records, the
Supplemental Security Records, and the Payment History Update System. Ac-
cess to these administrative-matched SIPP panels is restricted for the purposes
of confidentiality; to access the full SIPP-SSA matched files requires either a
Census Research Data Center project or contact with a Census or SSA coauthor
authorized to use these data on an approved project. However, a subset of the
SIPP-SSA, the Gold Standard File, is available via the Census Synthetic Data
Server as the SIPP Synthetic Beta. The SSB is designed to provide the benefits of
these matched data while preserving the confidentiality of survey respondents
- any researcher may apply for an account to use synthetic versions of the Gold
Standard File, requiring only a feasibility review.
The Gold Standard File (GSF) is created by sifting out and standardizing
comparable variables across the 1990 to 2004 SIPP panels. Then, these individ-
uals are matched to their Social Security Number and then to their Summary
Earnings Records and Detailed Earnings Records from the Master Earnings File,
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followed by further matches to each of the other administrative data sets. How-
ever, at this stage, the GSF contains missing values. These values are imputed
multiple times, resulting in four separate implicates, referred to as Completed
Data Files of the original Gold Standard File.
Last, all variables, except spousal link, type of OASDI benefit, and gender,
are synthesized, conditional on the values in a given Completed Data files. This
synthesis is performed four times for each Completed Data file, resulting in a
total of 16 implicates. See Abowd et al. (2006) for a thorough description of
the SSB project. Outside researchers construct and run their analyses on these
synthetic implicates and combine the results to produce single estimates. Once
this has finished successfully, an internal Census researcher then runs this anal-
ysis on the four non-synthesized Completed Data Files. These results are then
released according to the RDC project disclosure protocol.
All results presented here are the results from the Completed Data Files, with
code created on the Census Synthetic Data Server, tested on the SSB, then run
by an internal Census researcher on the confidential data, with the final results
then released. Although the SIPP Synthetic Beta requires only a feasibility-based
application process and an expedited disclosure process (in comparison to the
RDC project disclosure process), the SIPP Synthetic Beta contains far fewer vari-
ables than the public SIPP. In particular, there is no specific information on dis-
ability other than the work-limiting question from the public SIPP.
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3.3.2 Variable and Sample Construction
To estimate the labor supply elasticities using the variation described above,
I limit my analysis to SSDI beneficiaries who started being paid their benefits
prior to the current calendar year. My sample window stretches from 1988 to
2002, since this period has the greatest variation in SGA and state supplements.
I further limit the analysis to those under 62 to prevent interactions with Social
Security retirement benefits. I include only those individuals who are unmar-
ried or married with a non-SSDI/SSI-beneficiary spouse. Approximately 4% of
the sample is dropped with this latter exclusion; although there is potentially
exploitable variation between SSI/SSDI couples vs. individuals, modeling the
joint labor supply decisions of these spouses is distinct from the individual labor
supply decision and is thus beyond the scope of this analysis, especially given
the rarity of these couples.
My last restriction concerns SSI eligibility: not all SSDI beneficiaries are en-
titled to SSI benefits due to its asset test or because their SSDI benefit offsets the
SSI benefit available in their state completely. Fortunately, my dataset contains
a measure of non-housing wealth, which although fixed in time corresponding
to the respondent’s answer in a particular SIPP topical module, gives a sense
of how close to passing an asset test an individual is. Almost all analyses be-
low limit their sample to one of four subsamples: those who received SSI at
any point in our sample as determined by SSI administrative records, those
with under $2,000 in non-housing wealth (the asset test for individuals over
this time period), those with under $10,000 in non-housing wealth (including
those “near-eligible” for SSI, and those with non-negative non-housing wealth
under $10,000 (excluding those who may have more exotic financial holdings
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unlikely to be eligible for SSI). The results are largely consistent across these
subsamples, suggesting that although the elasticities estimated in this analysis
are for poorer SSDI beneficiaries, they most likely apply to a broader range of
SSDI beneficiaries than just those SSI eligible or near-eligible.
My dependent variables are either annual earnings or annual labor force par-
ticipation, which is defined as having any earnings in a year. Both of these vari-
ables are constructed using SSA administrative earnings. Additionally, monthly
self-reported hours worked and monthly self-reported earnings from 1990 to
2002 are accessible in the most recent 5.1 version of the SIPP Synthetic Beta.
However, these hours variables correspond to months in which SIPP respon-
dents are currently in a survey, and therefore last for between 2 to 4 years de-
pending on which panel the individual is in and have no observations for 1995
or 2000. Moreover, these monthly self-reported variables do not sit astride a
large source of variation in this analysis: the ad hoc shifts in the SGA levels in
1990 and 2000.
Next, for each individual I must determine their SSDI benefit, their poten-
tial SSI benefit, any potential AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp benefits available
to them, and the taxes they may need to pay. Although the Master Beneficiary
Record (MBR) and Payment History Update System (PHUS)9 both have infor-
mation on the initial payments due to SSDI beneficiaries, these initial payments
may not be representative of monthly benefits due to back-pay. To determine the
SSDI benefit an individual would receive on a recurring basis, I use the admin-
9The MBR measures what an individual is determined to be entitled to and is retroactively
updated anytime a new OASDI determination is made, while the PHUS measures when an in-
dividual is actually paid out his or her benefits. As such they can differ dramatically, especially
with regard to individuals who appeal SSDI rejections. If they win their appeals, then their
eligibility date and benefit will correspond to their original application’s onset date, although
benefits will not be paid out to them until much later.
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istrative earnings records to reconstruct each SSDI beneficiary’s SSDI Primary
Insurance Amount at the time they were considered eligible for the program,
with this eligibility date determined by the MBR. However, I then assign the be-
ginning of their SSDI benefit receipt to the year after they receive their first SSDI
payment, as determined by the PHUS. Hence, these individuals have already
received any SSDI back-payments and are now receiving the monthly benefit
based on their earnings up to their date of eligibility.
I calculate potential maximum SSI benefits as the federal maximum, referred
to as the Federal Benefit Rate, in a given year, in addition to the SSI state sup-
plement in that year. Both the SSDI and SSI benefits are reduced according to
federal and state laws in each work scenario modeled in the analysis below.
Welfare benefits (AFDC/TANF) are modeled according to the same state
rules used by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) as well as the program rules in
the Urban Institutes TRIM3 model, taking into account year, family structure,
state of residence, earnings, and unearned income. Food Stamps benefits are
similarly modeled. I input these same income, location, and family structure
variables into NBER’s Taxsim program to calculate federal, state, and payroll
tax burdens and rates over this time period. Since the real value of these ben-
efits is of more relevance than their nominal amount, all income sources are
adjusted for general price inflation using the CPI-U-RS as well as regional vari-
ation with the Cost-of-Living Geographic Pricing Cost Index used by Medicare
to account for state-level cost-of-living differences. Tables 3.3a and 3.3b provide
descriptive statistics for all the dependent and independent variables used in
the analyses below.
114
Table 3.3a
Descriptive Statistics
Counts
Person-Years 397,615
Unique People 29,963
Mean
Dependent Variables (SD)
ln(earnings) 9.40
(1.57)
participation 0.68
(0.47)
Independent Variables
Expected in 50 0.16
(0.37)
Likelihood in 50 0.39
(0.19)
Age 42.02
(11.56)
Male 0.54
(0.50)
Married 0.45
(0.50)
Spousal Income if Married 17,466.52
(22,252.11)
Monthly Variables
Wage 10.96
(1.46)
Hours Worked 61.24
(87.98)
Benefit Levels Mean if Positive
# Positive (SD if Positive)
SSDI 392,720 903.17
(518.97)
SSI 125,881 249.55
(180.74)
SNAP 225,666 158.21
(91.27)
AFDC/TANF 34,662 280.24
(178.93)
Source: SIPP-SSA, unit of observation is person-year or person-wolf 
where appropriate, 1988-2002. Income measures in 2002 dollars with 
CPI-U-RS.
3.4 Analysis
In contrast to prior papers estimating labor supply elasticities, this analysis uses
three distinct techniques: a basic reduced form approach using differing benefit
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Table 3.3b
Demographics Characteristics
Education
No High School 76,696
High School 133,992
Some College 110,371
College 48,938
Graduate 27,618
Industry
Manufacturing 49,187
Wholesale/retail 44,759
Public services 121,711
42,300
Occupation
Managerial and Professional 66,646
Sales and Support 69,258
Other 121,540
Race
White 314,815
Black 60,708
Other 22,092
Hispanic
No 358,683
Yes 38,932
Wealth Category
Negative 43,122
Exactly 0 53,939
0 to 5,000 38,089
5,000 to 10,000 35,634
Agriculture, Mining, Construction, 
and Other
Source: SIPP-SSA, unit of observation is person-year, 
1988-2002
reduction rates from expected earnings, a more complex reduced form model
adapted from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), and a structural maximum likeli-
hood estimation adapted from Friedberg (2000)’s analysis of the Social Security
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retirement earnings test. Together, these distinct methodologies allow for addi-
tional checks on the robustness of the estimates.
3.4.1 Basic Reduced Form
This technique tests the following question: what is the labor supply of those
individuals more likely to face a 50% benefit reduction rate due to the state and
year in which they live, all things equal. This greater likelihood is calculated in
two ways: first, would an individual face the 50% benefit reduction rate given
average earnings among work-limited individuals of the same gender, marital
status, and family structure; or second, how likely is an individual to face a
50% benefit reduction rate, given the distribution of earnings of individuals of
the same gender, marital status, and family structure. The former is therefore a
binary variable, while the latter can take on any value between 0 and 1.
To calculate these measures I follow Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) in gen-
erating an earnings distribution based on a joint annual hours-worked - wage
distribution from the March Current Population Survey. However, I diverge
from their analysis in that I restrict the sample from the March CPS to those who
report a work-limiting health condition. Then I estimate the likelihood of their
earning at or above 6 different annual hours worked points (100, 200, 500, 1000,
2000, 2500) and 10 different hourly wages (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25), given
their gender, whether they were married, and whether they had any children.
This distribution was estimated based on pooled samples from the 1988-1995
March CPS and the 1996-2002 March CPS separately. Assuming that this is the
distribution of hours worked/wage offers available to a potential SSDI benefi-
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ciary amounts to the assumption that these SSDI beneficiaries face employment
options similar to the work-limited population more generally, and that such
beneficiaries have access to no more information about their career prospects
than a researcher.
I construct my sample according to the restrictions described in the above
section, where each individual contributes one observation for every year that
they have been receiving SSDI benefits after their first year of receipt up to age
62. With this sample and the distribution of earnings from the March CPS, I
then calculate the first likelihood: whether a given SSDI beneficiary who is po-
tentially eligible for SSI would face the 50% benefit reduction rate from the SSI
benefit system if they earned at the average earnings level in their state and
year. Additionally, I calculate the second likelihood: in what percentage of the
earnings distribution does an individual face the 50% reduction rate. Regressing
labor force participation or actual (log) annual earnings onto these likelihoods
gives an estimate of the effect of facing a 50% disability benefit reduction rate
on these labor supply components, following equation (1) below.
LS it = κ + αF(50%BRR)it + X′itB + Y
′
itΓ + Z
′
itΛ + it (3.1)
where LS it is a labor supply decision, either participation or earnings.
F(50%BRR) is a function indicating that either individual i in year t is expected
to face a 50% benefit reduction rate on his or her disability benefits, or the like-
lihood of facing this rate. Xit is a vector of standard demographics, such as
occupation, gender, marital status, having any children, and industry. Yit is a
vector of indicator variables for age, year, and state of residence, so the γ vec-
tor represents fixed effects for these variables. Last, Zit is a vector composed
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of the various income amounts when an individual i is not working in year t,
including SSI and SSDI benefits, AFDC/TANF benefits, Food Stamps benefits,
and spousal income if applicable. Cash benefits, SNAP benefits, and post-tax
earnings are each allowed to have a different coefficient, indicating that they
may have distinct effects on the labor supply decision.
These regressions results are included in Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6,10 wherein
the controls in equation (3.1) are gradually introduced. In the first 5 specifica-
tions, the sample is limited to individuals who have at some point received SSI
benefits, as determined by SSI administrative records. Although demograph-
ics and fixed effects do not substantially change the estimate for either earn-
ings or participation, the inclusion of additional income sources greatly reduces
these estimates, suggesting that a substantial component of facing a 50% disabil-
ity benefit reduction rate derives from benefit income in the no-work scenario.
Once these benefits are controlled for, the analysis produces participation elas-
ticities on the order of -0.2 to -0.3, depending on which measure of facing the
50% rate is used: binary or likelihood.11 These estimates are slightly lower than
those found in the literature, although the confidence intervals overlap with
such seminal estimates as Gruber (2000).
Table 3.5 presents earnings-level estimates, including those with no earn-
ings. Although including non-workers is non-traditional in the labor supply
elasticity estimation field, since many SSDI workers enter and exit the labor
10Additionally, Appendix Table 3.1 shows the impact on labor force participation at an annual
earnings rate higher than twelve times the Substantial Gainful Activity level. These results are
presented only in the appendix because an individual could earn many times the SGA in a year
provided they keep enough months under the Trial Work Period threshold to prevent leaving
the Trial Work Period.
11Although the coefficient on likelihood is higher than that of the binary variable, its average
in the population is much higher as well, so when rescaled to represent a shift from no benefit
reduction rate to a 50% rate, it produces comparable elasticity estimates as the binary variable,
albeit slightly higher.
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Table 3.4
Effect of Facing 50% Benefit Reduction Rate on Labor Force Participation, OLS Results
By Wealth Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected in 50 -0.246*** -0.195*** -0.236*** -0.091***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
Expected in 50 X Negative Wealth -0.099***
(0.038)
Expected in 50 X 0 -0.087***
(0.027)
Expected in 50 X 0 to 5,000 -0.107**
(0.046)
Expected in 50 X 5,000 to 10,000 -0.078**
(0.039)
Implied Elasticity [95% Range] -0.54 -0.43 -0.52 -0.20
[-0.56, -0.52] [-0.46, -0.40] [-0.56, -0.48] [-0.27, -0.14]
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, State, and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Spousal Income No No No Yes Yes
All Income When Not Working No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.043 0.046 0.065 0.080 0.098
Observations 17719 17719 17719 17719 13072
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ever SSI
Notes: OLS regression results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Dependent variable is SSA administrative earnings. Unit of 
observation is person-year. 1988-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received SSDI benefits at least one year ago. 
Demographics include education, occupation, industry, gender, and marital status. "Expected in 50" is a binary variable equalling 1 if 
facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate at the average earnings level for a work-limited individual of the same characteristics in the 
March CPS. "Likelihood in 50" is the probability of facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate given the distribution of earnings for a 
work-limited individual of the same characteristics in the March CPS. "Ever SSI" is whether the individual ever received SSI benefits. 
force during their benefit receipt spell, these elasticities are generally informa-
tive as to the response of earnings capacity to differing benefit reduction rates,
and lends itself to direct comparability to the maximum likelihood estimation
below. These earnings-level elasticities are larger than the participation elastic-
ity estimates, with the two preferred specifications providing point estimates of
-0.47 and -0.79, although these include both intensive and extensive labor sup-
ply responses.
Table 3.6 provides labor supply estimates with regard to log earnings and
therefore drops all non-workers from the sample. The preferred specifications
provide point estimates of -0.68 and -0.89. Although these estimates are higher
than the participation elasticities, suggesting that once an SSDI beneficiary is
working, she is more responsive to marginal incentives than when considering
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Table 3.5
Effect of Facing 50% Benefit Reduction Rate on Administrative Earnings, OLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected in 50 -8199.25*** -6996.04*** -8436.67*** -3826.27***
(149.92) (212.96) (340.36) (489.73)
Likelihood in 50 -15528.38***
(1191.46)
Implied Elasticity [95% Range] -1.02 -0.87 -1.05 -0.47 -0.79
[-1.05, -0.98] [-0.92, -0.82] [-1.13, -0.96] [-0.60, -0.35] [-0.91, -0.67]
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, State, and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Spousal Income No No No Yes Yes
All Income When Not Working No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.080 0.101 0.121
Observations 17719 17719 17719 17719 17719
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ever SSI
Notes: OLS regression results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Dependent variable is SSA administrative earnings. Unit of 
observation is person-year. 1988-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received SSDI benefits at least one year ago. 
Demographics include education, occupation, industry, gender, and marital status. "Expected in 50" is a binary variable equalling 
1 if facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate at the average earnings level for a work-limited individual of the same characteristics 
in the March CPS. "Likelihood in 50" is the probability of facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate given the distribution of 
earnings for a work-limited individual of the same characteristics in the March CPS. "Ever SSI" is whether the individual ever 
received SSI benefits. 
the extensive-margin employment decision, they are nevertheless inelastic es-
timates. The salient implication for the proposed benefit reduction rate is that
although such a rate change may not have a large effect on labor force partici-
pation, there will be a great responsiveness among SSDI beneficiaries who are
already in the labor force.
Additionally, estimates by wealth level in the latter two specifications show
no significant difference among wealth level, nor any marked trends as one
moves up the wealth distribution. Despite these elasticity estimates deriving
from poorer SSDI beneficiaries, there does not appear to be much heterogeneity
in these elasticities within the wealth distribution of this subsample, consistent
with a broader applicability of these results.
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Table 3.6
Effect of Facing 50% Benefit Reduction Rate on Log Administrative Earnings, OLS Results
By Wealth Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected in 50 -1.050*** -0.782*** -0.855*** -0.428***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.032) (0.055)
Expected in 50 X Negative Wealth -0.421***
(0.147)
Expected in 50 X 0 -0.383***
(0.108)
Expected in 50 X 0 to 5,000 -0.506**
(0.176)
Expected in 50 X 5,000 to 10,000 -0.365**
(0.152)
Implied Elasticity [95% Range] -1.58 -1.17 -1.28 -0.64
[-1.65, -1.50] [-1.27, -1.08] [-1.38, -1.19] [-0.81, -0.48]
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, State, and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Spousal Income No No No Yes Yes
All Income When Not Working No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.061 0.062 0.090 0.131 0.122
Observations 12049 12049 12049 12049 8889
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ever SSI
Notes: OLS regression results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Dependent variable is SSA administrative earnings. Unit of 
observation is person-year. 1988-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received SSDI benefits at least one year ago. 
Demographics include education, occupation, industry, gender, and marital status. "Expected in 50" is a binary variable 
equalling 1 if facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate at the average earnings level for a work-limited individual of the same 
characteristics in the March CPS. "Likelihood in 50" is the probability of facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate given the 
distribution of earnings for a work-limited individual of the same characteristics in the March CPS. "Ever SSI" is whether the 
individual ever received SSI benefits. 
3.4.2 Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) Model
Although the above reduced form approach controlled for possible confound-
ing variables, such as age, year, and state fixed effects and other income when
not working, it also ignores many of the returns to work an SSDI beneficiary
may face, over and above the incentives in SSI. In particular, such a beneficiary
may be entitled to AFDC/TANF benefits or Food Stamps benefits even while
working, or the tax code may have a positive or negative effect on returns to
work, depending on one’s EITC benefit. As such, a more comprehensive ap-
proach is necessary to determine what the net returns to work may be, and tak-
ing those into account, if there is a separate responsiveness to an additional 50%
benefit reduction rate imposed by the SSI. To this end, I adapt the model used by
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Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for labor force participation of single women fac-
ing changing AFDC and EITC benefits to the current case of SSDI beneficiaries
facing changing SSI benefits.
There is a fundamental tradeoff between realism and complexity when mod-
eling the returns to work facing a given individual. The interaction of so many
programs creates highly complex budget constraints, and a researcher should
include this complexity. However, there are two downsides that arise: the anal-
ysis itself loses tractability as the complexity grows, and an in-depth modeling
of the entire budget constraint is most likely far beyond the understanding that
the decision-makers being analyzed have. As such, the Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2001) approach addresses this tradeoff by estimating overall income at differ-
ent points in the hours-worked and wage distributions, then using these dis-
tributions, constructs an expectaction of the returns to work facing a particular
individual. This approach has the strength of including much of the complexity
that arises from the interactions of various social programs and tax systems but
provides a tractable comparison for analysis.
The core of this analysis is the question: when would a SSDI beneficiary
choose to work? Given that such an individual faces a random draw from a
distribution of wages and hours worked, calculated as the distribution of wages
and hours of similar individuals with work-limiting conditions in the March
CPS, a beneficiary will work if the expected utility of working exceeds the utility
from not working, i.e.:
Pr [E[Uw] > Unw] (3.2)
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To estimate equation (3.2), we take an error term k to be normal and U to
be linear in income and nonmarket time. In the linear case, the decision has the
simple form:
Pr
[
α(E[Yw] − Ynw) + β(E[Lw] − Lnw) + δE[S S Iw] + X′γ > nw − w] (3.3)
where X consists of demogaphics, Y is income, L is nonmarket time, and
S S Iw is whether an individual is receiving SSI benefits and faces a 50% bene-
fit reduction rate. An assumption of normality results in equation (3.3) being
rewritten with the normal cumulative distribution function Φ as:
Φ
[
α(E[Yw] − Ynw) + β(E[Lw] − Lnw) + δE[S S Iw] > 0 + X′γ] (3.4)
Moreover, the vector α can contain distinct coefficients for each source of
income: αtax, αS NAP, αbene f its, αearnings, so that these different kinds of income
can have different marginal contributions to utility. Taxes, SNAP, SSI, and
AFDC/TANF benefits are calculated at the individual level in each state and
year at each of the 60 intervals in the joint wage and hours distribution from the
March CPS described above.
With this assumption of normality, probit estimation of labor force partici-
pation provides estimates of the above coefficients with regard to participation.
Additionally, OLS estimation of log earnings will provide unbiased estimates
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with regard to intensive margin decision-making given large sample asymp-
totics. Furthermore, OLS estimation of earnings levels will also allow for es-
timation of the same combination of intensive and extensive labor supply as
discussed in the reduced form section. Results from these participation and
earnings analyses are included in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. Note that in Table 3.7,
the results reported are the average marginal effects from the probit estimate of
equation (3.4), while Tables 3.8 and 3.9 display OLS coefficents.
Similarly to the reduced form analysis, the inclusion of demographics, age,
year, and state fixed effects do not substantially affect the estimates, while in-
cluding income from in the no-work state as well as the total post-tax, post-
transfer income from the working state does bring down the estimates dramat-
ically. The implied elasticities for participation are in line with the higher end
of the range estimated in the reduced form model, but they are largely consis-
tent with the previous estimates, with a point value in preferred specification
(3.4) of -0.3, but having a less precise 95% confidence interval of -0.09 to -0.50
which includes the prior estimates entirely. Again, these elasticities are not sig-
nificantly different across different wealth levels, nor is there an obvious trend
as one moves up the wealth distribution. The results are also not significantly
different if one restricts the analysis to just single or married individuals. And
again, these estimates suggest a low labor force participation responsiveness to
differences in benefit reduction rates.
The earnings level elasticities in Table 3.8 are systematically, albeit not statis-
tically significantly, lower than both the participation elasticities in Table 3.7 and
the earnings level elasticities from the reduced form analysis. However, neither
of these differences are statistically signficant, and we can reject at greater than
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the 1% level that these estimates are elastic.
The log earnings analysis in Table 3.9 provides again provides intensive mar-
gin elasticitiy estimates higher than extensive margin elasticities, parallel to the
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reduced form analysis. However, in this more-inclusive estimation technique,
these larger elasticities are only slightly larger, at -0.37 in the preferred specifi-
cation and partially overlaps with the 95% confidence interval from the reduced
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form estimates.
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Overall, both of these analyses provide consistently low estimates of labor
force participation, in line with Gruber (2000)’s estimates from the Canadian
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disability system, implying that there is little reactivity to benefit reduction rates
alone, either on the intensive or extensive margin. Additionally, the consistently
lower, albeit noisier log earnings elastictiy estimates from the Meyer and Rosen-
baum (2001) approach suggest that not including the full range of returns from
work can upwardly bias responsiveness to disability benefit reduction rates,
perhaps due to tax credits such as the EITC.
This Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) approach provides the clearest modeling
of the complex budget constraint facing these SSDI beneficiaries without many
structural assumptions. As such, it is the preferred specification in this paper.
However, the strongest underlying assumption is that an individual faces a dis-
tribution consistent with that in the March CPS and that he or she is aware
of this wage and hours-worked distribution. To relax this assumption and to
include the entire possible budget constraint an individual may face, the next
section follows a structural approach to estimating labor supply elasticities by
including more assumptions about the form of the individual’s labor supply
function, but allowing for a direct and well-identified estimate of the parameter
of interest.
3.4.3 Maximum Likelihood Kinked Budget Constraint Model
The above Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) model took into account the average
return to work facing an individual across nearly all channels in the tax and
transfer system. However, it provided estimates based on expectations over
a set of earnings. In the event that SSDI beneficiaries’ possible earnings from
employment differs systematically from the earnings distribution used, the re-
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sults will be biased. Additionally, in as much as individuals may change their
earnings based on the structure of the implicit marginal tax they face, OLS or
probit analyses above will also be biased. In order to correct for these possible
biases, I use a maximum likelihood estimation technique that explicitly includes
the entire budget constraint an SSDI beneficiary faces when choosing her labor
supply.
I use the maximum likelihood estimation technique pioneered by Burtless
and Hausman (1978) and Moffitt (1986)’s design, and adapted by Friedberg
(2000) to study Social Security kinked budgets constraints. In particular, Fried-
berg (2000) estimates labor supply elasticities by exploiting changes in the Social
Security retirement benefit earnings test. Friedberg (2000)’s likelihood function
had three sections with one potential kink and the truncation of non-workers.
Because of the more complex interactions between SSDI and SSI and because the
participation decision is of vital importance to the policy proposal at hand, the
likelihood function included in this analysis has five sections and three kinks,
and specifically includes non-workers.
Following Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Friedberg (2000), a beneficiary’s
choice of hours H is determined by:
H(w,Y, X, α) = κ + Xβ + γw(1 − τ) + δY + α = Zθ + α (3.5)
where w is the gross wage, w(1 − τ) is the net wage, Y is virtual income, X are
demographics, and α represents unobserved heterogeneity in preferences.
There are five possible income/net wage regimes a beneficiary could fall
under due to the SSDI and SSI program interactions describes above which are
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described in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10
SSI Benefit Reduction Rates and Virtual Income for Maximum Likelihood Estimation
j Earnings Regime τ_SSI Y
1 Under the $65 earnings disregard 0 SSI + 20
2 Over the disregard, positive SSI income, under SGA 0.5 SSI + 65/2 + 20
3 SSI Income = 0, under SGA 0 SSDI
4 Over SGA, positive SSI Income 0.5 SSI +65/2
5 Over SGA, SSI Income = 0 0 0
Additionally, note that the kinks in the budget constraint are: 1) the $65 SSI
earnings offset; 2) the earnings under the SGA level at which SSI benefits are
entirely offset by the SSDI benefit, determined by:
Earnings(S S I = 0) = 2 ∗ (S S IFederal + S S IS tate − (S SDI − 20)) + 65
3) the SGA level itself; and 4) the earnings above the SGA level at which SSI
benefits are entirely offset by earnings:
Earnings(S S I = 0, S SDI = 0) = 2 ∗ (S S IFederal + S S IS tate) + 65
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Kinks 1 and 3 are convex and thus may involved bunching, while kinks 2 and 4
are concave and thus correspond to areas wherein individuals will not locate.
In addition to this benefit reduction rate, τS S I , the overall implicit marginal
tax rate includes the payroll tax, federal income tax, and federal EITC rates, i.e.
τ = τS S I + τtax. If married, these tax rates are evaluated with both spousal earn-
ings and own earnings. In this analysis, no additional social programs were
included; this exclusion is due to a particular criticism of this maximum likeli-
hood technique: if there is mismeasurement of either the dependent variable or
the budget constraint used by the individual when deciding on his or her labor
supply, then the parameters estimated are no longer unbiased or consistent.
In each specification, gross wage is the predicted wage drawn from distribu-
tion of wages for individuals reporting work-limiting disabilities in the March
Current Population Survey.12 Separate wages are predicted depending on gen-
der, marital status, having any children, and pre/post-1996. Demographics con-
trols include a linear time trend, white, Hispanic status, having any children,
marital status, gender, a linear age trend, and region (Northeast, South, Mid-
west, West).
The dependent variable is either self-reported hours worked Hit or self-
reported earnings Eit (where in only implicit marginal tax rates are used and
not net wages), both available on the monthly level. These observations are
available only while an individual is in a SIPP Panel, and thus stretch for 2 to
4 year periods, depending on which panel they are in. For example, for those
in the 1996 SIPP Panel, I observe their self-reported hours worked up through
12Although the gross wage could be directly calculated for working SSDI beneficiaries by
dividing earnings by hours-worked, doing so would lead to possible “Division Bias” issues
(Borjas 1980).
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1999. Since the first panel is available starting in 1990, there are no individuals
for whom I see monthly hours-worked across the two major SGA changes. The
variation driving this analysis is therefore in real changes in SSI benefits, as well
as structurally modeling virtual income, allowing for comparison across indi-
viduals with different SSDI benefits. The same problem is encountered using the
self-reported monthly earnings. However, this analysis requires a monthly-level
resolution, since the budget constraint parameters only hold on the monthly
level and do not aggregate up to the annual level. Therefore, this analysis sac-
rifices some exogenous variation in exchange for much greater measurement of
the actual budget constraint, the former of which is of first-order importance in
maximum likelihood budget constraint estimation (Friedberg 2000).
Combining all of these components together yields the following maximum
likelihood equation for each individual i. Note that each component has an in-
dicator variable, corresponding to 1 if an individual is on that particular portion
of the likelihood function in the month in question and 0 otherwise, indicated
by a K or an S , depending if they are at one of the three kinks in the budget
constraint (no-work, $65 earnings disregard, and SGA) or at the interior of a
segment. For some individuals, their SSDI benefit is so large that they will have
a zero SSI benefit at any earnings level below SGA. These individuals are indi-
cated by the variable I0i = 0. Alternatively, for some SSDI beneficiaries, their
SSI benefits are high enough such that no earnings level under SGA will reduce
their SSI benefit to zero. These individuals are indicated by the variable I1i = 0.
log(L(Hit)) = K0i ∗ I0i ∗ log
[∫ −Z1iθ
−∞
1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi
]
+ K0i ∗ (1 − I0i) ∗ I1i ∗ log
[∫ −Z3iθ
−∞
1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi
]
+ K0i ∗ (1 − I0i) ∗ (1 − I1i) ∗ log
[∫ −Z4iθ
−∞
1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi
]
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+ S 1i ∗ I0i ∗ log
[
1
σα
φ
(
αi=Hi−Z1iθ
σα
)]
+ K1i ∗ I0i ∗ log
[∫ Hi−Z2iθ
Hi−Z1iθ
1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi
]
+ S 2i ∗ I0i ∗ log
[
1
σα
φ
(
αi=Hi−Z2iθ
σα
)
∗ Φ
(
α
′
2,3
σα
)]
+ S 3i ∗ I1i ∗ log
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1
σα
φ
(
αi=Hi−Z3iθ
σα
)
∗
(
1 − I0i ∗ Φ
(
α
′
2,3
σα
))]
+ K2i ∗ I1i ∗ log
[∫ Hi−Z3iθ
Hi−Z2iθ
1
σα
φ
(
αi
σα
)
dαi
]
+ S 4i ∗ log
[
1
σα
φ
(
αi=Hi−Z4iθ
σα
)
∗ Φ
(
α
′
4,5
σα
)]
+ S 5i ∗ log
[
1
σα
φ
(
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σα
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∗
(
1 − Φ
(
α
′
4,5
σα
))]
Hi − Z jiθ = Hi − κ − Xiβ − γwi(1 − τ j) − δY ji
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
The terms involving α′k−1,k variables correspond to the nonconvex kinks
wherein an individual will not locate. Therefore, α′k is the value of α wherein
the individual’s indifference curve is tangent to both the lower slope prior seg-
ment and the higher slope subsequent segment. It is computed by equating the
indirect utility functions given by the linear labor supply function for these two
segments: eδw(1−τk−1)
(
yk−1 +
γ
δ
w(1 − τk−1) − γδ2 +
κ+Xβ+α
′
k−1,k
δ
)
=
eδw(1−τk)
(
yk +
γ
δ
w(1 − τk) − γδ2 +
κ+Xβ+α
′
k−1,k
δ
)
This maximum likelihood formula is then maximized using Stata’s standard
Newton-Raphson algorithm on the pseudo-maximum likelihood generated by
clustering at the individual level. Convergence was achieved in all maximiza-
tions.
Although the above maximum likelihood function follows the program rules
consistent with constant earnings levels, this function is misspecificed in the
134
event that SSDI beneficiaries consider exceeding the Trial Work Period threshold
as program exit instead of exceeding the Substantial Gainful Activity level.13 To
this end, I reestimate the above maximum likelihood function, but I replace the
SGA level with the TWP level. Results are reported in Tables 3.11 and 3.12.
All parameters are estimated with the predicted signs, and most are highly
statistically significant. The parameter of greatest interest in the hours-worked
analysis reported in Table 3.11 is “Net wage,” which can be interpreted as the
change in monthly hours worked when the net wage increases by $1. This pa-
rameter is precisely estimated at about 3.5 hours worked across both specifica-
tions. The implied elasticity is within a 95% confidence interval of -0.5 to -0.72.
Given the structure of this estimation, there is not a direct comparison available
to the results in the two previous sections, since the dependent variable is hours
worked, the frequency is monthly, and the estimate includes both intensive and
extensive labor supply responses. However, this estimate is about twice that
of older working Social Security retirement benefit recipients reported in Fried-
berg (2000) and what was estimated in Table 3.7, although even with this greater
magnitude, it shows that the labor supply of DI beneficiaries with regard to ben-
efit reduction rates is nevertheless inelastic.
Table 3.12 provides similar estimates of the effect of the implicit marginal tax
rate on earnings. Again, these elasticities, estimated at -0.68 and -0.65, are higher
than those estimated in the structural analysis, albeit with substantially overlap-
ping confidence intervals with the reduced form analysis, once again providing
evidence that SSDI beneficiaries already in the work-force are more likely to re-
spond to disability benefit reduction rates than those contemplating joining the
13Anecdotal evidence from the Benefit Offset National Demonstration suggests that some
SSDI beneficiaries considering work anchor these work decisions around the TWP threshold in
order to not jeopardize the long-term stability of their benefits.
135
Table 3.11
Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimates from Monthly Hours Worked Analysis
(1) (2)
SGA TWP
Time Trend -0.97*** -1.41***
(0.20) (0.23)
Age Trend -2.44*** -2.53***
(0.04) (0.04)
White 6.31*** 6.60***
(1.12) (1.22)
Hispanic -20.37*** -22.04***
(1.97) (2.11)
Any Children 8.44*** -3.14
(2.08) (2.07)
Married 3.87** 3.55
(1.91) (2.22)
Male 42.78*** 48.66***
(2.00) (2.19)
Net wage 3.57*** 3.43***
(0.26) (0.28)
Virtual Income -0.007*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
ln(σ) 5.108*** 5.213***
(0.005) (0.006)
Implied wage elasticity [95% Range] -0.628 -0.603
 [-0.535, -0.722]  [-0.504, -0.702]
Region Controls Yes Yes
Log pseudolikelihood -2,386,223 -2,278,266
Clusters 29,469 29,469
Number of Observations 842,666 842,666
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Dependent variable is self-reported monthly 
hours worked. Unit of observation is person-month. 1990-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received SSDI 
benefits at least one year ago, under 62 years of age, and have under $10,000 in self-reported non-housing wealth. 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. "SGA" column places the SSDI cliff at the Substantial Gainful Activity 
level, while "TWP" column places the cliff at the smaller Trial Work Period threshold level. Net wage includes payroll and 
federal income tax, as well as 50% SSI benefit reduction rate when appropriate
work-force. There is evidence that this technique generally produces overes-
timates of labor supply elasticities, since Friedberg (2000)’s analysis found the
most reactivity of any analysis in the earnings test literature. Additionally, the
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Table 3.12
Maximum Likelihood Parameters Estimates from Monthly Earnings Analysis
(1) (2)
SGA TWP
Time Trend -18.1*** -28.0***
(4.1) (5.3)
Age Trend -50.2*** -52.2***
(0.7) (1.2)
White 140.2*** 142.0***
(25.3) (1.22)
Hispanic -420.2*** -443.7***
(35.8) (39.2)
Any Children 172.2* -28.2*
(88.3) (15.2)
Married 163.2*** 233.8***
(35.6) (45.5)
Male 534.4*** 552.2***
(83.3) (90.2)
Implicit Marginal Tax 79.2*** 82.2***
(28.2) (30.3)
Virtual Income -0.23*** -0.27***
(0.08) (0.09)
ln(σ) 6.28*** 6.43***
(0.01) (0.01)
Implied wage elasticity [95% Range] -0.68 -0.65
 [-0.31, -1.02]  [-0.36, -0.92]
Region Controls Yes Yes
Log pseudolikelihood -1,588,923 -1,437,112
Clusters 29,469 29,469
Number of Observations 842,666 842,666
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimation results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Dependent variable is self-reported 
monthly earnings. Unit of observation is person-month. 1990-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received 
SSDI benefits at least one year ago, under 62 years of age, and have under $10,000 in self-reported non-housing 
wealth. Standard errors clustered at the individual level. "SGA" column places the SSDI cliff at the Substantial Gainful 
Activity level, while "TWP" column places the cliff at the smaller Trial Work Period threshold level. Net wage includes 
payroll and federal income tax, as well as 50% SSI benefit reduction rate when appropriate
data itself suggest concerns as to bias and precision: because the analysis must
be monthly, one strong source of variation is lost in that I observe no individ-
ual across any large SGA shift. In as much as an identifying assumption of
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this approach is that exogeneity of the budget constraint due to policy changes
overpowers endogeneity of high wage workers with high amounts of labor sup-
ply, the results from this analysis may be biased upward. Moreover, since the
wages used herein are predicted instead of actual, and the dependent variables
are self-reported instead of administrative, the overall precision of the estimates
is lessened, and any inherent bias in any of these approximations will corre-
spondingly bias the results. Nevertheless, these estimates are inelastic and are
just above the high 95% confidence interval estimates in the preferred analysis.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper used a previously unexploited source of variation as a quasi-
experiment to identify and estimate labor supply elasticities for Social Security
Disability Insurance recipients with regard to changes in disability benefit re-
duction rates. Across specifications and techniques, ranging from reduced form
to structural maximum likelihood estimation, this analysis found that SSDI re-
cipients’ labor supply is relatively inelastic to changes in disability benefit re-
duction rates. I used the variation in benefit reduction rate faced by SSDI recip-
ients who are SSI eligible or near-eligible generated by geographical and tem-
poral differences in parameters in both programs. Since this variation in benefit
reduction rate (zero vs. 50%) is the same as a leading proposal to encourage
work among SSDI recipients, these inelastic estimates of labor supply elastici-
ties suggest that such a proposal will have at most limited success in encourag-
ing labor force participation among this population, albeit slightly more success
at increasing earnings of those already working.
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However, the applicability of these elasiticity estimates for the population
at large is limited in that the variation exploited is largely limited to the poorer
segment of the SSDI population who may also be eligible for SSI. This issue
was addressed by estimating the effect of this variation across the wealth dis-
tribution of SSI eligible and near-eligible individuals. There was no significant
difference in effect across this distribution, nor was there any distinctive pattern
in this effect. Additionally, the estimated elasticities are in line with estimates
in the literature using different sources of variation on different populations,
suggesting that the external validity of these estimates is not limited to only
SSDI-SSI concurrent beneficiaries.
Although the Benefit Offset National Demonstration is currently in the pro-
cess of implementing a randomized control trial to experimentally estimate
similar elasticities, the analysis in this paper is based on variation in an exist-
ing setting and thus avoids any possible Hawthorne or information effects that
could drive reactivity in the BOND study. Also, this analysis specifically ex-
ploits the interactions between SSI and SSDI, allowing for a full understanding
of the marginal incentives facing many SSDI beneficiaries, while previous work
on the topic either ignores or simply controls for SSI receipt, assuming an inde-
pendent effect of this other program on work behavior. As such, this paper is
the first to provide labor supply estimates for US disability insurance beneficia-
ries based on changes in the disability benefit reduction rate, as opposed to rate
changes in other countries or variation in program acceptance or rejection in
the US. The low elasticities estimated suggest that there will not be much labor
supply responsiveness among SSDI beneficiaries to changes in disability benefit
reduction rates.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TABLES
Appendix Table 1.1
Effect of Statement Receipt on Reporting a Health Condition
ADL iADL Mental Back Work-Limiting
Statement Receipt 0.0041 -0.0047 0.0034 0.0009 0.0128
[0.0049] [0.0032] [0.0071] [0.0061] [0.0073]*
5-year Age Group X Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 40308 40308 40308 40308 40308
R-Squared 0.006 0.153 0.069 0.096 0.017
Note: OLS Linear Probability regression results from HRS waves 1-7. All regressions control for education, race, gender, and marital status.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Reporting Any
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Appendix Table 2.1
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Self-Reported Earnings Excluding Top 5% of Earners, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Received Statement 2208 731.3 5552 2238 1017
[987.9]** [1226] [2275]** [1112]** [1129]
Age Category X Statement .
40 to 44 12196
[7566]
45 to 49 7433
[4514]*
50 to 54 -3332
[1817]*
55 to 59 -993.5
[1057]
60 to 62 2700
[1808]
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -1719
[1337]
College X Statement -15516
[4777]***
More than College X Statement -19334
[6296]***
Had a 2nd Job Last Interview -4444
[2742]
2nd Job Last Interview X Statement 206.9
[2416]
Ever Received 2 Statements 2805
[1406]**
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11068 15438 11648 15758 18123 15466
[517.0]*** [774.5]*** [5512]** [786.0]*** [12879] [774.4]***
Observations 10034 10034 9986 10034 10034 10034
R-squared 0.093 0.116 0.112 0.125 0.121 0.116
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported Earnings from All Jobs per Year, 2000 Dollars
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported earnings across all jobs in the reference year, price adjusted to 2000 
dollars with the CPI-U-RS. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage 
by 1992). Additionally, the top 5% of overall earners (sum of real earnings from 1992-2002) are dropped. All regressions control for marital status, 
education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS 
waves 2-6). All specifications are unweighted OLS. 
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Appendix Table 2.2a Mean
Descriptive Statistics, Weighted (SD)
Dependent Variables
Annual Hours Worked 1760.91
(1,179.49)
Self-Employment Annual Hours Worked 419.31
(1,010.79)
Self-Reported Annual Earnings 37,354.99
(69,343.22)
Adminstrative Annual Earnings 28,021.21
(24,754.33)
Decreased Expected PIA 0.28
(0.45)
ln(Self-Reported Earnings) 10.09
(1.22)
ln(Hours Worked) 7.67
(0.48)
Independent Variables
Age 57.24
(2.90)
White 0.908
(0.289)
Married 0.848
(0.359)
High School 0.505
(0.500)
College 0.123
(0.329)
More than College 0.121
(0.326)
Ever Received Statement 0.390
(0.488)
Ever Received 2 Statements 0.135
(0.342)
Had Second Job Before 1st Statement 0.122
(0.328)
All Hours Worked Self-Employed Hours Worked
1 to 9 per Week 12.95% 80.91%
10 to 19 per Week 1.92% 0.96%
20 to 29 per Week 3.95% 1.78%
30 to 39 per Week 7.11% 2.35%
Exactly 40 per Week 27.01% 2.08%
Over 40 per Week 47.07% 11.91%
Hours Worked Category Pre-Statement among those with Positive Hours 
Worked Pre-Statement
Note: Descriptive statistics from 1992-2002 Health and Retirement Study, matched to SSA 
administrative records, from sample restrictions outlined in Table 1, weighted with 1994 HRS 
person-level weights.
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Appendix Table 2.2b Mean
Descriptive Statistics, Weighted, cont'd (SD)
Received a Statement by w-1 0.27
(0.45)
Decreased Hours between w-2 and w-1 0.19
(0.39)
Decreased Hours X Statement by w-1 0.10
(0.31)
Decreased Hours X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 0.06
(0.25)
Decreased Earnings between w-1 and w-2 0..20
(0.40)
Decreased Earnings X Statement by w-1 0.12
(0.32)
Decreased Earnings X 2nd Statement Between w-1 and w 0.08
(0.26)
Decreased Earnings between w-1 and w 0.29
(0.46)
Decreased Earnings X Statement by w 0.16
(0.37)
ln(Expected PIA) 6.72
(0.52)
Note: Descriptive statistics from 1992-2002 Health and Retirement Study, 
matched to SSA administrative records, from sample restrictions outlined in 
Table 1, weighted with 1994 HRS person-level weights.
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Appendix Table 2.3
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Hours Worked, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever Received Statement -32.86 -249.8 - -163.4 -212.3 -291.5 -
[23.08] [57.39]*** - [58.68]*** [57.76]*** [35.68]*** -
Age Category X Statement
50 to 54 -59.11
[80.61]
55 to 59 -207.5
[43.79]***
60 to 61 -419.0
[57.52]***
Less than High School X Statement -
-
High School X Statement -128.0
[58.99]**
College X Statement -66.22
[114.1]
More than College X Statement -104.6
[104.9]
Had a 2nd Job Before Statement Receipt 238.1
[54.78]***
2nd Job X Statement -300.9
[83.75]***
Ever Received 2 Statements -331.0
[108.0]***
Pre-Statement Hours Worked Category X Statement
1 to 9 per Week 662.0
[80.19]***
10 to 19 per Week 48.61
[142.7]
20 to 29 per Week 84.18
[64.40]
30 to 39 per Week -44.29
[108.2]
Exactly 40 per Week -369.1
[53.63]***
Over 40 per Week -620.8
[52.89]***
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4330 2265 1613 2215 2055 2261 1660
[43.01]*** [253.9]*** [366.2]*** [233.0]*** [204.7]*** [253.6]*** [16.72]***
Observations 10145 10145 10144 10145 10145 10145 10145
R-squared 0.073 0.525 0.524 0.525 0.528 0.529 0.562
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported hours worked across all jobs in the reference year. Sample limited to under 
age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for marital status, 
education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 
2-6). All specifications are OLS weighted with the 1994 HRS person-level weights.
Self-Reported Hours Worked per Year
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Appendix Table 2.4
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Self-Employment Hours Worked, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever Received Statement 60.31 -11.68 36.41 0.752 -15.65
[23.71]** [15.83] [25.18] [13.90] [15.47]
Age Category X Statement
50 to 54 -18.95
[18.12]
55 to 59 9.754
[11.30]
60 to 61 -43.21
[16.85]**
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -70.88
[41.70]*
College X Statement -53.24
[34.42]
More than College X Statement -44.09
[31.97]
Had a 2nd Job Before Statement Receipt 86.16
[18.56]***
2nd Job X Statement -104.4
[58.69]*
Ever Received 2 Statements -31.52
[34.22]
Pre-Statement Hours Worked Category X Statement
1 to 9 per Week 138.7
[21.09]***
10 to 19 per Week -164.0
[222.5]
20 to 29 per Week 59.81
[144.3]
30 to 39 per Week -14.08
[98.73]
Exactly 40 per Week -642.6
[187.1]***
Over 40 per Week -960.1
[122.3]***
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -105.5 8.513 7.163 -18.41 -74.65 8.247 3.15e-10
[21.11]** [19.51] [19.31] [15.61] [22.08]*** [19.33] [0.000639]
Observations 10145 10145 10144 10145 10145 10145 10145
R-squared 0.010 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.758 0.757 0.787
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported, Self-Employment Hours Worked per Year
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported hours worked across all self-employment jobs in the reference year. Sample 
limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for 
marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 
(i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are OLS weighted with the 1994 HRS person-level weights.
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Appendix Table 2.5
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Self-Reported Earnings, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Received Statement 891.3 -1363 2685 -3279 -2188
[1153] [1173] [940.3]*** [1280]** [1764]
Age Category X Statement
50 to 54 3583
[1791]**
55 to 59 -3774
[1048]***
60 to 62 -6200
[4311]
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -4011
[1408]***
College X Statement -10730
[8146]
More than College X Statement -5124
[5548]
Had a 2nd Job Last Interview -8249
[4620]*
2nd Job Last Interview X Statement 15483
[4640]***
Ever Received 2 Statements -6812
[2896]**
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No No Yes No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 110469 69508 69782 66300 68863 69291
[1519]*** [3059]*** [7622]*** [2772]*** [3104]*** [3016]***
Observations 9684 9684 9683 9684 9684 9684
R-squared 0.058 0.099 0.095 0.101 0.099 0.099
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Self-Reported Earnings from All Jobs per Year, 2000 Dollars
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is self-reported earnings across all jobs in the reference year, price adjusted to 
2000 dollars with the CPI-U-RS. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at least 40 
Quarters of Coverage by 1992). All regressions control for marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in 
brackets are two-way clustered at year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are OLS weighted with the 
1994 HRS person-level weights.
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Appendix Table 2.6
Effect of Statement Receipt on Annual Administrative Earnings, Linear Regression Results, 1992-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ever Received Statement 323.9 1433 -730.5 505.2
[720.7] [874.8] [1062] [787.0]
Age Category X Statement
50 to 54 4254
[1509]***
55 to 59 -2125
[1126]*
60 to 62 -1523
[1503]
Less than High School X Statement
High School X Statement -1822
[646.2]***
College X Statement 331.8
[588.8]
More than College X Statement -2205
[1661]
Had a 2nd Job Last Interview -1094
[1866]
2nd Job Last Interview X Statement 1194
[1378]
Ever Received 2 Statements 956.9
[1267]
Age Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Category Control No Yes No No No
Pre-Statement Hour Category Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only OAI Qualified Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 15438 11648 15758 15758 15466
[774.5]*** [5512]** [786.0]*** [12879] [774.4]***
Observations 12693 12693 12693 12693 12693
R-squared 0.116 0.112 0.125 0.121 0.116
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Administrative SSA Earnings, 2000 Dollars
Notes: Unit of observation is person-wave. Dependent variable is SSA administrative Summary File earnings in the reference year, price 
adjusted to 2000 dollars with the CPI-U-RS. Sample limited to under age 62 men fully insured for Old Age Insurance in 1991 (those with at 
least 40 Quarters of Coverage by 1992). Additionally, the top 5% of overall earners (sum of real earnings from 1992-2002) are dropped. All 
regressions control for marital status, education, race, and age and year fixed effects; standard errors in brackets are two-way clustered at 
year and birth-year levels, 1992-2002 (i.e. HRS waves 2-6). All specifications are OLS weighted with the 1994 HRS person-level weights, 
reweighted with the inverse predicted probability of rematching SSA records in 2004 from a logit model. 
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Appendix Table 3.1
Effect of Facing 50% Benefit Reduction Rate on Labor Force Participation above SGA Level, OLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected in 50 -0.267*** -0.243*** -0.298*** -0.121***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Likelihood in 50 -0.435***
(0.031)
Implied Elasticity [95% Range] -0.59 -0.54 -0.66 -0.27 -0.44
[-0.61, -0.57] [-0.57, -0.51] [-0.70, -0.62] [-0.33, -0.21] [-0.45, -0.34]
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, State, and Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Spousal Income No No No Yes Yes
All Income When Not Working No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.052 0.054 0.080 0.018 0.043
Observations 17719 17719 17719 17719 17719
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ever SSI
Notes: OLS regression results from SIPP-SSA matched files. Participation above SGA defined as SSA earnings above 12 times the 
monthly SGA in a year. Unit of observation is person-year. 1988-2002 sample window. Limited to those who received SSDI benefits at 
least one year ago. Demographics include education, occupation, industry, gender, and marital status. "Expected in 50" is a binary 
variable equalling 1 if facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate at the average earnings level for a work-limited individual of the same 
characteristics in the March CPS. "Likelihood in 50" is the probability of facing a 50% SSI benefit reduction rate given the distribution of 
earnings for a work-limited individual of the same characteristics in the March CPS. "Ever SSI" is whether the individual ever received 
SSI benefits. Standard errors two-way clustered at person and year levels.
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Prevent identity theft—protect your Social Security number
Your Social Security Statement
Prepared especially for Wanda Worker
WANDA WORKER
456 ANYWHERE AVENUE
MAINTOWN, USA 11111-1111
www.socialsecurity.gov
May 1, 2012
See inside for your personal information
What’s inside…
Your Estimated Benefits ................................................................2
Your Earnings Record ...................................................................3
Some Facts About Social Security ................................................4
If You Need More Information .....................................................4
What Social Security Means To You
This Social Security Statement can help you plan 
for your financial future. It provides estimates of 
your Social Security benefits under current law and 
updates your latest reported earnings.
Please read this Statement carefully. If you see 
a mistake, please let us know. That’s important 
because your benefits will be based on our record of 
your lifetime earnings. We recommend you keep a 
copy of your Statement with your financial records.
Social Security is for people of all ages…
We’re more than a retirement program. Social 
Security also can provide benefits if you become 
disabled and help support your family after you die.
Work to build a secure future…
Social Security is the largest source of income for 
most elderly Americans today, but Social Security 
was never intended to be your only source of 
income when you retire. You also will need other 
savings, investments, pensions or retirement 
accounts to make sure you have enough money to 
live comfortably when you retire.
Saving and investing wisely are important not 
only for you and your family, but for the entire 
country. If you want to learn more about how and 
why to save, you should visit www.mymoney.gov, 
a federal government website dedicated to teaching 
all Americans the basics of financial management.
About Social Security’s future…
Social Security is a compact between generations. 
Since 1935, America has kept the promise of
security for its workers and their families. Now, 
however, the Social Security system is facing 
serious financial problems, and action is needed 
soon to make sure the system will be sound when 
today’s younger workers are ready for retirement.
Without changes, in 2033 the Social Security 
Trust Fund will be able to pay only about 75 cents 
for each dollar of scheduled benefits.* We need 
to resolve these issues soon to make sure Social 
Security continues to provide a foundation of 
protection for future generations.
Social Security on the Net…
Visit www.socialsecurity.gov on the Internet to 
learn more about Social Security. You can read 
publications, including When To Start Receiving 
Retirement Benefits; use our Retirement Estimator 
to obtain immediate and personalized estimates of 
future benefits; and when you’re ready to apply for 
benefits, use our improved online application— 
It’s so easy!
Michael J. Astrue 
Commissioner
* These estimates are based on the intermediate 
assumptions from the Social Security Trustees’ 
Annual Report to the Congress.
2 [C]
Your Estimated Benefits
*Retirement You have earned enough credits to qualify for benefits. At your current earnings rate, if you  
continue working until…
 your full retirement age (67 years), your payment would be about ........................................................$ 1,590 a month
 age 70, your payment would be about ....................................................................................................$ 1,983 a month
 age 62, your payment would be about ....................................................................................................$ 1,096 a month
*Disability You have earned enough credits to qualify for benefits. If you became disabled right now,
 your payment would be about .................................................................................................................$ 1,450 a month
*Family If you get retirement or disability benefits, your spouse and children also may qualify for benefits.
*Survivors You have earned enough credits for your family to receive survivors benefits. If you die this 
year, certain members of your family may qualify for the following benefits:
 Your child ................................................................................................................................................$ 1,133 a month
 Your spouse who is caring for your child ...............................................................................................$ 1,511 a month
 Your spouse, if benefits start at full retirement age................................................................................$ 1,477 a month
 Total family benefits cannot be more than .............................................................................................$ 2,782 a month
 Your spouse or minor child may be eligible for a special one-time death benefit of $255.
Medicare You have enough credits to qualify for Medicare at age 65. Even if you do not retire at age 65, be 
sure to contact Social Security three months before your 65th birthday to enroll in Medicare. 
* Your estimated benefits are based on current law. Congress has made changes to the law in the 
past and can do so at any time. The law governing benefit amounts may change because, by 2033, 
the payroll taxes collected will be enough to pay only about 75 percent of scheduled benefits.
We based your benefit estimates on these facts:
 Your date of birth (please verify your name on page 1 and this date of birth) ...................................... May 5, 1971
 Your estimated taxable earnings per year after 2011 ............................................................................. $43,467
 Your Social Security number (only the last four digits are shown to help prevent identity theft) ......... XXX-XX-1234
How Your Benefits Are Estimated
To qualify for benefits, you earn “credits” through your 
work — up to four each year. This year, for example, you 
earn one credit for each $1,130 of wages or self-employment 
income. When you’ve earned $4,520, you’ve earned your four 
credits for the year. Most people need 40 credits, earned over 
their working lifetime, to receive retirement benefits. For 
disability and survivors benefits, young people need fewer 
credits to be eligible.
We checked your records to see whether you have earned 
enough credits to qualify for benefits. If you haven’t earned 
enough yet to qualify for any type of benefit, we can’t give 
you a benefit estimate now. If you continue to work, we’ll 
give you an estimate when you do qualify.
What we assumed — If you have enough work credits, 
we estimated your benefit amounts using your average 
earnings over your working lifetime. For 2012 and later 
(up to retirement age), we assumed you’ll continue to work 
and make about the same as you did in 2010 or 2011. We 
also included credits we assumed you earned last year 
and this year.
Generally, the older you are and the closer you are to 
retirement, the more accurate the retirement estimates will be 
because they are based on a longer work history with fewer 
uncertainties such as earnings fluctuations and future law 
changes. We encourage you to use our online Retirement 
Estimator at www.socialsecurity.gov/estimator to obtain 
immediate and personalized benefit estimates.
We can’t provide your actual benefit amount until you 
apply for benefits. And that amount may differ from the 
estimates stated above because:
(1) Your earnings may increase or decrease in the future.
(2) After you start receiving benefits, they will be adjusted 
for cost-of-living increases.
(3) Your estimated benefits are based on current law. The 
law governing benefit amounts may change.
(4) Your benefit amount may be affected by military 
service, railroad employment or pensions earned 
through work on which you did not pay Social 
Security tax. Visit www.socialsecurity.gov to learn more. 
Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) — In the future, 
if you receive a pension from employment in which you do 
not pay Social Security taxes, such as some federal, state 
or local government work, some nonprofit organizations 
or foreign employment, and you also qualify for your own 
Social Security retirement or disability benefit, your Social 
Security benefit may be reduced, but not eliminated, by 
WEP. The amount of the reduction, if any, depends on 
your earnings and number of years in jobs in which you 
paid Social Security taxes, and the year you are age 62 or 
become disabled. For more information, please see Windfall 
Elimination Provision (Publication No. 05-10045) at 
www.socialsecurity.gov/WEP.
Government Pension Offset (GPO) — If you receive a 
pension based on federal, state or local government work 
in which you did not pay Social Security taxes and you 
qualify, now or in the future, for Social Security benefits as a 
current or former spouse, widow or widower, you are likely 
to be affected by GPO. If GPO applies, your Social Security 
benefit will be reduced by an amount equal to two-thirds 
of your government pension, and could be reduced to zero. 
Even if your benefit is reduced to zero, you will be eligible 
for Medicare at age 65 on your spouse’s record. To learn 
more, please see Government Pension Offset (Publication 
No. 05-10007) at www.socialsecurity.gov/GPO.
3Your Earnings Record
Years You
Worked
Your Taxed
Social Security
Earnings
Your Taxed
Medicare
Earnings
1987 594 594
1988 1,454 1,454
1989 2,591 2,591
1990 4,366 4,366
1991 5,961 5,961
1992 7,500 7,500
1993 9,055 9,055
1994 11,509 11,509
1995 14,064 14,064
1996 16,545 16,545
1997 19,147 19,147
1998 21,699 21,699
1999 24,363 24,363
2000 27,015 27,015
2001 28,798 28,798
2002 30,079 30,079
2003 31,668 31,668
2004 33,906 33,906
2005 35,897 35,897
2006 38,192 38,192
2007 40,552 40,552
2008 42,127 42,127
2009 41,977 41,977
2010 43,467 43,467
2011 Not yet recorded
You and your family may be eligible for valuable benefits:
When you die, your family may be eligible to receive 
survivors benefits.
Social Security may help you if you become disabled—
even at a young age.
A young person who has worked and paid 
Social Security taxes in as few as two years can 
be eligible for disability benefits.
Social Security credits you earn move with you from 
job to job throughout your career.
Total Social Security and Medicare taxes paid over your working career through the last year reported on the chart above:
Estimated taxes paid for Social Security:
You paid: $33,009
Your employers paid: $33,009
Estimated taxes paid for Medicare:
You paid: $7,724
Your employers paid: $7,724
Note: In 2011, you paid 4.2 percent of your salary, up to $106,800, in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes 
on your entire salary. Your employer paid 6.2 percent in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes for you. If 
you were self-employed, you paid the combined employee and employer amount of 10.4 percent in Social Security taxes and 
2.9 percent in Medicare taxes on your net earnings.
Help Us Keep Your Earnings Record Accurate
You, your employer and Social Security share responsibility 
for the accuracy of your earnings record. Since you began 
working, we recorded your reported earnings under your 
name and Social Security number. We have updated your 
record each time your employer (or you, if you’re self-
employed) reported your earnings.
Remember, it’s your earnings, not the amount of taxes you 
paid or the number of credits you’ve earned, that determine 
your benefit amount. When we figure that amount, we base 
it on your average earnings over your lifetime. If our records 
are wrong, you may not receive all the benefits to which 
you’re entitled.
Review this chart carefully using your own records to make 
sure our information is correct and that we’ve recorded each 
year you worked. You’re the only person who can look at the 
earnings chart and know whether it is complete and correct.
Some or all of your earnings from last year may not be 
shown on your Statement. It could be that we still were 
processing last year’s earnings reports when your Statement 
was prepared. Your complete earnings for last year will be 
shown on next year’s Statement. Note: If you worked for 
more than one employer during any year, or if you had both 
earnings and self-employment income, we combined your 
earnings for the year.
There’s a limit on the amount of earnings on which you 
pay Social Security taxes each year. The limit increases 
yearly. Earnings above the limit will not appear on your 
earnings chart as Social Security earnings. (For Medicare 
taxes, the maximum earnings amount began rising in 1991. 
Since 1994, all of your earnings are taxed for Medicare.)
Call us right away at 1-800-772-1213 (7 a.m.–7 p.m. your 
local time) if any earnings for years before last year are 
shown incorrectly. Please have your W-2 or tax return for 
those years available. (If you live outside the U.S., follow the 
directions at the bottom of page 4.)
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Some Facts About Social Security
About Social Security and Medicare…
Social Security pays retirement, disability, family and 
survivors benefits. Medicare, a separate program run by the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, helps pay for 
inpatient hospital care, nursing care, doctors’ fees, drugs, 
and other medical services and supplies to people age 65 
and older, as well as to people who have been receiving 
Social Security disability benefits for two years or more. 
Medicare does not pay for long-term care, so you may want to 
consider options for private insurance. Your Social Security 
covered earnings qualify you for both programs. For more 
information about Medicare, visit www.medicare.gov or call 
1-800-633-4227 (TTY 1-877-486-2048 if you are deaf or 
hard of hearing).
Retirement — If you were born before 1938, your full 
retirement age is 65. Because of a 1983 change in the law, the 
full retirement age will increase gradually to 67 for people 
born in 1960 and later.
Some people retire before their full retirement age. You can 
retire as early as 62 and take benefits at a reduced rate. If you 
work after your full retirement age, you can receive higher 
benefits because of additional earnings and credits for delayed 
retirement.
Disability — If you become disabled before full retirement 
age, you can receive disability benefits after six months if 
you have:
 — enough credits from earnings (depending on your age, you 
must have earned six to 20 of your credits in the three to 
10 years before you became disabled); and
 — a physical or mental impairment that’s expected to prevent 
you from doing “substantial” work for a year or more or 
result in death.
If you are filing for disability benefits, please let us know if 
you are on active military duty or are a recently discharged 
veteran, so that we can handle your claim more quickly.
Family — If you’re eligible for disability or retirement 
benefits, your current or divorced spouse, minor children 
or adult children disabled before age 22 also may receive 
benefits. Each may qualify for up to about 50 percent of your 
benefit amount.
Survivors — When you die, certain members of your 
family may be eligible for benefits:
 — your spouse age 60 or older (50 or older if disabled, or any 
age if caring for your children younger than age 16); and
 — your children if unmarried and younger than age 18, still 
in school and younger than 19 years old, or adult children 
disabled before age 22.
If you are divorced, your ex-spouse could be eligible for a 
widow’s or widower’s benefit on your record when you die.
Extra Help with Medicare — If you know someone who 
is on Medicare and has limited income and resources, extra 
help is available for prescription drug costs. The extra help 
can help pay the monthly premiums, annual deductibles 
and prescription co-payments. To learn more or to apply, 
visit www.socialsecurity.gov or call 1-800-772-1213 (TTY 
1-800-325-0778).
Receive benefits and still work...
You can work and still get retirement or survivors benefits. 
If you’re younger than your full retirement age, there are 
limits on how much you can earn without affecting your 
benefit amount. When you apply for benefits, we’ll tell you 
what the limits are and whether work would affect your 
monthly benefits. When you reach full retirement age, the 
earnings limits no longer apply.
Before you decide to retire...
Carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of early 
retirement. If you choose to receive benefits before you reach 
full retirement age, your monthly benefits will be reduced. 
To help you decide the best time to retire, we offer a 
free publication, When To Start Receiving Retirement 
Benefits (Publication No. 05-10147), that identifies the 
many factors you should consider before applying. Most 
people can receive an estimate of their benefit based on 
their actual Social Security earnings record by going to 
www.socialsecurity.gov/estimator. You also can calculate 
future retirement benefits by using the Social Security 
Benefit Calculators at www.socialsecurity.gov.
Other helpful free publications include:
 — Retirement Benefits (No. 05-10035) 
 — Understanding The Benefits (No. 05-10024)
 — Your Retirement Benefit: How It Is Figured 
(No. 05-10070)
 — Windfall Elimination Provision (No. 05-10045)
 — Government Pension Offset (No. 05-10007)
 — Identity Theft And Your Social Security Number 
(No. 05-10064)
We also have other leaflets and fact sheets with 
information about specific topics such as military 
service, self-employment or foreign employment. You 
can request Social Security publications at our website, 
www.socialsecurity.gov, or by calling us at 1-800-772-1213. 
Our website has a list of frequently asked questions that 
may answer questions you have. We have easy-to-use 
online applications for benefits that can save you a 
telephone call or a trip to a field office.
You may also qualify for government benefits outside 
of Social Security. For more information on these benefits, 
visit www.govbenefits.gov.
If you need more information—Contact any Social Security office, or call us toll-free at 1-800-772-1213. (If you are 
deaf or hard of hearing, you may call our TTY number, 1-800-325-0778.) If you have questions about your personal 
information, you must provide your complete Social Security number. If you are in the United States, you also may write 
to the Social Security Administration, Office of Earnings Operations, P.O. Box 33026, Baltimore, MD 21290-3026. If 
you are outside the United States, please write to the Office of International Operations, P.O. Box 17769, Baltimore, MD 
21235-7769, USA. You can request a Statement at any time.
